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Two days before the 51st anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan Uprising in Lhasa, Nepali police were ordered to arrest Thinley Gyatso, the representative of the Dalai Lama in Nepal. This is a preemptive strike against the anti-China demonstrations expected to take place on Wednesday March 10.
On March 1959, Tibetans rose up in arms against the Chinese annexation of their kingdom, but the resistance ended in a bloodbath by the People’s Liberation Army. The suppression of the uprising led to the Dalai Lama’s flight to India and a prolonged resistance against the Chinese communists, conducted by Tibetan freedom fighters, who received arms and training from the CIA. The freedom fighters operated from Mustang, one of Nepal’s northernmost districts that jut out into the Tibetan Plain. The resistance ended in 1974.
Since then, under Chinese pressure, a succession of Nepal governments – from the monarchy, to the Maoists, to the current government – have clamped down on the Tibetan Diaspora in Nepal, particularly after the headline-making protests that led up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
In recent weeks there have been numerous signs that China’s nervousness over the March 10 anniversary has only increased – particularly since President Obama’s recent meeting with the Dalai Lama in Washington. China has retaliated in Nepal by pressuring the Nepal President, Foreign Minister and other ministers into staying away from the March 10 celebrations at a Kathmandu monastery.
More important, since February, Nepal police have arrested nearly three-dozen Tibetan refugees trying to escape to India through Dolakha, a Nepali district bordering the Tibetan border. This was followed by an unprecedented move. The military attaché at China’s embassy in Kathmandu, General Chen Chong, personally flew to Dolakha on February 28 to meet with the chief district police officer and other Nepali border officials. It has been reported that he lectured the officials, saying, “Tibetans who flee to India via Nepal are trained to carry out terrorist activities by their religious leader Dalai Lama.”
So much for China’s claim that they do not intrude into Nepal’s internal affairs.
It is expected that a rounding up of more leaders of the Tibetan refugee
community in Nepal will follow.
Note: Sources for this posting are Nepalnews.com, the
Hindustan Times and Times of India.
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The deadline for completing Nepal’s new constitution is less
than 100 days away from now. The prognosis is not good.
The coalition parties believe that federal states should be formed on a geographic basis and the opposition Maoists demand that the states be created on ethnic criteria. Although the Constituent Assembly has had nearly two years to draft the document, it looks increasingly unlikely that it will meet the crucial May 28 deadline – crucial because the very legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly will come into question.
Bipin Adhikari, a constitutional expert based in Kathmandu,
has just written an excellent recap of what has transpired inside and outside
the halls of Parliament in the last two years, how it has brought the nation to
this political precipice, and what the odds are of a “miracle” taking place in
the next 100 days.
His article “Writer’s Block”, was just published in the March 2010 issue of Himal Southasian magazine.
The hundred-day deadline has just passed for the promulgation of Nepal’s long-awaited new constitution. But there is little optimism that this date will be met.
Shortly after Madhav Kumar Nepal was elected chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the Constituent Assembly, in January 2009, he brought together some 25 Nepali lawyers for a meeting. As a consensus candidate agreed by the major political parties, he had been brought into the House as a nominated member to lead this committee, even though he had lost the election of April 2008 – and, therefore, access to the Assembly. After accepting the responsibility of leading the principal drafting body at the Constituent Assembly, the senior Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) leader – and current prime minister – wanted to meet with the constitutional lawyers to discuss how to move ahead with the technical aspects of the constitution-drafting work, the primary purpose of the Constituent Assembly.
During the course of the meeting, he took the opportunity to discuss the process that had been followed thus far by the Constituent Assembly since it came into existence on 28 May 2008, as well as the process of drafting the statute and easing ongoing irritations. Some of the lawyers assembled were quick to explain how, in the history of constitution-making, some able individuals (such as James Madison or Alexander Hamilton in the US, or B N Rau or Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar in India) had been crucial to drafting the document, while involving others in the process. The immediate question from Chairperson Nepal, who is known for his simplicity, was “Tell me, jurists, from among all of you, or those in the Constituent Assembly, who could qualify to be James Madison or B N Rau for us?” Everybody smiled and looked at each other, but there was no answer.
Four months later, Madhav Nepal went on to become prime minister, and a jurist from the House, Nilambar Acharya, took over his position as chairperson. But the question remains unanswered. Indeed, the problem with Nepal’s Constituent Assembly is not just that it has neither a technical team of experts nor elected legal or constitutional talents working with the drafting body inside the House; rather, the issue goes far deeper.
At the outset, it must be stated that the Constituent Assembly, tasked with writing a new constitution and fundamentally reshaping the government as part of the peace process, has already completed 21 out of the 24 months mandated for it to do its job. A body of 601 members – of which 240 were elected in a direct vote, another 335 came to join on the basis of proportional representation, and the remaining 26 were nominated by the government leading the transition – is no doubt a particularly inclusive, heterogeneous group, and one that is, the most representative assembly that Nepal has ever seen. It represents most of the country’s political forces, from the revolutionary Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) to the regionalist Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, as well as a variety of fringe parties. As the first inclusive body to represent Nepal’s multi-religious, -lingual and -ethnic communities, it is a mosaic of Nepali diversity and pluralism. “It is the House of peasants, the House of industrialists and the House of the marginalised people,” The chairman of the Constituent Assembly, Subhas Nemwang, said to an international audience on 15 January. “It is set to work on the new constitution for Nepal as part of the comprehensive peace process that the country is passing through.”
This House is to restructure the state, establish the identity of indigenous communities and minority groups; end all discrimination based on ethnicity, language, culture and religion, and regional diversity; end all forms of feudalism; and establish a new Nepal. As a prelude, the 1990 Constitution was withdrawn, an interim constitution was enacted declaring Nepal to be secular. (This had little check and balance as when compared with the constitution that it replaced), citizenship certificates were issued to millions, the electoral system was modified, and a proportional system of representation was introduced, all before holding the elections to the Constituent Assembly on 10 April 2008. The Fourth Amendment to the Interim Constitution even declared the country to be a federal set-up, before any discussion on the issue took place in the House. No sooner had the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly taken place than it abolished the monarchy, and gave 15 days to the king and his family to leave the Narayanhiti Palace. Things were getting done, it appeared, at breakneck speed.
Vague committees
The Assembly has 11 thematic committees, tasked with producing a concept paper and preliminary draft in the constitutional area that each had been allocated. All committees are of equal strength and capacity, and are empowered to make proposals to the full House. By now, all of these committees have done their work. But as expected, their reports are not unanimous – sometimes mere majority formulations, or not even that, and most include dissenting opinions. After arguing for the past year, for example, the Committee on the Determination of the Form of Government submitted its report to the full House with almost four options as to what form of government Nepal should adopt in the changed context. Their task, of course, had been to decide on one. In the absence of clear direction as to the form of government (parliamentary, presidential, or mixed?), the rest of the work that the Constituent Assembly has so far accomplished looks something like a Statue of Liberty without a head.
It is the Constitutional Committee that has the responsibility for formulating the final draft, for which it is to build on both the thematic reports and the recommendations and directions of the full House, following debate on each committee report. From the beginning the idea has been to draft the constitution according to a bottom-up approach – even the committees did not rely on any draft prepared by experts in finalising the preliminary draft proposals, instead starting from scratch. By 5 March, the Constitutional Committee is expected to bring out the first draft of the constitution, in accordance with a schedule that has now been revised seven times. Yet the job seems ominously difficult, given that the committees have resolved little on matters where there are major differences, particularly between the Maoists and the rest. Indeed, only one report seems to be relatively finalised, that of the Committee on the Allocation of Natural Resources, Financial Powers and Revenues. Instead, the committees have helped to further polarise the political parties.
According to the Interim Constitution, the final draft of the constitution, following public consultation and debate, must be taken to the plenary meeting of the Constituent Assembly, which is then to undertake a clause-wise discussion and vote. Once there is agreement on each provision, the entire draft is to be taken for adoption by the House before its promulgation. According to the present interim arrangement, the new constitution must be adopted and promulgated by the end of two years – ie, by 28 May 2010. But very few are optimistic that the Assembly would be able to do following this schedule.
Dealing with undoubtedly one of the most controversial issues, the Committee on State Restructuring and Allocation of State Powers only recently published its report, reaffirming its contentious commitment to re-design Nepal on the basis of federalisation along ethnic lines. Many have long warned that a 14-province Nepal, out of which seven have been given ethnicity-based names (such as Newa, Tamuwan and Limbuwan) would come with in-built discriminatory arrangements – in a country that is said to have 103 ethnic categories, this proposal is sure to arouse ethnic sensitivities of the neglected lot more than ever. Further, there are very few who believe that such a set-up would be economically workable; the federal arrangement is not asymmetrical, all provincial units are treated by the same standards as far as centre-state relations are concerned, and little attention has been given to reasonable farmland claims, capacity and potentials of each province. Provinces such as Jadan and Sherpa will not be able to feed their people for even a month with their existing farmland capacity. There is cynicism regarding the demarcation of the provinces, and also the basis on which their size is determined, while the report contains nothing about how an ethnic division is going to secure a competitive advantage for the inhabitants in each province or for the country as a whole. Critics suggest that these provinces will barely be able to survive for a half-year.
There are also problems with the exhaustive list of fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy released by the Committee on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. While it is very liberal, as much as it identifies the basic rights of the Nepali people, the list is without judicial sanction in most of the cases involving the economic, social and cultural rights. The responsibility is placed in the government to pass the necessary laws and implement them within two years. Yet one can easily see that such a demand placed on the shoulders of the state is too heavy, particularly without considering how a non-performing economy can help the state to fulfil such requirements. The report of the Committee on the Rights of Minority and Marginalised Communities has also created controversies by putting forth ambiguous provisions as to the compensation to be paid by the state to certain communities for past abuses against them. In the same vein, the Committee on Determination of Structure of Constitutional Bodies has proposed 11 independent commissions to deal with issues specific to Madhesis, Dalits, indigenous peoples and others, substantially limiting the role of the elected government in the affairs of the state.
The report of the Committee on Judicial System recommends many questionable provisions in the new constitution, which belittle the parameters of the Supreme Court as the guardian of the constitution. It robs the power of judicial review from the Supreme Court, which can neither interpret the constitution in any significant sense, nor can it judge upon the constitutionality of any law where it matters most. The report also makes sure that the Supreme Court and its judges are under parliamentary control in all matters relating to their appointment, dismissal and the job of judicial decision-making. A Special Judicial Committee is provided for in both the central and provincial legislature to take care of these issues. Yet a federal system cannot work in a society where the federal Supreme Court does not have the power to interpret what the constitution says, and decide on the controversies regarding the division of powers between the federal and constituent units. Without the power of judicial review, and the ability to strike down a legislation that contradicts the constitution, a Supreme Court cannot maintain the supremacy of the constitution.
Similarly, the report of the Committee on Determination of the Form of Legislative Organ is insufficiently conceived. It is not clear whether the legislature is supposed to be a presidential set-up, or parliamentary or ‘mixed’. Further, the report of the Committee on the Preservation of National Interest has not been able to provide for a credible arrangement for the country’s defence forces. Admittedly, the issue must be kept outside day-to-day politics, and attempts to bring abrupt change in the institution must be resisted. However, the committee’s suggestion to establish a national defence council, where there is no representation of the chief of army staff, cannot be considered anything but a wild arrangement, serving neither democracy nor any national interest. The provision of compulsory military training to youths without the leadership and support of a disciplined army is also not a viable concept. While many successful small states do practice this to some extent, the provision serves only when there is explicit determination to keep the army out of any military alliance, soft or hard, and its politicisation can be thoroughly prevented.
Finally, the work so far done includes no economic vision for the state. For instance, the current recommendations do not even consider, much less take a position on, how to preserve access to a secure and reasonably priced supply of oil in place of the current India guarded supply system. There is also no direction about the national food-security strategy, a constant and crucial issue. Further, it is questionable how a country can preserve its national interest without a clear concept on how to deal with internal security challenges such as climate change, floods and natural disasters affecting a large segment of the people.
Miracles?
As referred to by Madhav Kumar Nepal’s question at the beginning of this article, all these drafts have suffered in the absence of outside technical support. Most of the important modern examples of success in getting a new democratic constitution through an elected constituent assembly have something in common: the presence of a charismatic leader who commands the confidence of the House and the people at large, and is able to give necessary patronage to the process. There are a few other factors in common, too: for instance, the presence of a party in the assembly that not only speaks to the conscience of the people, but also keeps necessary political clout to push the document through. Also important is negating ideological gaps between the dominant party and the others, in terms of commitment to liberal democracy, the basic values of limited government and the rule of law. Also, that all involved look forward to building a nation with positive energy and forward-looking strategies, rather than looking back and scolding the past in order to build the future.
For example, the Indian Constituent Assembly certainly satisfied these requirements. Few can miss, for instance, the critical patronage of Mohandas K Gandhi, and the overriding presence and clout of the Indian National Congress. Also, very few points of divergence emerged between the Congress and other smaller groups, while general commitment on the part of the political actors to build the nation on the strength of liberal values was extremely helpful. Indians were determined to throw off the yoke of Great Britain, but were not ready to dispense with the virtues of Westminster-inspired institutions, which they believed provided a model for Indian democracy. This is true of South Africa as well.
Worryingly, these common attributes are hardly to be seen in the Constituent Assembly of Nepal. While this body is very promising in terms of its composition, for better or worse the Constituent Assembly is today a divided House – politically, as well as in its long-term determination. There is no choice but to move on, but to enact a new constitution within the next three months is very difficult. Importantly, the Interim Constitution, which defines the role of the Assembly, does include a chapter on constitutional amendment, but it does not suggest anywhere that this chapter could be used to prolong the constitution drafting time frame. It is also true that there are no express limitations on the power of the Parliament to amend the constitution. But exercising the power of the Parliament to prolong the tenure of the House could be counterproductive, as by now the people of Nepal know that things are not merely black and white. At the moment, the only sustainable way forward seems be to go for a framework constitution that represents the existing consensus in Nepal’s political society, leaving the rest of the issues for the future. The parties could thus go ahead with the existing institutions where there is no consensus.
Many Nepalis believe in last-minute ‘miracles’. In this context, such a miracle would include a framework constitution (as this writer and other lawyers have suggested), or by extending the tenure of the House for another six months, as many of the Assembly members are urging. More broadly, however, the problem of Nepal’s constitutional development lies not merely with the House. Even if the new constitution is finalised and promulgated, after all, it might still collapse the way the last five constitutions collapsed – without even knowing the factors that caused their demise. No matter how good the constitution or how democratic the people, Nepal’s geophysical situation makes peace and stability difficult – though both can be helped by the stable underpinnings of a solid constitution.
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Last week, The Economic Times published an excellent analysis on a Chinese foreign policy shift in regards to Nepal:
China intensifies tug of war with India over Nepal
For years, Nepal never bothered too much with policing its
northern border with China. The Himalayas seemed a formidable-enough barrier, and Nepal’s political and economic attention was
oriented south toward India. If Nepal was a mouse trapped between elephants, as
the local saying went, the elephant that mattered most was India.
But last week a Nepalese government delegation visited Beijing on a trip that underscored, once again, how China’s newfound weight in the world is altering old geopolitical equations.
As Nepal’s home minister, Bhim Rawal, met with China’s top
security officials, Chinese state media reported that the two countries had
agreed to cooperate on border security, while Nepal restated its commitment to
preventing any “anti-China” events on its side of the border.
Details of the meetings were not yet known, but the two countries were expected to finalize a program under which China would provide money, training and logistical support to help Nepal expand police checkpoints in isolated regions of its northern border.
The reason for the deal is simple: Tibet.
At a time when President Barack Obama’s decision to meet with the Dalai Lama has infuriated China, Rawal’s meetings in Beijing could have greater practical effect on the lives of Tibetans. Prodded by China, Nepal is now moving to close the Himalayan passages through which Tibetans have long made secret trips in and out of China, often on pilgrimages to visit the Dalai Lama in his exile in India.
If it once regarded Nepal with intermittent interest, China is now exerting itself more broadly toward its small Himalayan neighbor, analysts say – partly because of its concern that Nepal could become a locus of Tibetan agitation, partly as another South Asian stage in its growing soft-power fencing match in the region with India.
“Nepal has become a very interesting space where the big
players are playing at two levels,” said Ashok Gurung, director of the India
China Institute at The New School. “One is their relationship with Nepal. And
the second is the relationship between India and China.”
In the broadest sense, India and China share similar goals in Nepal. Each wants Nepal’s political situation to stabilize and is watching closely as the country’s Maoists negotiate with other political parties over a new constitution that would fundamentally reshape the government. Each is also worried about security, as India is concerned about political agitation on the Nepalese side of their shared border, as well as the possibility that terrorists trained in Pakistan could transit through Nepal.
But India is also paying close attention to what many India experts consider newfound Chinese activism in South Asia, whether by building ports in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, or signing new agreements with even the tiniest South Asian nations like the Maldives. An expanding Chinese presence in Nepal would be especially alarming to India, given that India and Nepal share a long and deliberately porous border.
“India has always been concerned about what access China might have in Nepal,” said Sridhar Khatri, executive director of the South Asia Center for Policy Studies in Katmandu. “India has always considered South Asia to be its backyard, like a Monroe Doctrine.”
From China’s perspective, Nepal’s geopolitical significance rose after Tibetan protests erupted in March 2008, five months before Beijing hosted the Olympic Games. Those protests began inside China; in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital; and other Tibetan regions, but also spread across the border to Katmandu, where an estimated 12,000 Tibetans live.
Even as Chinese officials were able to block international media coverage of the crackdown under way in Tibet, the protests in Nepal attracted global attention as photographs circulated of the Nepalese police subduing Tibetan protesters. In a few cases, media outlets mistakenly identified the photographs as coming from inside Tibet.
“There was a shift after March,” Gurung said. “The Chinese realized that Nepal is going to be an important site where they could potentially be embarrassed on Tibetan issues.”
V.R. Raghavan, a retired general in the Indian army, said
that China for years had tacitly allowed Tibetans to cross into Nepal, many of
whom were making pilgrimages or attending universities in India. But the March
protests made China realize that it had a “southern window” that needed to be
closed, he said.
“Every movement of important personages and priests and others from Tibet has taken place through Nepal,” said General Raghavan, now director of the Delhi Policy Group, a research institute.
Chinese officials tightened security on their side of the border in the name of preventing pro-Tibet agitators from slipping into, or out of, the country. They also pushed Nepal to become more vigilant.
Last fall, Rawal announced that Nepal, for the first time, would station armed police officers in isolated regions like Mustang and Manang on the border with Tibet.
Meanwhile, Tibetan advocates say the tightening border security has already sharply slowed movement. Until 2008, roughly 2,500 to 3,000 Tibetans annually slipped across the border, according to the office of the Dalai Lama. By last year, the number dropped to about 600, a change that Tibetan advocates attribute to closer ties between China and Nepal.
“As they get closer,” said Tenzin Taklha, secretary for the Dalai Lama, “it is becoming more difficult for Tibetans.”
In fact, many Nepalese believe that moving closer to China is in the best interests of the country.
For more than a half century, India has been deeply influential in Nepalese affairs and remains Nepal’s biggest trading partner and economic benefactor, even as some Nepalese resent India’s role in their affairs. Nepal’s currency is pegged to the Indian rupee, and citizens of the two countries are allowed to pass freely across the border. More than one million Nepalese work in India, sending back remittances.
But trade with China has quadrupled since 2003, according to government statistics, and Nepalese business leaders want to increase economic ties.
In recent years, Chinese airlines have opened routes into Nepal as the number of Chinese tourists has risen steadily, and Nepalese officials also want China to extend rail services to the border so that Nepal can be linked to the same high-altitude line that connects Beijing to Tibet.
Kush Kumar Joshi, president of the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, said his group was trying to establish special economic zones to lure Chinese manufacturers to Nepal – and for Indian companies, too.
“We need to have both countries as our development partners,” he said.
Khatri, the analyst in Katmandu, said that India would remain Nepal’s dominant neighbor, but that China’s expanding global reach would inevitably make it more engaged than before. To assume that China would not exert itself more in South Asia and Nepal, he said, “would be to neglect the reality.
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February 19, 2010
Surviving the Dragon is much more than an autobiography. It is a fascinating history, told by an insider, of China's occupation, domination, and destruction of Tibetan culture. For anyone interested in the story behind the inner workings of China-controlled Tibet, this is a must-read told by a deeply religious leader.
Arjia Rinpoche was born in 1950, the same year Mao Zedong’s
People’s Liberation Army invaded Tibet. His early ears were ones of
geographical and political isolation. His nomadic family herded their yaks
across the high plains of the Tibetan-Mongolian border, there camp never far
from the vast blue waters of lake Kokonor. At the age of two, he was recognized
by the Tenth Panchen Lama (the second-ranking figure in Tibet after the Dalai
Lama) as the reincarnation of the father of Tsongkhapa (the founder of the
Gelug sect of Tibetan Buddhism).
At the age of seven, he was sent to live in Kumbum Monastery, one of Tibet’s six great monastic universities.
In the following years, the Arjia Rinpoche’s life became a series of extreme swings of fortune: first as a carefree child, then as a protected and revered incarnate lama, then as a youth singled out and ridiculed by the communists, then as a forced laborer in a Chinese camp, then as a “rehabilitated counterinsurgent” released from hard labor at the age of thirty, and, finally, as a favorite of the Beijing hierarchy. He was named head abbot of Kumbum Monastery, a position that proved to be more political than religious; it paved the way for even higher positions, including vice-president of the Chinese Youth Association, vice president of the Central Government’s Buddhist Association, and member of Beijing’s Central Government.
Aria Rinpoche also remained closely aligned with the Tenth Panchen Lama throughout this time. He acted as his assistant for many years and was with him the day before he died in 1989 – an event still shrouded in rumors of foul play. After the Panchen Lama’s passing, Arjia was named a member of the communists’ nominating committee, created to select a new Panchen Lama, a task traditionally left to the standing Dalai Lama. He witnessed firsthand as the communists choreographed the “lottery” for the Eleventh Panchen Lama. (The Chinese apprehended the little boy who had been the Dalai Lama’s choice; tragically, the boy’s whereabouts are still unknown.)
After the rigged selection, Arjia Rinpoche was named tutor of the new Panchen Lama. Demoralized and realizing that he could no longer support the grim charade of a false Panchen Lama, Arjia Rinpoche fled China. Against tremendous odds he successfully eluded the Chinese and in 1998 reached American soil, where the United States Government granted him political asylum. His escape remains a major source of embarrassment for China’s Central Government.
In 2005, the Dalai Lama appointed Arjia Rinpoche the
director of the Tibetan Cultural Center (TCC), in Bloomington, Indiana. His
Holiness’s eldest brother, Professor Thubten Jigme Norbu, established the
strictly nonpolitical, nonprofit TCC in 1979 to support Tibetans both in Tibet
and in exile and to preserve Tibetan (and Mongolian) Buddhist culture.
To purchase Surviving the Dragon LINK HERE:
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February 12, 2010
According to Agence France-Presse, the murderers of an eight-year-old girl were finally apprehended this week. The tragic incident occurred in early December of 2009.
"The circumstances of the killing in early December
suggest the girl was sacrificed," local police official Narhari Adhikari
told AFP from Rupandehi district in the south of Nepal.
The child's throat had been slit and her body pierced with a sharp weapon. Local media reported her blood was found inside a brick kiln along with religious offerings of money and food.
"We have arrested four people including the owner of the brick kiln on charges of murder. Two of those arrested confessed they killed the girl as an offering to the gods to bring good fortune to the business," he added.
Nepal outlawed human sacrifice in 1780, but experts have long insisted that it is still practiced by some communities in backward rural areas.
"Some people still believe sacrificing human beings will appease the gods, improve their fortunes and raise their social status," said Chunda Bajracharya, professor of cultural studies at Kathmandu's Tribhuvan University.
The general Nepali public are horrified by such primitive and barbaric practices, but the incident should serve to remind the public how far Nepal still needs to come in protecting its children’s rights. Bonded child laborers and child slaves still exist in Nepal. Some children are sold by their parents for as little as $40 to middlemen, who sell them to private households where they are forced to do domestic chores up to 16 hours a day. Others migrate with their parents to unsupervised industries, such as brick factories, where the children are put to work as donkey handlers or brick carriers. Still other children are lured away from their parents by despicable agents who promise the parents that their offspring will be given a good education – but once in the custody of the agents, false documents are created to “prove” that they are orphans and, ultimately, end up in adoption centers that cater to wealthy Westerners, particularly from the United States, Spain, Italy and France. (The latest Hague Conference report just censored Nepal’s continuing lax adoption practices.)
One final note: Rupandehi district, where the eight-year-old girl was cruelly sacrificed, also boasts the site of the birthplace of Nepal’s most famous son. Siddhartha Gautama, the historic Buddha, was born in Lumbini, not too far from where the girl was slaughtered. Lumbini is one of Nepal’s major tourist attractions. It’s a deeply sad irony – lost on tourists and the Nepali government alike – the latter of whom are too busy fighting among themselves to rectify the cruel superstitions and lack of education that feed into and allow such horrifying practices to remain a reality in the hinterlands.
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February 5, 2010
On
February 3, 2010, President Obama’s nominee for the new US Ambassador to Nepal
Scott Delisi was introduced and questioned by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
Mr. Delisi has been
with the Senior Foreign Service for 28 years. He has served as Ambassador to the State of Eritrea and as
Deputy Chief of Mission of the American Embassy in Gaborone, Botswana. Most
recently, Mr. DeLisi has been the Director of Career Development and
Assignments in the State Department’s Bureau of Human Resources, where he has
played a key role in the staffing of embassies. This has included missions in
Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan.
Previously, as the
Director for Entry Level Programs, Mr. DeLisi was responsible for the training,
placement and career development of 600 new entrants and over 2500 existing
Foreign Service Officers. Mr. DeLisi has also served as Director for Southern
African Affairs, Vice Counsel for the Embassy in India, the Chief of Political
Section in Sri Lanka, in addition to other postings in Madagascar and Pakistan.
A native of Minnesota, Mr. DeLisi holds both a B.A. and J.D. from the
University of Minnesota.
The following are
excerpts from the hearing, chaired by Senator Jim Webb, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
In Senator Webb’s
opening statement, he acknowleged that Asia was of vital importance to the
United States:
In his opening
statement, Mr. Delisi concurred with Senator Webb assessment:
Finally, I hope we
will continue our robust development assistance program, which contributes
significantly to building a peaceful and stable Nepal. We were the first
country to sign a technical cooperative agreement with Nepal in 1951, and that
cooperation continues today. The United States plays a critical role in
supporting the government of Nepal's efforts to increase access to vital health
care for its citizens, and we have contributed to the government's marked
successes in reducing maternal and child mortality and in stemming the spread
of HIV/AIDS.
After Mr Delisi’s
opening statement, Senator Webb voiced his concern about the Maoists continued
inclusion in the United States terrorist exclusion list and asked Mr. Delisi to
comment on this ongoing political hurdle.
Mr. DeLisi’s response:
Finally, Senator Webb
asked the future ambassador to voice his views on Nepal’s effect on the
relationship between its neighbors China and India and what the United States
position should be
Mr. DeLisi’s response:
It's an interesting
question. It is an interesting location, Senator. The Nepalese, generally they
talk of themselves as a yam between two bounders. And it's a delicate balancing
act for them. There's no question about it.
So they'll keep us
busy on both sides of the border, I think.
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February 3, 2010
1)
the accuser is fairly high-profile
2)
this is a critical moment for the Nepali government and
Tribhuvan International Airport’s security. Recently, the subcontinent has been
place on high alert for terrorist infiltration and Nepal cannot afford to be
identified as the loose link in South Asian security measures. The Nepali
government is already waffling on India’s request to allow air marshals on
those Indian aircraft landing in Kathmandu – an absurd stance fueled by
ill-advised hyper-nationalistic sentiments.
If the accusation is true, the government should
immediately rectify its sloppy response to international concerns by replacing
sub-standard personnel at the airport. There are many extremely capable men and
women in Nepal’s police force who can handle this important assignment with
vigilance, sobriety and intelligence.
If the accusation is false, I welcome readers’ evidence
to the contrary.
Santosh Shah’s allegations dated February 1, 2010
I faced racial
discrimination and intimidation by police personnel at Tribhuvan International
Airport, Kathmandu.
When I crossed the main
entrance gate of Tribhuvan International Airport Kathmandu, 1st
February at 9.45pm, as the usual routine the Security personnel past the
entrance asked me for my passport/tickets. I said that I had come to airport to
pick up an important guest from abroad arriving at 10.30pm by China Southern
Airlines. I produced my Press ID Card issued by the Department of Information,
Ministry of Information and Communications. The police denied my entry. I
requested that since the guest is a woman and since it’s really late in the
night, its important that I go and receive her. Then I even produced my ID Card
of the United Nations, Kathmandu. The police, three of them gathered by now,
asked me to step out of the taxi, asked me to pay the taxi and asked the driver
to vanish. They looked at my IDs, and didn’t seem to be able to read them well.
The scene was intimidating, with three armed police personnel in the barren
street - I said them that I hold a respectable position in society and knew
their high ranking officers at Airport and at Police Headquarter. The head
among the three; with 1-star on his uniform shouted out to me “Of course, you
f*### Madhise have such contacts and
respect. Dial the number to whomever you want, and I will see how you go in.” I
told him “You know that no one will lift a call at this late hour, and you are
going to have your racial take on me”. He smelled drunk. These are the three
guys responsible for the entry and exit of all the incoming and outgoing
vehicles, trespassers etc. into the International and Domestic Airport of
Kathmandu. The head police among the three wasn’t wearing his name plate; when
I asked him for his name; he refused to give his name and said - “This is point no 13”. And then he
told me – “You want to see my power, see!” He allowed at least half a dozen of
vehicles pass through without checking their documents or ID.
Since I didn’t use any foul word and maintained my
politeness; that avoided any possible assaults. The guy was drunk and had
already committed several offenses in front of me including allowing people to
enter without checking; I already felt intimidated – I thought the best
solution was to walk back. I walked down to the main road, ring road, and saw
another cab by the open waiting area at the main airport entrance. Since the
area was empty, dark and quiet, and Kathmandu isn’t that a safe place; I
convinced the taxi driver to wait for me and my guest. My guest called me from
the airport and I directed her to walk all the way down to highway. This was
definitely not an easy thing for her to do. Fortunately she made it to the main
road and I dropped her.
Normally, I use my office vehicle and have my securities
maintained. I go to this airport at least a hundred times a year. So, this was
quite an odd, rater revealing experience for me. If a public face of one of
Nepal’s leading channel has to face this at the international airport; what
must be the fate of an ordinary citizens in rural backdrops of Terai where the
monitoring of security surveillance does not surface out.
- Drunk
and on duty
- don’t wear their name badges
- look at the ID of a passer-by facial reading, with racial discriminations
- fail to recognize their own senior officers in the police command
- allow
a dozen vehicles to enter without a check to show-off his power to a
journalist.
This is a serious security threat to the airport and an
intimidation to tourists arriving at midnight at a barren airport.
This is not the first time that I am facing a racial
discrimination; but this is the first time I am facing this level of
intimidation and that too from a civil servant. According to the article 13 of
interim Constitution of Nepal, racial discrimination is a punishable act. And
in this case its committed by the protector of the law; the Police personnel
stationed at International airport.
I am preparing to approach the concerned government, civil
and international authorities for justice.
For phone-calls/information:
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According to a new report released by MigrantRights.org, Qatar, the rapidly developing Gulf state, “is becoming a death chamber for Nepali workers, with the number of Nepalis dying in Qatar increasing in the last three years.”
Expatriate workers are a crucial part of the fabric of Gulf society and economy, where they make up to 80% of the population in some states. While many work in white-collar jobs or are successful businessmen and highly skilled professionals, the majority of foreigners working in the Gulf are part of the manual labor workforce. They are also employed as domestic servants and drivers. By and large, individual employers are not held accountable for their treatment of Nepalis.
Around 217 Nepalis working in the country lost their lives in 2009, Nepal’s ambassador to Qatar, Dr Surya Nath Mishra, announced recently. “This is a matter of serious concern,” he said, adding that a new mechanism needs to be developed to reduce the risks of workers in Qatar. A total of 175 Nepalis died in Qatar in 2008.
As per data at the Nepali embassy in Doha, 40 Nepalis died of traffic-related accidents, 23 died at the work site, 14 died of drowning, including 12 in a July 2009 boat tragedy. Nine Nepali workers committed suicide.
Of the 162 deaths in 2007, 103 were due to cardiac arrest. Of the 143 workers who died in 2006, myocardial infarction claimed the lives of 72.
In spite of the high risks, Nepalis – particularly non-skilled workers -- scramble to get jobs in Qatar. The remittances they send home are in important source of revenue for their impoverished families in Nepal.
Salaries have increased along with the risks. The Nepali embassy in Doha increased the minimum salary to be paid for Nepali workers in Qatar by at least 200 Riyals (Rs 4000) per month effective January 1, 2010.
The embassy has increased the minimum salary of unskilled workers such as laborers, cleaners, helpers, watchmen, and office boys to 800 Riyals (Rs 16000) per month from the existing 600 Riyals.
Likewise, the embassy has stipulated the minimum salary of semi-skilled workers from 800 (Rs 16000) Riyals to 2500 Riyals and that of skilled workers up to 3500 Riyals, depending on the profession.
The salary of professionals such as engineers, doctors, surgeons, managers and chartered accountants has been stipulated at 3500 Riyals (Rs 70000) to 10000 Riyals (Rs 200000) a month depending on profession and experience.
The embassy has also made it mandatory for employers either to provide food facility or a food allowance of at least 200 Riyals (Rs 4000) per month.
At present, most companies provide the facility of accommodation, transportation and medical treatment, but only a few companies, particularly hotels and restaurants, provide food.
The remittance to Nepal from workers in Qatar will increase by about Rs 1.8 billion per month with the new provisions. According to the Nepali embassy in Doha, there are almost half million Nepalis working in Qatar.
Meanwhile, the embassy has also made it mandatory for employers to bear the cost of roundtrip tickets for Nepali workers. With this rule, the cost for workers going to Qatar will be reduce by about Rs 30000 to 35000.
What have not been adequately addressed are the working conditions that Qatar provides for its completely vulnerable guest-workers, as seen by the new statistics for death and injury. This should not be happening in a place where the economy is so glaringly vibrant.
January 28, 2010
It’s not a question of whether or not India has treated Nepal unfairly. Historically, India has regarded Nepal as its poor relation to the north. Lopsided treaties between the two countries reflect that condescension. Illegal land encroachment continues to be a hotly debated issue. There are ample examples that can be cited in which India’s treatment of Nepal could and should be rectified.
However, when Nepali politicos exploit the long-standing resentments of their people, when they use India as their scapegoat for everything that needs fixing in Nepal, when anti-Indian rhetoric becomes the cynical tool for rallying blind nationalism (and easy votes), when they use India-bashing as a means for advancing their own political agendas -- then the people of Nepal should take a hard look at where that hate-mongering will inevitably lead.
Prachanda is a case in point. Nepal’s Maoist leader and
erstwhile Prime Minister, has been capturing the headlines recently by making
accusations against India that he cannot possibly prove. In a speech given on
Jan 9, he made the startling accusation that the Indian Government was behind
the tragic Palace Massacre of June 1, 2001 – the fateful event in which King
Birendra and his entire immediate royal family were wiped out. In the same
speech, Prachanda also asserted that the Indian government was behind the 1993
death of popular communist leader Madan Bhandari. Bhandari died in a road accident. Prachanda provided no evidence to substantiate his allegation that the
Indian government orchestrated the event.
As reported in Janadisha, (the daily Maoist newspaper), Prachanda claims that, “Madan Bhandari and King Birendra were killed because they did not surrender to India.” Why, specifically, did New Delhi have the royal family slaughtered? Prachanda provides us with two unverifiable reasons: King Birendra favored buying weapons for the Royal Army from China instead of India and 2) the Indians discovered that he, Prachanda, was planning to secretly meet the king within the month, presumably with negotiations in mind.
One would like to ask Prachanda what happened to his previous theory that it was King Gyanendra who had his own brother and family assassinated – also unsubstantiated but very popular among the people in 2001.
In 2010, neither credibility nor consistency seem to be high priorities for Prachanda. Depending on the group he is speaking to, he demonizes India or insists that he wants to have calm discussions with India. He contradicts himself so frequently that even his fellow Maoist leaders seemed to be at a loss as to where he is going.
In the second week of January, Prachanda turned on Maoist Second-in-Command Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. Prachanda complained that he was being slighted by New Delhi and that the GOI preferred to deal with Bhattarai instead – the implication being that Bhattarai was too pro-India.
Dr. Bhattarai fired back the next day in an interview with Outlook Magazine by characterizing Prachanda’s remark as “an attempt to assassinate my character.” Bhattarai also cautioned that, “Anti-Indian nationalism has always prevailed in Nepal. But blind nationalism does not work. I have always been in favor of a rational debate and consensus, but there are people in my party, as well as other parties, who are followers of blind nationalism. A leader should be diplomatic and political when he speaks. We shouldn’t be blaming India in a loose manner. We should be able to put across our differences in a polite but clear manner and seek its resolution to the best of our national interest.”
This is not the first time Prachanda and Bhattarai have crossed swords. It will be remembered that during the 10-year insurgency Bhattarai fell from grace, reportedly because Prachanda (and other central committee members) felt that Bhattarai was too cozy with Indian power brokers.
In any event, on January 16, India’s Foreign Minister S M
Krishna met with Prachanda. Krishna had come to Nepal to emphasize the
importance of rebuilding consensus among political parties to conclude the
peace process and to draft Nepal’s new constitution within the stipulated
timeframe. But Krishna used his meeting with Prachanda as an opportunity to let
him know that his ramped up India-bashing had crossed the diplomatic line.
According to an Indian spokesperson, Krishna conveyed “his deep disappointment
at the baseless attacks on India by the Maoist leadership, which vitiate the
age-old and time-tested friendly relations between India and Nepal and people
of the two countries. He emphasized that such baseless propaganda has negative
impact on Indian public opinion.”
The latter point may be the salient one: Prachanda behaves as if his remarks are spoken in a vacuum and that no repercussions need be feared. But the truth is that Nepal cannot behave as if it needn’t fuss with Indian opinion. There is practically no level on which Nepal, to some extent, is not reliant on its far more powerful neighbor to the south. Warmer relations with China may somewhat mitigate Nepal’s dependence on India, but it will never erase the fact that Nepal is geographically surrounded by India to the east, south and west. Nepal is landlocked. All the bravado in the world is not going to make that hard fact go away.
After his meeting with Krishna, Prachanda glossed things over by assuring reporters that his discussion with Krishna had been a positive one.
PRACHANDA AND THE INDIAN ARMY
In the meantime, on January 19, India’s Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor flew into Kathmandu on a four-day goodwill visit to Nepal. Historically, the bilateral relationship of the Indian and Nepali armies has provided a significant means of sustaining trust and mutual confidence between the neighboring nations. The traditional linkage of the two armies underlines Nepal and India’s social and cultural commonality. Beyond that, there is a unique military relationship between the two armies: Large numbers of Nepali Gorkha soldiers and officers have served in the Indian army. General Kapoor met with Nepal’s prime minister, defense minister and COAS. The visit culminated on January 21, when President Yadav conferred on General Kapoor the title of Honorary General of Nepal Army.
As if to sabotage the general’s visit, Prachanda gave a speech on January 20 in which he not only dismissed the longstanding relationship between the two armies, but strongly supported the unrealistic (if not bizarre) “Demand for Greater Nepal”, an ultra-nationalist movement to retrieve territories that were lost to India in 1816: The Sugauli Treaty.
Prachanda’s logic for demanding the return of land lost two centuries ago goes like this: “The Sugauli Treaty was signed with the British India Company, not with the rulers of present day India. …We have the right to reject the treaty that was signed with the now non-existent East-India Company that ruled India for centuries. The Treaty of 1950 made with India after liberation clearly annuls all those treaties signed with the British India Company. …It is our right to discuss that our territories that extended up to Tista in the east and Sutlej in the west, prior to the signing of the Sugauli Treaty.”
It may be Prachanda’s right to discuss such matters, but short of Nepal declaring war on India – a move that would be suicidal and patently absurd – who in Delhi is going to listen to Prachanda with a straight face?
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS THAT DEMAND INDO-NEPALI COOPERATION
One of the overriding concerns behind India’s desire to have a good working relationship with Nepal is an international security issue: The use of Nepali soil by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and international terrorist elements – particularly anti-Indian terrorist cells. New Delhi would very much like to see an extradition treaty in place with Nepal.
On January 12, for instance, Mizra Ali aka “Rasool”, a murder convict with links to the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, was arrested by India’s Special Task Force on a train headed for Bangladesh, where he had intended to fly on to Afghanistan. Rasool admitted that he worked as an operative of the Taliban and LeT between 2004 and 2008. He also confessed to his involvement in several terror strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, after which he escaped to Nepal. Rasool explained to the Bihar police that he had selected the Katihar-Jogbani train because it “took advantage of the long and porous Bihar-Nepali border.”
In fact, since the beginning of the 2010, Indian intelligence wings and anti-terror squads have received numerous tips of increasing activity to and from Nepal. They have responded by stepping up security along the Nepali border, in concert with Nepali police.
On January 22, the Indian government issued a terror alert in its airports after gathering intel of a possible hijack attempt by al-Quada, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamat-ul-Dawa linked terrorists. Specifically, the groups planned to hijack an Air India plane operating in or from Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, in an effort to destabilize the region.
It will be remembered that, on Christmas Eve 1999, Islamic militants took over an Air India jet flying out of Kathmandu, bound for New Delhi but rerouted to Kandahar, Afghanistan. One passenger was stabbed to death during the hijack. 167 passengers and crewmembers were later released in exchange for New Delhi turning over four Islamic militants.
Following Delhi’s January 22 terror alert, Nepal put security at its international airport on high alert. According to Keshav Raj Khanal, Director General of the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal, “We will deploy more security forces and beef up our vigilance at the Tribhuvan Airport.”
On January 23, India revised its report on Indo-Nepali terrorist activity, stating that recently “not three but over 24 terrorists have intruded the territories of Bihar and UP through the Nepal border.” Director-General of Police of Uttar Pradesh Karmveer Singh suggested that increased activity might be concentrated on January 26, India’s upcoming Republic Day celebration.
India’s intensified focus on security
issues with Nepal (and other neighbors) can be seen – according to many analysts –
by the recent shift of former Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon to the
position of National Security Advisor.
According to the Times of India: “Given Menon’s facility with neighboring nations, his appointment as NSA is seen to indicate that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is keen on tacking some long-running sores. Stability in India’s ties with countries vital to its geo-political interest may well be top priority for the PM in his second term.”
This shift may also be reflected in the Indian Prime Minister's impending visit to Nepal. The last time an Indian PM visited Kathmandu was in 2002.
Nevertheless, Prachanda’s diatribe against India continues unabated.
January 23-24. Prachanda continued to try to have it both ways – practicing diplomacy when in front of Indians and blasting them when he thought they couldn’t hear.
Last Saturday, while speaking at the Indian border town of Rajbiraj, he avoided the topic of India's many wrong-doings.
The following day, however, 100 kilometers northwest of Rajbiraj in a provincial outpost, Prachanda gave yet another blistering speech damning India. He reiterated his earlier claim that “both King Birendra and communist leader Madan Bhandari were murdered as per India’s wish.” He went on to claim that “no force on earth” could stop the Maoists from waging another revolt if the peace process was derailed or the constitution drafting was disrupted – an odd thing to say since the Maoists have played the major role in disrupting the process for nearly a year.
But really, Prachanda: No power on earth can stop the Maoists?
Forget for the moment that India has the bomb. India has many ways of exerting pressure on the Nepali government. Take electricity, for instance.
On January 21, Nepal Electricity Authority and the Power Trading Corporation of India reached an agreement to import an additional 30 MW of electricity in Nepal. Nepal asked for 60MW in an effort to reduce Nepal’s chronic load-shedding to twelve hours daily. But after two months of pleading, they settled for half that amount for the simple reason that Nepal had nothing in its pocket to leverage a better deal.
If India can turn on Nepal’s light switch—and they do so
because they want to work with Nepal – they can just as easily turn it off. And
no amount of Maoist chest-thumping can change that unfortunate, but working
reality. To deny that reality is not only to be mindlessly provincial, but heedless of what is in the best interest for the people of Nepal. Nepal really has no choice but to keep an open dialogue with India and -- as Dr. Bhattarai suggested -- within civil perimeters. The alternative is dangerous and counterproductive.
January 23, 2010
The IRIN, a project of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, reported yesterdays that suicide has emerged as the single leading cause of death among women in Nepal aged 15-49, outranking other causes such as accidents and disease.
The Maternal Mortality and Morbidity Study 2008/2009 undertaken by the Family Health Division (FHD) of the Department of Health Services looked at changes in maternal mortality in Nepal since 1998, when the last survey was done.
The yearlong study of women of reproductive age (15-49 years) was carried out in eight districts chosen to represent different ethnicities and levels of development in Nepal.
The total population of women of this age group in these districts was over 86,000. But in preliminary findings that the study described as shocking, of the 1,496 deaths recorded, suicide - rather than maternal-related issues - was the single leading cause of death, accounting for 16 percent of deaths.
In the 1998 study, suicide ranked as the third single cause of death.
The finding "highlights the urgent need to address this issue, which has received little attention since its significance was first noted in 1998," the study said.
The second single leading cause was accidents, accounting for 9 percent of deaths; no details were specified about the nature of these.
"We are absolutely concerned with the findings. This was totally unexpected," Bal Krishna Subedi, who led the study and is a former FHD director, told IRIN. "It has opened our eyes to delve into this issue," he said.
The study also found the overall maternal mortality rate in Nepal had improved to 229 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, compared to 539 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 1998.
The study said mental health problems, relationships, marriage and family issues were factors in suicides, as was youth, since 21 percent of the suicides were committed by young women aged 18 years and under.
However, it did not elaborate on these issues and noted that more research was required into the causes.
"Research is needed to improve understanding of the circumstances and contributory factors of these tragic events, to guide interventions," it said.
"We need more analysis to find the causes behind suicide, in order to go forward to address this serious concern at the community level," said Sushil Baral, health adviser for the Nepal office of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), one of the study’s funders.
"Gender-based violence could be one of the major cause(s), but to what extent it actually impacts, needs to be further studied," he said.
Women activists said the study results were not surprising, and that the problem could be even more widespread because suicides are under-reported.
"Most families will never report suicide cases as they are afraid of being entangled in police cases," Pinky Rana, director of Samanta, a local women’s rights NGO, told IRIN.
The only way to prevent suicides is to criminalize the causes of death, such as dowry disputes and domestic violence, said Sapana Malla Pradhan, a member of parliament and president of the Forum for Women, Law and Development (FWLD).
"Once there is suicide, the case is closed and never investigated on what led women committing such [a] drastic step,” said Pradhan.
There was a need for proper research to get an accurate picture of suicide among women. However, most aid agencies were not interested in funding such research or studies, she added.
Women’s groups also said there was a need for psychosocial counseling in many parts of the country to help women to cope with issues such as depression.
"There is a crucial need for counseling training programs and we need more counselors to help these poor victims," said Pradhan.
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January 14, 2010
As horrific as the news is coming in from Port-au-Prince, there is good news for Nepalis who have family members and loved ones in Haiti. According to
Brigadier General Ramindra Chhetri, spokesperson for the National Army, all
Nepal Army soldiers deployed in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti are safe,
except for one man who sustained unspecified injuries. More than 1100 Nepali Army troops are on the impoverished island of which 350 are deployed in Port-au-Prince. This comes as an enormous
relief since it is reported that 100 people are missing in the rubble of the
collapsed UN headquarters building in Haiti – including mission chief Hedi
Annabi.
Meanwhile, according to Republica, the contingent of Nepali police is also believed to be safe. There are 27 Nepal Police officers stationed in Port-au-Prince and 125 policemen stationed in Cape Haikian, 260 kilometers north of the capital. Additional good news: The 11 Armed Police Force officials from Nepal are reported unharmed.
According to a trusted source, who contacted me earlier today, most of the Nepali personnel -- including police, armed police and even UN civilians who ordinarily worked at UN HQ -- were away for a function at Nepalese Battalion HQ during the fateful event. This is incredibly good news, given the tens of thousands of casualties expected to be eventually tallied as dead or missing. Chinese peacekeepers, for instance -- according to Chinese newspapers -- have already suffered eight dead and ten missing.
Personnel of the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti include:
9,065 total
uniformed personnel
7,031 troops
2,034 police
488 international
civilian personnel
1,212 local
civilian staff
214 United Nations
Volunteers
CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES to UN mission in Haiti, in addition to Nepal:
Military personnel:
Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Jordan, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, United States and Uruguay.
Police personnel:
Argentina, Bangladesh,
Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad,
Chile, China, Columbia, Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Croatia, Egypt, El
Salvador, France, Guinea, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal,
Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, United States, Uruguay and
Yemen.
Photographs below are primarily from twitter and video grabs.
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December 12, 2010
A treasure trove of rare color films shot by British, Tibetans and Chinese -- and up until now preserved by the British Film Institute -- has just been made into a invaluable documentary by the BBC. You can see it on YouTube by clicking on the three links below.
YouTube links:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NwBeO6cdGiw
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7F2zqUU7HI&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vio0P1DBebw&feature=related
January 09, 2010
Dawood Ibrahim (aka Dawood Ebrahim and Sheikh Dawood Hassan)
was born on December 26, 1955. He is the godfather of the organized crime
syndicate D-Company in Mumbai and one of Interpol’s most wanted men. He was No.
4 on the Forbes' World's Top 10 most dreaded criminals list of 2008 and is
ranked #50 in Forbes list of “The World's Most Powerful People.”
Dawood Ibrahim first attracted international interest after
the 1993 Bombay bombings. In 2003, the United States declared him an
“international terrorist” with close links to al-Qaida’s Osama bin Laden, and
pursued the matter before the United Nations, attempting to freeze his
international assets and crack down on his operations. More recently, Russian
and Indian intelligence agencies have looked closely at Ibrahim's possible
involvement in the November 2008 Mumbai hotel attacks. Among other things,
there is circumstantial evidence that Ibrahim’s network provided a boat to the
ten terrorists who killed 173 people in the 2008 Mumbai slaughter.
Ibrahim’s whereabouts remains unknown, although India’s
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) believes he is in hiding in Pakistan. Pakistan
officials deny any knowledge of his presence in their country. But the issue
will not go away. The extradition of Dawood Ibrahim remains one of the major
hurdles in the difficult relations between India and Pakistan.
THE SPECIFICS OF IBRAHIM’S D-COMPANY
Four days ago, on January 5, 2010, the United States’
Congressional Research Service (CRS), a research wing of Congress, released a
report that identifies D-Company as a criminal syndicate now numbering 5,000
members with strategic alliance with the ISI, LeT and al Qaida, thus making it
a leading example of the “criminal-terrorism” fusion model that currently poses
an increasing threat to South Asian interests.
The report, titled "International Terrorism and
Transnational Crime: Security Threats, US Policy, and Considerations for
Congress", notes that D-Company is involved in a variety of criminal
activities, including extortion, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, contract
killing, and deep infiltration into the Indian filmmaking industry, (extorting
producers, assassinating directors, distributing movies, and pirating films).
But, according to the report, D-Company's evolution into a
genuine terrorist group began in response to the destruction of the December
1992 Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, India. 2000 people died in the ensuing riots and
Hindu-Muslim relations deteriorated dramatically as a result.
Then: "Reportedly with assistance from Pakistan government's intelligence branch, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), D-Company launched a series of bombing attacks on March 12, 1993, killing 257 people," the report said. Following the attacks, Ibrahim moved his network's headquarters to Karachi. There, D-Company is believed to have deepened its strategic alliance with the ISI and developed links to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT).
(For those unfamiliar with it, LeT is an organization included in the Terrorist Exclusion List by the US Government in December 2001. It was subsequently proscribed by the United Nations in May 2005. Formed in 1990 in the Kunar province of Afghanistan, LeT is now headquartered in Muridke, near Lahore in Pakistan, and headed by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed.)
During the 1990s, according to the Congressional Research
Service report, Ibrahim’s D-Company “began to finance LeT's activities, use its
companies to lure recruits to LeT training camps, and give LeT operatives use
of its smuggling routes and contacts. …Lending his criminal expertise and
networks to such terrorist groups, [Ibrahim] is capable of smuggling terrorists
across national borders, trafficking in weapons and drugs, controlling
extortion and protection rackets, and laundering ill-gotten proceeds, including
through the abuse of traditional value transfer methods, like hawala."
Also known as hundi, hawala is an informal value transfer system based on the
performance and honor of a huge network of money brokers, which are primarily
located in the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and South Asia.
DAWOOD IBRAHIM’S RELATIONSHIP TO NEPAL AND THE PAKISTANI
CONNECTION
Ibrahim has a long-standing connection to Nepal and was once
a regular visitor to Nepal, according to Indian officials. He has since restricted his movement
outside of Pakistan but, according to a South Asia Tribune report written in
April 2004, Ibrahim was last seen in Kathmandu in the last week of August 2003.
During that visit, he met his Nepali front man Sartaj Ahmed and several leaders
from fundamentalist organizations. Sartaj is reportedly “in constant touch with
officials of the Pakistani Embassy.”
Dawood has big financial stakes in Nepal: “He has made huge
investments in a variety of business ventures, from media, private airlines,
hotels, travel agencies to trans-border smuggling including that of gold. In
Nepal he has built high level contacts with businessmen, officials,
politicians, smugglers and religious fundamentalists,” according to South Asia
Tribune. “The late Mirza Dilshad Beg, an ex-member of parliament of Nepal, was
once an associate of Dawood. He was gunned down in Kathmandu in 1998. After his
death, his son-in-law Sartaj joined Dawood.”
WHY NEPALIS SHOULD CARE ABOUT THE DAWOOD IBRAHIM CONNECTION
The exploitation of trade routes crossing through Nepal’s
porous southern border – for both smuggling and the either direct or indirect
exportation of terrorism (both domestic and Pakistani) – has now become a
problem of increasing international concern and scrutiny. As long as the main
political parties continue to squabble among themselves, while a would-be new
constitution remains unwritten, and while southern Nepal remains an area with
little or no effective security, the “criminal-terrorism fusion”, which has
taken root in Nepal, will be favored with conditions suitable for further
expansion and control. If this pattern cannot be reversed by the good people of
Nepal, eventually, the international community may decide that they must
address Nepal’s degeneration of law and order themselves – with or without
Nepal’s consent.
Dawood Ibrahim’s name came up once again – in connection
with Nepal – just last week. In
the first days of 2010, the dramatic arrest of the son of a powerful Nepalese
politician on charges of heading a major fake Indian currency and drugs
smuggling racket, allegedly sponsored by Pakistani intelligence agencies,
further exposed how illicit funds pour into Nepal (with the underworld’s help)
– presumably to destabilize India’s relations with Nepal.
Here’s what happened.
A special task force of Nepal police arrested Yunus Ansari,
the son of former minister Salim Miya Ansari, who is alleged to have links with
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Dawood Ibrahim, after a
tip-off by Indian authorities that he was running the two criminal networks.
Yunus Ansari, the president of Nepal’s National Wrestling
Federation, is also the chairman of a new television channel that is yet to
start regular transmission. While Yunus Ansari was arrested along with three
Nepalis, two Pakistanis, one African and one from the Caribbean, police said
they had no evidence against his father, former forest and soil conservation minister
Ansari.
Yunus Ansari and his associates were caught with fake Indian
currency worth over Indian Rs.2.5 million last week and nearly four kilograms
of heroin after a long period of surveillance that started with the arrest of
two Nepalis with fake Indian currency in India’s Madhya Pradesh state last
year.
The Nepal chase started on New Year’s Day when Yunus
Ansari’s Nepali bodyguard, Kashiram Adhikari, was dispatched to Thamel, once
the hub of tourists and now increasingly targeted by criminals and sex workers,
to make contact with Pakistani agents.
Adhikari led police to the Red Planet Guest House in Thamel
where Pakistani national Mohammad Sajjad was awaiting him in room 304. The
bodyguard collected a red suitcase from Sajjad and went to room 204 where
another Pakistani, Mohammad Iqbal, was waiting with two suitcases.
After collecting the lot, Adhikari headed for the Bluebird
Mall in Thapathali where Yunus Ansari had allegedly rented a room. Police
caught him there and a search exposed the false bottoms in the suitcases, where
the fake notes were hidden.
According to initial investigation, the racket starts from
Karachi, where a Pakistani known as Haji Talad Ali heads it. The modus operandi
was simple. The money would be brought to the same guesthouse from where
Adhikari would take it to his master.
When police raided the hotel and arrested the two
Pakistanis, Sajjad was found to possess heroin as well. Yunus was arrested soon
afterwards from his residence in Tahachal.
Police also arrested a Guyana citizen, K. Ibrahim, and
another from Sierra Leone, Austin Ibrahim, who were to have circulated the
heroin.
ON NEW YEAR’S DAY, INDIA BEEFED UP SECURITY ALONG NEPAL’S
BORDER BECAUSE OF PAKISTANI CONCERNS
On January 1, 2010, New Delhi placed its country on alert as
the police launched a manhunt for three Pakistani militants who escaped from
police custody.
Abdul Razzak, Mohammed Sadiq and Rafaqat Ali escaped from G
B Pant hospital in central Delhi.
While the Meghalaya Police personnel, who were escorting the
three, were being questioned by security agencies, Uttar Pradesh state police
deployed additional security along the India-Nepal border to guard against
possible threats or escapes through the 870-mile open border of Nepal.
The point here is that, in many people’s minds, the potential of a Nepali-Pakistani connection is becoming a
given. This is not a healthy presumption for Nepal to have to contend with.
The Nepali police did an outstanding job of bringing Yunus
Ansari to ground. Crimes were being committed and a crack team stepped in and
took proper action.
But the police cannot be expected to do the government’s
job, which is to provide stability – an atmosphere in which criminal
activity can be curtailed before it actually takes place. Neither the Maoists
nor the UML nor the Congress Party, nor any of the other parties for that
matter, have been able to provide that sort of backdrop for the people of
Nepal, who deserve far better.
Little wonder that the three major parties’ leaders –
Prachanda, Koirala and Prime Minister Nepal -- were christened “The 3 Idiots”
by the Nepali Times this week, a reference to a new Bollywood film that is
currently all the rage in Kathmandu.
The international community may not get the joke, per se,
but they’ll comprehend the cynicism behind the joke. They know that
incompetence, at the end of the day, really isn’t all that funny.
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January 1, 2010
Nepal Monitor, with research support from the Media Foundation, sampled the top 10 news stories that more or less defined the events and issues in Nepal during the year. These stories dominated the headlines and affected domestic daily lives and the international community’s view of Nepal. These were randomly selected by NM editors “based on their salience in the public domain.”
The country’s peace process took a u-turn following the Maoists’ firing of Nepal’s Chief of Army Staff Rukmagat Katuwal and his reinstatement to the post by President Ram Baran Yadav. Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal “Prachanda” Dahal, who led the coalition government, quit on May 4 over his failed bid to fire Katuwal, calling for “civilian supremacy.” The unlikely comeback newsmaker was Madhav Kumar Nepal of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). He was elected the new premier by lawmakers on May 23. As new political alliances emerged, the gulf between political parties widened and public disillusionment continued to be exacerbated, even as the call for consensus became louder and fruitless, and these cast increasing doubts about the main agenda of the transitional process— Constitution-making.
The Maoist change in posture— starting with the infamous Prachadagate video and characterized by blockage and disruption of parliamentary sessions, phase-wise protests, continued killings, intimidation of media and other public or professional bodies, their unilateral declarations of autonomous regions in the country, their call for dialogue with India to resolve Nepal’s political deadlock, etc.—overshadowed the peace process. Other political parties came under fire for their incapability to address the Maoist demands and embrace a consensus politics, or to form a national unity government. There were also protests by other ethnic groups, such as the Tharus, Rais, and Limbus. Other stakeholders in the peace process, such as the United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN) also came under fire from political parties for being too lenient to the Maoist positions.
Unnatural and sustained rise in food prices and real estate, coupled with a bearish NEPSE, with the index early December laying the lowest (down to -3.15%) since May 2007, and liquidity crisis in the banking sector dominated the news, pointing to the economic woes of country with a poverty rate of 32 percent and unemployment rate as high as 42 percent. In the first quarter of 2009-10, according to the Nepal Rastra Bank, the country’s exports had declined (17 percent) and imports continued to soar (30 percent).
Although, in the first two months of the current fiscal year inflation became moderate (9.7 percent as against 13.5 percent during the same period last year) prices of consumer goods skyrocketed, as much as 43.5 percent for fruits and vegetables. Foreign remittance, the backbone of the nation’s economy, was hit hard, with its growth rate slowing down dramatically. According to a NRB report, there was a 19.7 percent increase in remittance during the period as against 59.4 percent during the same period in 2008. Trade deficit reached Rs 73.77 billion, 48.6 percent up from 2008.
Among the many cases of kidnapping and murders, the case of Khyati Shrestha stood out. The young woman’s kidnapping and brutal murder shocked the country. As the law and order situation worsened with the rise in cases of child-kidnapping, many groups and people took the law in their hands. In many cases innocent people were lynched or killed on mere suspicion of being kidnappers. On July 7, three students in Bhaktapur were lynched to death in one such mob attack. In another case, a woman was burnt alive by a mob in Dhanusa, southern Nepal (April 12) after she was accused of trying to kidnap a toddler
The Jajarkot diarrhea epidemic, the deadly bird flu strain and the swine flu scare also collectively stood at #4. The first case of the deadly H5N1 strain of bird flu was confirmed in early January 2009, which triggered panic in the poultry industry. The government declared an emergency and thousands of chickens were slaughtered in the southern districts and poultry consumption almost came to a standstill for several months.
The diarrhea epidemic, which broke out in the remote western district of Jajarkot and spread to other adjoining 19 districts killed more than 280 people. The problem was compounded by difficult geography, monsoon reason, and poor access as well as inefficient government relief efforts. Worse, the region was already reeling under food shortage.
The global swine flu strain also arrived in Nepal. The Ministry of Health in late 2009 confirmed 150 cases of AH1N1 across the country. At least one death from the flu was reported.
#4. POWER OUTAGES
Closely following health epidemics was the story on power cuts—as many as 16 hours a day during the peak winter season. The outage--which has dominated news for several years--adversely affected not only daily lives of ordinary people living in urban and semi-urban areas but also many enterprises relying on electricity. It even affected the media industry: For several months, beginning in January, all private television stations in the country stopped broadcasting their programs past mid-night until 5 am, citing power cuts. No alternatives were developed although last year the Maoist-led government had proposed setting up thermal plants to avert the crisis. Lacking policies to ensure investments in infrastructure development, Nepal is currently able only about 2 percent of its total hydroelectricity capacity of and estimated 83,000 MW.
#5. CLIMATE CHANGE/ ENVIRONMENT
The first major regional climate change conference in Himalayan nations was organized in Kathmandu on Aug 31. Nepal’s cabinet met near Mt. Everest (Kalapathar plateau, 5,262 meters, the Himalayas), the highest altitude such meeting in human history, on December 4, to highlight the issue of retreating mountain glaciers due to climate change. This has been a real concern to policymakers ever since a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)-backed scientific study in 2002 found that the glacier near Mt. Everest had retreated by around five kilometers up the mountain. The meeting received global media attention. The Sagarmatha Declaration called on the world to preserve the Himalayas. It was followed by Nepal’s large presence at the Copenhagen summit (Dec 7-18).
Related stories included the news on the discovery of some 353 new species in the Eastern Himalayas, and continued efforts to manage garbage in the capital city.
#6. GADHIMAI SACRIFIES/ PASHUPATINATH ROW
Toward the end of the year, November 24-25, more than 250,000 animals were sacrificed at the Gadhimai temple, in Bara district of south-central Nepal, in a centuries-old tradition—described as the world's biggest ritual slaughter. The event is organized every five years, but this year it got unprecedented news coverage in both local and international media, mainly because of protests spearheaded by animal rights activists. Several animal rights groups, including prominent personalities or celebrities from abroad like Brigitte Bardot of France and Maneka Gandhi of India as well as Ram Bahadur Bomjon (the Buddha Body) from home joined the appeal and the protest campaign in an effort to stop the sacrifices. But the authorities did little to stop it and organizers went ahead, arguing that animal sacrifice is part of religious and traditional beliefs and cannot be stopped.
The other story on the #6 slot was the Pashupatinath temple priest row. The Maoist-led government forced three Indian priests of Pashupatinath--one of Hinduism’s most revered temples--to resign in late December 2008. The government appointed Nepali scholars in their place. In the New Year, the move sparked widespread protests from other political parties, Nepali priests of the temple and civil society groups. Since the last 300 years, Nepal has recruited south Indian priests to head the temple ceremonies. The controversy was widely reported in the Indian media as well. After nearly two weeks and a Supreme Court challenge against the new appointments, the government withdrew its appointment of two head priests.
In August at least 7 people died in floods in Jhapa district, and thousands were displaced. In the first week of October, 34 people lost their lives in landslides in Dailekh, Achham, Bajhang, Kailali and Doti, in western Nepal. There were also floods in Nepalgunj and near Rapti River.
Bus accidents, as in the previous years, also comprised majority of disaster stories. More than 80 people were killed in such accidents across the country. A sample: Baitadi (10 killed; March 1), Gaindakot, Nawalparasi (3 killed; July 24), Jaibire, Sindhupalchowk, Sun Koshi river (18 killed; Sept 10), Sukute, Sindhupalchowk, Sun Koshi river (20 killed; Sept 25), Lahan (2 killed; Sept 25), Palpa (6 killed; Oct 7), Mahendranagar (2 killed; Oct 26), Hanshapur, Arghakhanchi (16 killed; Nov 8), Pokhara (2 killed; Nov 8), Gaindakot, Nawalparasi (8 killed; Nov 10), Aabukhaireni, Tanahu (1 killed; Nov 12), among others.
On April 23, 13 Nepal Army men were killed while fighting forest fire in Ramechhap district. Two days later, 6 people were burnt to death in Gulmi while trying to put out a fire in the Hastichaur community forest. On 4 January, at least two people drowned after a crowded ferry capsized in Koshi river in eastern Nepal. On March 9, four teenaged students, including three girls, were killed in another boat capsize in Koshi.
VP Paramananda Jha on July 23 took the oath of his office in Hindi. After much public criticism and a Supreme Court order of Aug. 12 to take his oath of office and secrecy in Nepali, he declined to do so and his post remains defunct to this day.
The Narayanhiti, the former royal palace and the site of the infamous massacre of 2001, was turned into a national museum in late February, nine months after monarchy was abolished. Several months later, it opened for public viewing, drawing in large crowds.
The 50 cm tall Khagendra Thapa Magar, 18, remained in media spotlight both at home and abroad, as the shortest person in Nepal, and possibly the shortest man in the world. His campaign to include himself as the shortest man in the Guinness Book of World Records became successful by mid-December. However, he was still striving to compete for another title—the lightest man in the world. He weighs only 4.5 kg.
The minority Christian community in Nepal faced two tragedies that thrust them into unprecedented media spotlight. On May 23, two people were killed in a church at Lalitpur packed with worshippers when a bomb exploded. Religious communities in Nepal were rarely before fatally targeted by groups. A Hindu extremist group called the National Defense Army claimed the responsibility. On September 29, 23 people were killed and some 65 injured when a makeshift church building in Dharan, eastern Nepal, collapsed. A positive spotlight was seen in December during Christmas—the media, now under a secular environment, gave unprecedented coverage to the festivities.
The other #9 story was attacks on the media, most
prominently highlighted in the killing of Janakpur-based journalist Uma Singh
on January 11. There were many other cases of intimidations of journalists by
Maoist and other groups across the country. Another case involved the arrest in
early February of journalist Rishi Dhamala and his and imprisonment. Police
charged Dhamala had links with the extremist outfit Ranabir Sena. He was
released in April. Two other journalists Ram Shuvak Mahato and Birendra KM
remain in jail. The Supreme Court on Dec 27 ordered both be released on general
bail. By the end of the year, in mid-December Tika Bista, a journalist based in
Rukum was brutally attacked allegedly by Maoist cadres.
Tibetan refuges living in Nepal organized series of protests against China, demanding the freedom of their homeland. These protests, which continued for several months intermittently, were sometimes participated in by thousands of Tibetans and some turned violent. There was an increasing pressure on Nepal from China to suppress the demonstrators, which received widespread international media attention. Tensions between China and India began to emerge and both seemed concerned over their interests in Nepal. China’s more overt policy manifestations in recent times also added to this new posturing, which affected Nepal’s politics as well.
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December 24, 2009
by Ruchira Gupta
When a problem is big and tends to profit a powerful group, there’s a time-honored temptation to sweep it under the rug by assuming it’s natural and inevitable. This was true of slavery until the abolitionist movement of the 19th century, and of colonialism until the contagion of independence movements in the 20th century. Now these same forces are at work in attitudes toward the global and national realities of sex slavery.
The biggest normalizer of profiteering from the rental, sale and invasion of human bodies is the idea that it is too big to fight, that it has always existed, and that it can be swept under the rug by legalizing and just accepting it. Those who profit—in this case, the global network of sex traffickers, sex tourism operators and brothel owners—are the major force behind the argument to legalize and increase profits that already rival those from the global arms and drug trade.
What will diminish and end this injustice? Exposing its reality: the lack of alternatives for those who are prostituted; the addiction and inability to empathize among those who create the demand, and the disastrous results wherever the selling or renting of human beings for sexual purposes has been legalized and normalized.
In Australia and the Netherlands where prostitution has been legalized, for instance, trafficking and the harms that come with it have only increased. In Victoria, Australia, it not only allowed legal brothels to proliferate, but illegal brothels increased by 300 per cent in a year. A hospitable environment for sex tourists and other buyers drove up demand local women and girls had too many alternatives to becoming the supply, they had to be trafficked from Southeast Asia.
The same is true of Amsterdam where trafficked East European and North African girls outnumber Dutch citizens in brothels. The mayor of Amsterdam reports that the red-light district has become a centre for illegal immigration and money laundering. In Germany and in an area near Las Vegas where prostitution has been legalized, government agencies tried to make applicants for unemployment benefits show they had attempted to find ‘work’ in the so-called ‘hospitality industry’ of prostitution in order to become eligible for such benefits. This was only defeated by massive organizing by women’s movements.
In the few countries that have legalized prostitution—with the idea that it would reduce harm to prostituted women, as is now being argued by some in India—rates of assault and rape against the prostituted have not dropped. There is also no corroborated evidence that legalization increases the use of condoms or women’s power to demand such use. On the contrary, an official emphasis on condoms has often made it possible for brothels to demand more money for unprotected sex, while also causing them to conceal the number of prostituted women and children who have lost their lives to AIDS.
In Calcutta, a group of women who had asked for the unionization of prostitution to guarantee workers’ rights admitted to facing violence when they’re alone with the client. “They paid for it, we cannot stop it.” A doctor working for this group said he left after having to stitch up the vagina of a fifteen-year-old Nepali girl—for the third time.
But there is some good news. It comes from countries where traffickers have been pursued, and prostituted women and children have been given services and alternatives. Sweden has gone after traffickers and pimps, confiscated their illegal assets, and made them compensate for damages while also decriminalizing and offering services to prostituted women and children. By imposing penalties on those who create the demand and providing ‘John schools’ that address their addiction to dominance, they diminish the problem itself.
The result has been a significant decrease in sex trafficking and the commodification of sex. In ’99, it was estimated that 1,25,000 Swedish men bought about 2,500 prostituted women one or more times per year, before the law came into force. By ’02, this figure had fallen to no more than 1,500 women. The only truly effective way to curb trafficking is to see it for what it is, an outrage to human rights; one that can diminish, just as labor slavery and colonialism have come to do. Prostitution has not existed in all societies: it is a function of the inequality of women and the equation of masculinity with domination. All men in the present are not dependent on prostitution.
Commodification of human beings creates a separate class of people whose bodies can be rented or sold—the very opposite of the universal protection of human dignity enshrined in the body of the Indian constitution.
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Ruchira Gupta - President Apne Aap Women Worldwide has worked for 25 years to end human trafficking.[1] She was awarded the Abolitionist Award by the UK House of Lords in 2007,[2] won an Emmy for ‘outstanding investigative journalism’ her documentary, 'The Selling of Innocents' and has been honored at the White House for her work to combat trafficking. She has founded Apne Aap (www.apneaap.org), a grassroots organization supported over 10,000 women and children trapped in or at risk to prostitution.
She sits on the Steering Committee for the Planning Commission of the Government of India for the 11th Five-year Plan for Women and Children and on the Working group of the Ministry of Women and Children. She is on the Advisory board of Asia Society, New York, Coalition against Trafficking in Women, Asia-Pacific, Cents for Relief, US, Nomi Network, US, Ricky Martin Foundation and Vital Voices, Washington DC. Her testimony to the United States Senate had a direct role in the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 2000.
She has worked in the United Nations for the last ten years and helped the Government of Nepal, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia, Kosovo and Philippines to develop National Action Plans and laws against human trafficking. She has written two manuals developed with UNODC and UNIFEM.
Her publications on trafficking include: a) Trafficking Responses in Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia: Needs, Capacity assessment and Recommendations b) Trafficking in the Asia and Near East region: Problem analysis and Proposed framework for response; Kosovo plan of action to counter trafficking in persons; c) Manual for law-enforcement officers to confront Demand for Human trafficking.; d) Manual for prosecutors to confront human trafficking
Her work has been cited in the following books: Half the Sky by Nicholas Kristoff and A. Wu, Sale by Patricia McCormick, That Takes Ovaries by Rivka Solomon, Adventure Divas by Holly Morris, Ten Thousand Miles without a Cloud by Sun Shun Yun, Breaking the Earthenware Jar by Ruth Hayward, Revisiting India by Ramin Jehanbegloo, Violence against Women by Kalyani Sen, and In the name of Ram By Abid Surti.
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Beginning on December 20,
the Maoists staged a nationwide bandh (general strike) that has resulted in violent clashes between Maoists
and riot police and further weakens the peace process that began almost three
years ago.
Pushpa Kamal Dahal
Prachanda, the Maoists’ leader also hinted that this could lead to an
indefinite general strike, should the current government fail to meet his party’s
demands.
The protest began with a
torch protest on Saturday evening and gained momentum the following day.
Security conditions were tightened, vehicular movement came to a halt and the
clashes ensued.
Policemen, who were trying
to clear a blocked road in the nation’s capital, came under attack with hurled
bricks and stones thrown by the Maoist crowd. The police responded with batons,
water cannons and teargas in an effort to gain control of the situation. 21
policemen were injured, one critically. Maoists’ claimed that 100 of their
members were injured.
Maoist “civil protest” also
erupted into vigilante-type vandalism. Buses, trucks and cars were torched.
Although the Maoists promised not to obstruct the movement of press vans,
vehicles carrying diplomats, tourists and medical personnel, widespread
disruption occurred, including one vehicle filled with hospital staff
responding to an emergency call from Shahid Gangalal Heart Center. The
ambulance driver was severely injured.
Violence was not confined to
Kathmandu.
In Gorkha District, members
of the YCL, the paramilitary youth wing of the Maoists, beat up Nepali Congress
leader Dhruba Panta, leaving him in critical condition.
In Nepalgunj, Kaviiraj
Karki, a Mugu journalist, was stoned and pummeled within an inch of his life
while photographing the strike. His camera was destroyed and he remains in
critical condition with severe head wounds.
The Maoists latest efforts
render Nepal’s fragile peace process increasingly dubious. Time is running out
for the nascent republic that now has just five months to draft a people’s
constitution and implement it on May 28, 2010.
Information and
Communications Minister Shankar Pokhrel called the bandh a gross violation of the peace agreement. Prime
Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, who just returned from the Copenhagen summit,
decried the Maoists, saying that their movement was now not even in their
control.
The last few days do smack
of “mob rule”, even though the
Maoists only secured 40% of the popular vote during the 2008 elections. At this
point, a showdown – which is of course what the Maoists have wanted ever since
they lost control of the government earlier this year -- seems inevitable. Kunda Dixit, editor of Nepali Times,
described the Maoists’ game plan thusly:
"The end goal is, let the protests
escalate, frustrations of the public, let it boil over, and then they can swing
into power through street protests or an urban uprising. That seems to be the
plan at least as far as the hardcore is concerned."
Does the coalition government have the ability to frustrate this plan? The days of political impasses are numbered. Something has to give.
And soon.
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DECEMBER 17, 2009
As the Maoists
further destabilize Nepal by declaring local autonomies and the creation of a
renegade parallel government, India and China are wooing Nepal’s central
government with pledges of military assistance.
On December 6, a
Chinese military delegation had separate meetings in Kathmandu with Defense
Minister Bidhya Bhandari and Foreign Minister Sujata Koirala. The leader of the
delegation, Lt. Gen. Shu Yutai reaffirmed China’s continued military assistance
to the Nepal Army.
On December 16, a second Chinese delegation visited Nepal Army headquarters, where a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by Major General Jia Jialing and acting Chief of Nepal Army Toran Jung Bahadur Singh. The document specifies that China will provide “non-lethal” military hardware including logistics and training for the Nepal Army – assistance worth approximately 220 million Nepali rupees (over 3,000,000 US dollars). The delegation also invited Defense Minister Bhandari and Defense Secretary Navin Ghimire to Beijing for a follow-up meeting.
This comes at a
time when India has announced that it will resume supplying military hardware
to Nepal, which had been discontinued following King Gyanendra’s takeover of
the government in 2005. In fact, Nepal’s new army chief, General Chhatraman
Singh Gurung, is in the middle of an eight-day visit to Delhi, where he has
been feted and, in return, hosted a banquet for the Indian Army Chief at the
Nepal Embassy.
(Defense Minister A
K Antony, Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor, Indian Air Force Chief Air Chief
Marshal P V Naik and Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma and Defence Secretary
Pradeep Kumar were also in attendance at the ceremony.)
On December 15, the
general had a private follow-up meeting with Defense Minister A. K. Antony,
during which they discussed ways to enhance the defense cooperation between the
two countries. According to one unnamed defense official, counter-insurgency
and recent Maoist maneuvers were at the top of the agenda.
The Indian Army,
which has about 40,000 Nepali Gurkhas in its ranks, also resumed recruitment in
Nepal this year, after a hiatus of nearly two years.
The question many
analysts are asking is: How does this Sino-Indian increase in military
assistance affect Nepal’s stability?
In a recent speech
written by Dr. Katak Malla (who originally delivered it as a lecture at the
Swedish Association of International Affairs in Stockholm and was consequently
reprinted in Republica), he pointed out that Nepal’s domestic instability
“provides opportunities for the external actors to intervene in its domestic
affairs….Officially, both China and India insist that they do not interfere in
the internal affairs of Nepal. At the same time, the Indian government openly
implied that it did not like the idea of a Maoist-led government in Nepal and
the Chinese leaders wonder why the Maoist government did not last long enough.”
“Mahendra’s successor
[King] Birendra bought some anti-aircraft guns from China in the late 1980s,
which was opposed by India, blockading Nepal nearly one year (1989-1990). The
Panchayat regime ended in 1990 as a result of the internal demand for
democracy, coinciding with arms import from China. India supported Nepal’s
democratic movement in 1990 for its own interest, but derailed the democratic
development being involved in the frequent change of governments in Nepal. The
political leadership failed practicing democracy; the Maoist war 1996-2005 was
a cause as well as consequence of it. Nepal’s leaders served the interest of
the neighbors to remain in power.”
Another question:
How does the new Sino-Indian military assistance affect the Nepal Army?
Apart from the
obvious point – that it leaves the army better equipped – the deals come with
tacit approvals from both Beijing and Delhi, i.e. that they condone what the
Nepal Army stands for – stability – particularly in light of the fact that the
Maoists have entered into more revolutionary-like tactics with their ongoing
strikes, continuation of illegal land grabs, threats to return to insurgency,
creation of autonomous regions and finally, the promise of launching of a
parallel government. Their actions are in violation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and seem to be designed to liquidate the current government, the
members of which were elected in the 2008 National Elections. Apparently, the
Maoists have given up all pretenses of supporting a democratic practice, while
the Nepal Army has remained consistently and reliably steadfast.
China has no
appetite for a resumption of a protracted Maoist armed-struggle in Nepal; it
doesn’t serve their economic or political interests. India would certainly like to see the Maoists brought to
heel. And Nepal’s struggling central government’s past willingness to bow to
Maoist bullying seems to be rapidly vanishing.
Nevertheless, the
Maoists have drawn a line in the sand as if their belligerence existed in an
international vacuum. As history has shown time and again, all political ploys
in landlocked Nepal are, sooner or later, subject to international
ramifications. Intentionally or not, the Maoists’ latest maneuverings – by
their very existence – extend beyond Nepal’s northern and southern boundaries…
and the foreign stakes grow higher.
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THE KAILALI
INCIDENT
Disillusionment, lawlessness and violence continue to shackle Western Nepal, particularly in the Madhes, the southern swath of Nepali plains that constitutes 33% of the country’s population. In the past week, two events in particular illustrate the regions’ tinderbox-like conditions. And the Maoists have played a major role in the unrest.
On Friday, December
4, near Lamki township, in the Dudhejhari forest, in the Far-Western district
of Kailali, police were deployed to remove thousands of homeless families, who
had suddenly moved in at the end of November after being displaced by floods
and landslides. An estimated 15,000 people were living in approximately 4,000
shanties. The squatters were from the Dalit caste.
But the squatters
fought back with bricks, lathis, khukuris and axes. Security forces responded
with firearms. At least six people were killed and an additional fifty people
were injured, some critically, including at least one police personnel.
Nevertheless, the
demolition was completed -- shacks
razed and torched.
The government
blamed the Maoists for the incident, asserting that the Maoist-affiliated All
Nepal Squatters’ Association (ANSA) orchestrated the encroachment of settlers
in the forest in the first place. Specifically, it was alleged that Maoist
cadres, led by PLA combatants from nearby UNMIN-monitored cantonments,
instructed the squatters how to retaliate, once the police entered the forest.
On Sunday, December
6, Hari Gyawali, the Maoist in charge of Kailali district – who had previously
signed a document proclaiming the encroachment illegal, thereby approving of
security force intervention – not only retracted his position, but demanded
that the dead be declared martyrs and that the squatters be allowed to remain
in the forest.
The Maoists then
ramped up their moral outrage by calling a general strike.
Over twenty vehicles
were torched or vandalized by Maoists along the roads of Indian border towns,
as well as medical shops that dared to remain open. The party office of Matrika
Prasad Yadav was also attacked. Yadav was once the senior-most Maoist leader in
Madhes, but had since left the Maoist party to form his own group in the south.
(To read my interview with Matrika Yadav CLICK HERE).
On December 8, the
Maoists turned up the heat yet again when the All Nepal Trade Union
Federation-Revolutionary – the powerful trade union affiliated with the Maoists
– said it would enforce a shutdown of Nepal’s media organizations. Leaders of
various media networks who constitute the Media Society were outraged and
called the Maoists hypocrites, claming the Maoists were attempting a kind of
censorship that imperiled the very civilian supremacy the Maoists claimed to be
fighting for.
To complicate the
issue, Raj Kumar Lekhi, leader of the Tharu Kalyankarini Sabha, an organization
comprised of ethnic Tharus, blamed the Kailali incident on the encroachment of
Indians and settlers from the hilly people of Nepal. The Tharus claim to be the
first settlers of southern Nepal and the direct descendants of the historical
Buddha, who was born in the Nepali border town of Lumbini. The organization is
resisting the government’s move to issue citizenship to people who have lived
in the plains for only several generations, fearing that the Tharus will become
a minority in their own ancestral territory.
But the government
in Kathmandu kept its sights on the Maoists. The leader of the anti-Maoist
block in the Communist Party Nepal (United Marxist Leninist – CPM-UML), K P
Oli, dared the Maoists to go back to underground warfare:
“If you think that
your rebellion was Great and Glorious, why don’t you re-enter the jungles and,
if you do so, then the country will not lose anything. What a double standard! The Maoists
teach their cadres to make sacrifices, yet the leaders live a luxurious life.”
Even the US
embassy, which kept its cards close to its chest during the ambassadorship of
Nancy Powell and is now transitioning under the auspices of charge de affaires
Randy Berry, voiced criticism of recent Maoist activities. According to South
Asia Press, Mr. Berry expressed concern that “the continuing seizure of crops
and land throughout Nepal is inconsistent with the stated Maoist commitment to
the peace process, the rule of law, and democratic practices.”
THE ATTEMPTED MURDER
OF JOURNALIST TIKA BISTA
On December 7, in
the western hilly district of Rukum, Tika Bista, a young female journalist was
brutally attacked and left for dead, in reprisal for her anti-Maoist reporting.
The Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ), an independent, nonprofit organization based in New
York, filed this excerpted report:
Bista reported
receiving death threats from Maoist groups on November 29 after publishing a
commentary in the local Jantidhara weekly that criticized local members of the
Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) for using intimidation and threats,
the federation said. The Kathmandu-based human rights group Freedom Forum said
Bista had called a colleague before the assault to say three men were following
her.
“The media
environment for journalists has not improved since Nepal’s transition to democratic
rule in 2008,” said Bob Dietz, CPJ Asia program coordinator. “Police must
investigate the death threats Bista received and bring the perpetrators of this
vicious attack to justice.”
CPJ research shows
that acts of violence against Nepali journalists historically have occurred
frequently and without official investigations. The attack against Bista is the
most serious journalist assault reported in Nepal since the shocking January
murder of Uma Singh.
[Journalist Uma
Singh was murdered in January 2009 in Nepal’s southern district of Dhanusha.
Singh was stabbed repeatedly by a group of approximately 15 unidentified men
who broke into her rented room in Janakpur. Maoist involvement was not ruled
out, but no one, to date, has been arrested. Uma was well known for her reports
on women’s rights and political issues and was vocal in condemning the ongoing
violence in the southern Terai region.]
Nepal has the
dubious distinction of being rated eighth place on the Committee to Protect
Journalists’ 2009 Impunity Index, which ranks the 14 worst countries in the
world for solving journalist murders, recorded by CPJ since 1998.
In the meantime,
Tika Bista is in stable but serious condition. She has a blood clot in her
brain, injuries to her cervical spine, left shoulder, right hand and left foot.
She is lucky to be alive.
According to
Republica, three masked persons blindfolded her and “gradually cut her right
fingers -- the hand she uses for writing -- and the sole of her left foot even
as she ran away to save her life. They also bashed her head. [ ]… she had
phoned her colleague and told she was being chased by three persons. They then
pushed her over a cliff -- estimated to be around 80 feet -- in the forest and
left her to die. She was found in an unconscious state in the forest Tuesday
evening.
***
So what is the
master plan of the Maoists these days? Perhaps we should look to Ganesh Man
Pun’s explanation, as told to a Calcutta Telegraph interviewer (Sankarshan
Thakur) last week. Pun is the chief of the Young Communist League (YCL), the
Maoists’ much-feared paramilitary wing:
“The revolution is
not over,” Pun says as an explanation of current tactics and future objectives,
“but we realize that in the 21st century, we must employ a mix of the bullet
and the ballot, political action and military action have to be fused. The
guerrilla war phase of our struggle is over and we are in the mainstream. We
think we can achieve our aims with mass mobilization but if the forces of
feudalism and imperialism resist the kind of state we want, we shall have to
use force.”
“We would not have
come this far if we had not used violence as a means, you know how powerful the
interests of status quo can be, and nobody talks about the violence they have
unleashed on the people over centuries. This is a struggle for revolutionary
changes, violence will happen. Having said that, we function under the
disciplines of ideology and line, what we do is for our political and social
objectives.”
A simpler of way of
saying this is: “Plant anarchy and reap the political rewards.” It's textbook Marxist methodology.
.......................................................................................
December 4, 2009
Chandan Acharya has created a group on Facebook called
“Nepal in Pictures”. To date he has over 1000 fans and contributors that
include both professional and amateur photographers. The purpose is to collect
a broad spectrum of photographic documentation on Nepali ethnic groups,
festivals and religious holidays, local geography, history, urban and country
life, maps, musical instruments – to name a few socio-cultural interests– and
the cumulative effect is a very impressive peek at a Nepal that you won’t find
in tour guides. Videos and valuable links are also included. Anyone interested
in Nepali culture should visit his visual collection – and revisit – since the
archives keep growing.
The Facebook link is: NEPAL IN PICTURES
A few examples are found below. Click on image to enlarge.
………………….......................................................…………….
Warren W. Smith Jr. has emerged as the preeminent writer on
Tibetan history and Sino-Tibetan relations. Smith, a research historian with
Radio Free Asia's Tibet Service in Washington, D.C., is also the author of Tibet
Nation, and China’s Tibet?
His newest work solidifies that position by offering the most comprehensive account available of Tibet’s resistance during the buildup to the Beijing Olympics – an uprising that challenged China’s claim that it has a legitimate right to colonize and suppress the Tibetan people. Smith relates Beijing’s paranoid reaction to the uprising in fascinating detail.
The organization of the book is extremely helpful for readers who would like to extricate fact from fiction. He begins with a deeply knowledgeable chronology of the 2008 revolt and moves on to examine China’s reaction, not only to the Tibetan protestors but international criticism as well.
Especially insightful is Smith’s examination of the traditional themes of Chinese propaganda, used with tremendous success since the 1950s.
Finally, Tibet’s Last Stand? convincingly reveals that – far from becoming more lenient in response to Tibetan discontent – China has determined to eradicate Tibetan opposition internally and coerce the international community (including Nepal) to conform to China’s version of Tibetan history and reality.
Anyone who is genuinely interested in the Tibetan issue of the nature of modern Chinese nationalism must read Tibet’s Last Stand?, a seminal and mesmerizing book.
Available through Rowman & Littlefield Publishers click here
November 21, 2009
For years I’ve been photo-documenting human rights issues in Nepal, including child labor. Recent statistics shows that about 7 million Nepali children between the ages of 5-14 are working. Apart from health considerations, this negates their chances of getting an education. Nearly half of these children are working full time. Some of them work in India and even further abroad.
I was recently in touch with Alex Masi, a London photographer who shares my interest in child exploitation. Alex has taken some amazing shots of Indian child laborers in the last few years. The brilliance of his photography makes verbal social commentary almost superfluous. Alex’s work has appeared in “Vanity Fair”, “Marie Claire”, “Newsweek”, “'Condé Nast Portfolio”, “El Pais Semanal”, “Aftenposten Innsikt”, “L' Espresso”, “US News & World Report”, among other international magazines and publications.
The photographs that Alex has allowed me to publish are from his Hidden Youth series, a project documenting child labor in Firozabad, India, an extremely polluted city in Uttar Pradesh (not far from Agra) famous for its glass bangle industry. Firozabad is the only place in India where these bracelets are manufactured and they are sold worldwide – perhaps in a store near you.
In Alex’s words:
Most of the work is carried out by local children, raised to be tools of mass production, chained to a life of exploitation inside their own homes, where the glittering bracelets they handle everyday assume the form of handcuffs to a future of servitude. Due to extreme poverty and a lack of choices, over 20.000 young children are still employed in this area, considered to be one of the highest concentrations of child labour on the planet. Forced to work to support their disadvantaged families, children as young as five can earn an average of 30-40 Indian Rupees [approximate one US dollar] for eight or more hours of work daily, while being unable to receive any sort of education. They sit in crouched positions, use solvents, glues, kerosene and various other dangerous materials while breathing toxic fumes and spending most time of the day in dark, harmful environments.
To see more of Alex's superb work, visit his website by clicking on his name below:
....................................................................................................
October 30, 2009 (with an October 31 update-- letter from Marcus Cotton)
Yesterday, Akanshya
Shah filed a report with Republica that sheds light on China’s continuing
unwillingness to give up its apparent addiction to supporting the human
consumption and profiteering of tiger parts. (According to EcoWorldly.com,
China supplies animal “medicine” to 60 countries worldwide.) I’ve posted Ms.
Shahs’ article in full. At the end, I’ve included a four-minute youtube video
on China’s ongoing harvesting of tiger. Everyone interested in the preservation
of tigers, should watch the video and see why the Chinese are the underlying
problem.
KATHMANDU, Oct 29:
Restating its stance in favor of tiger farming, the Chinese delegation at the
ongoing Kathmandu Global Tiger Workshop said Wednesday that China cannot put an
end to its tiger farming as medicine produced from tiger parts is supplied to
60 countries.
Professor Xiong of
Beijing University in his presentation at the interaction said that although
China recognizes the need to stop habitat loss, it will be extremely difficult
for the country to put a ban on tiger breeding and farming, a participant of
the program told myrepublica.com on condition of anonymity.
The source said
that China´s anti-ban stance was criticized by other participants. Stephen
Board, Executive Director of Traffic International, is said to have pointed to
the need of “attitudinal change” by countries involved in tiger farming.
Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Russia, among others, are also said to be
engaging is breeding practices, besides China.
The media was
prohibited from attending the interaction.
Stating that the
total trade in animal parts has now crossed $10 billion in Asia alone, which is
second only to the illegal trade in arms, the Global Tiger Workshop has pointed
out the urgent need for governments to design proactive national policies aimed
at nipping poaching in the bud.
In addition,
participants have strongly urged decision makers to change the paradigm of the
management model and equip the concerned departments with new and modern
technology to fight poachers. Similarly, they have stressed capacity-building
of staff and strengthening the intelligence unit to identify poaching sites.
Moreover, they have urged states to formulate a clear system and revive the
existing mechanism between and among countries to stop trafficking in animal
parts.
Save the Tiger
Fund, the US-based Rhino and Tiger Conservation Fund and Panthera Foundation
have jointly pledged 3-4 million US dollars to identify top priorities and
support government efforts to fight illegal trade in tiger parts.
The workshop on
Wednesday deliberated on topics ranging from steps to be taken to integrate
nature conservation into development priorities and arresting habitat
deterioration caused by infrastructure development and land use to engaging
communities to protect tiger landscapes and helping people come out of the
poverty trap, which, they said, requires “game changing actions” in order to reverse
the current trajectory of extinction.
The participants
also discussed strengthening wildlife enforcement and governance, improving
landscape management and capacity development, suppressing demand for wild
tiger parts, enhancing demand for live wild tiger, estimating conservation
resource needs and developing innovative financing mechanisms.
India urged to hold
anti-poaching talks
In a bid to seek
renewed commitment in controlling illegal trafficking in animal parts and
poaching activities from its southern neighbor, the Nepal government has asked
the Indian side to hold the much-delayed secretary-level meeting on transborder
cooperation as soon as possible. India has delayed the talks for three years.
“India has lagged
behind in the regional effort to strengthen transborder cooperation to control
poaching,” a Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation official said, adding,
“We have strongly urged the Indian side to hold the talks without further
delay.”
Asked to comment,
spokesperson at the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation
Shiva Raj Bhatta said, “The Indian delegation at the tiger workshop has
reassured us that the talks will be initiated soon in Delhi.”
Secretary-level
talks, which are supposed to design bilateral mechanisms for border management,
regulation and control against poaching activities, especially illegal trade in
tiger parts, have been held twice in Kathmandu in 2001 and 2006 and once in
Delhi in 2003.
youtube video on Chinese tiger farms click here
.........................
October 31, 2009
Below is an interesting letter of response to this post from Marcus Cotton, Chief Executive of Tiger Mountain Nepal
Dear Mikel,
We met recently. I was also at the
Tiger Workshop – it was great for Nepal to have gathered so many experts and to
see how the World Bank really does seem to have undergone an attitudinal change
and is now firmly supporting conservation on solid economic grounds. Better
late than never.... The Minister of Forests was ever present, meeting everyone,
eating with everyone, and always encouraging, supporting, and driving the
process forward – impressive indeed.
I would have liked a little more emphasis
on the role of thoughtfully and sensitively managed tourism as a positive force
for conservation. Tiger Tops has clearly proved the formula can work, combining
responsible conservation tourism, charitable support, local communities and the
government agencies in an effective partnership. This, to me, is key for the
effective conservation of tigers across their range – wide stakeholder
partnerships. It will not work if business is told “give us your CSR money and
go away.” For a partnership to be effective, it must be open, candid, and have
full two-way communication. We must all appreciate and understand the
motivations and constraints of our partners.
Knocking China for its slower
approach is not really the way ahead. The leader of the Chinese delegation to
the workshop has achieved significant forward moves in China on conservation –
including opening up towards CITES, regional cooperation in enforcement and
conservation management. Yes, tiger farms are a vile monstrosity, but steady
rational pressure, I believe, will win the day to close them down.
Yours sincerely,
Marcus Cotton
Chief Executive
Tiger Mountain Nepal
................................................................................
October 26, 2009
The World Wildlife Fund had some good news today. In fact, all of us did.
The Government of Nepal has just announced an expansion of Bardia National Park in the Terai Arc Landscape by 900 sq km, which will increase critical habitat for tigers.
Plans for the expansion were revealed at the inaugural
session of the Kathmandu Global Tiger Workshop, held this week with 200
international delegates. The Kathmandu Global Tiger Workshop is the first in a
series of political negotiation meetings occurring throughout the year and
leading up to a final Heads of State Tiger Summit in September 2010, which is
the Year of the Tiger.
Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal attended and stated that the government would establish a National Tiger Conservation Authority as well as a Wildlife Crime Control Committee saying, "The solutions will be area specific, but the future of conservation will depend upon how we act now and how we make tiger conservation and overall biodiversity much more valuable to the livelihoods of local communities."
"This is indeed a great conservation initiative, which will certainly help in curbing illegal wildlife trade and poaching in Nepal," said Anil Manandhar, Country Representative of WWF Nepal. "We are confident that by embracing innovative conservation strategies Nepal will succeed in doubling its number of endangered tigers."
Earlier this year the first ever nation-wide estimate of the tiger population revealed the presence of only 121 breeding tigers in the wild within four protected areas of Nepal. In order to ensure that these tiger numbers remain stable and start to increase, WWF and its partners called on the government to increase anti-poaching activities and habitat protection.
"In making these commitments at a global forum before the 12 other tiger range countries, the Government of Nepal has set an important precedent for others to follow," said Mike Baltzer, Leader of WWF's Tiger Initiative. "The next three days of the workshop are vital as countries and tiger experts band together to create a game-changing plan to save tigers in the wild."
Poaching is the most urgent and immediate threat to tigers. Illegal trade in skins and tiger body parts remains highly profitable in China and other Asian countries – particularly China, where tiger parts are believed to be aphrodisiacs.
Note to China: Viagra is alive and well, but time is running out for the survival of tigers. The worldwide population of tigers is estimated to be below 3,500 animals, down from 100,000 one century ago.
Experts estimate that a single tiger trades for about $1,000 in Nepali markets, but will fetch at least $10,000 internationally.
The Government of Nepal should be applauded for hosting the international workshop. It is also hosted by the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation, and cosponsored by the CITES Secretariat, Global Tiger Forum, Global Tiger Initiative, Save The Tiger Fund, and World Bank.
For more information or to arrange interviews, contact:
Sarah Janicke Email: sjanicke@wwfint.org Tel: +41 79 528 8641
Trishna Gurung Email: trishna.gurung@wwfus.org Tel: +977 98510 20164 (local) +1 202 203 8863 (US)
Sanjib Chaudhary Email: sanjib.chaudhary@wwfnepal.org Tel: +977 9841323152
.................................................................................................
October 10, 2009
KATHMANDU,
CAPITAL OF QUAGMIRE
When the 2006 Peace
Agreement was signed – marking the end of the Maoist armed conflict – it was
hoped that Nepal had set a new course for political stability. The largely
peaceful process of the 2008 elections reinforced that hope. But the
intervening eighteen months have acted as a steady drizzle, dampening Nepalis’
initial optimism.
The primary duty of
the Constituent Assembly was to pen a new constitution by May 2010.
Insufficient progress has been made to that end. If the CA cannot deliver as
promised, and when promised, the legitimacy of the interim government will be
thrown into question. And rightly so.
What has the CA been
doing with its time? Internecine power struggles between the various political
parties have sapped much of the energy that should have been directed
elsewhere. Focusing on emotional issues of symbolic importance – the shape of
the national flag, for instance – have taken precedence over the far less sexy
and more labor-intensive work of knocking out a document, a constitution that
would create a foundation and source of the legal authority for a new republic.
The 601 members of the CA were elected to be the architects of the framework
that would define the powers and duties of the main branches of Nepal’s
government. They were not hired as interior decorators.
Writing a
constitution, in the best of conditions, is a mammoth undertaking. Emerging
from an insurgency that claimed the lives of 16, 278 Nepalis (the death toll
was recently adjusted from the original 13,000 killed) is hardly what could be
called ideal conditions. In 2008, someone needed to be selected to take the
helm and to keep the Constituent Assembly on task – preferably someone who was
not easily distracted – a pragmatist, a taskmaster, a clock-watcher.
Prime Minister
Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) was the first man to have the opportunity to
steer the CA in the right direction. He did not. He worked very hard and very
efficiently to consolidate his party’s power until it blew up in his face with
the General Katawal debacle. Instead of returning to his cardinal task of
captaining the writing of a constitution, he quit his post to save face. In
poker terms, he lost heavily and decided to cash in his remaining chips; he
left the table but not the casino.
Left in the lurch,
the CA brought in Madhav Kumar Nepal: He became the new Prime Minister in May
2009. He inherited a CA in total disarray and has been working hard ever since
to pick up the pieces – not an easy task insomuch as wherever he and his
cabinet go, incensed Maoists block them with black flags and intransigent
rhetoric. It is true that the Maoists garnered a majority of votes during the
elections and they must still play a central role in the writing of the
constitution. But they behave as if they received a mandate, which is not the
case. They behave as if their reputation is the issue, not the writing of the
constitution.
How does the
outside world perceive Nepal? The clock ticks, the political deadlock in
Kathmandu continues – myopic and petty – while the southern swath of Nepal goes
to hell.
SOUTHERN NEPAL,
THE NEW KILLING FIELD
What is going on in
the rest of the country, particularly in the south, is of growing concern to
the international community. The politicos in the Kathmandu Valley should take
note of this concern.
In the three years
since the 2006 Peace Agreement, terrorist and unlawful activity has
dramatically increased with complete impunity and with no end in sight.
To give but one
example of the absence of accountability, in September 2007, there were riots
in Kapilvastu following the murder of a local Muslim landowner, Mohit Khan.
Fourteen people were killed, the town was torched (as were neighboring
villages) and thousands were displaced, afraid to return to an area that
offered no security. The perpetrators of the riots and murders and arson have
never been captured; the government has mounted no impartial investigation.
This is the norm in the south. Atrocities occur. Thugs and terrorists walk away
unscathed.
Last month, the
Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) published findings that illustrate how
bad things really are. In the last two years and ten months, 1,284 deaths and
2,100 abductions have occurred in the Terai. Over 100 new underground
armed-groups have come into existence. 90% of the deaths have been attributed
to these armed groups. Adding to the general atmosphere of violence, political
parties have now formed semi-armed youth wings, perhaps in response to the
pre-existing YCL – the youth wing of the Maoists. 10 of the deaths and 336 of
the abductions in the Terai in the last three years are attributed to the YCL.
One of the old and
better organized armed-groups in the south (established in 2004), is the Akhil
Terai Mukti Morcha (ATMM), an insurgent outfit fighting for a separate homeland
for ethnic Madhesis, who make up one-third of Nepal’s population. The leader of
ATTM is Jaikrishna Goit. He was once a Maoist leader. Last week, in a secret
interview with Anuj Chopra (for Madhesi-United We Stand), Goit insisted that
Madhesis had the right to secede from Nepal and form an independent state. When
asked how he justified terrorism, murder and extortion to achieve his
separatist goals, Goit gave a bizarre response. He cited Gandhi: “’I would
rather have people resort to arms in order to defend her honor than that she
should in a cowardly manner remain a hopeless witness to their own dishonor.’”
(The provenance of the quote was not cited.) The article continues to explain
that, “After the interview, [which was conducted in an undisclosed place in
northern India], Mr. Goit crossed back over the porous border into Terai
through the flood plains of the monsoon-swollen Koshi river, which is lined
with sandbanks and riddles with shifting grasslands.”
This last bit is
what most concerns the international community: the ease with which outlaws and
terrorists can move undetected between Nepal and India. It’s beginning to look
like a very nasty breeding ground.
INDIA’S MISGIVINGS
– INSURGENTS AND THE PAKISTANI CONNECTION
There is no doubt
that criminal and terrorist movement from Nepal, made possible by its
1800-kilometer border, has forced India to reexamine how it regards its
northern neighbor. The steady succession of incidents that have occurred in the
last month alone illustrate why they are alarmed.
September 22:
Sudhanshu Sudhakar, an ex-soldier of the Indian Army was arrested in northern
India for spying for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He was
allegedly captured with dossiers on missile designs, locations of Indian Army
deployment along the Nepali border, as well as plans for future army deployment
to Jammu and Kashmir. Also seized in the arrest were five sim cards and a
Nepali mobile phone. Officials claimed that Sudhakar admitted that these were
used to contact “Rana”, an ISI operative employed at the Pakistan Embassy in
Kathmandu. Apparently Sudhakar was arrested on his way to Kathmandu to brief
the ISI representative. The suspect also admitted that he had already visited
Nepal twice earlier.
Another September
22 incident: According to Indian Express, the Anti-Terror Squad and Delhi Police had proof that three
Indian Mujahideen terrorists, accused of carrying out blasts in Delhi and Uttar
Pradesh, were currently hiding in Nepal: The three men were allegedly being
provided safe haven in Nepal by ISI.
October 1: Indian
police captured a Nepali Maoist leader who had escaped from a Nepali prison, “a
high security jail in Kanchanpur district of Nepal”, according to Press Trust
of India. Twelve other prisoners escaped but have not been captured. Again, the
point is that the porous Indo-Nepali border has become a symbol of safe-haven
for wanted men.
October 7: Majid
Manihar, the alleged kingpin of a counterfeit Indian rupees racket, operating
inside southern Nepal, was shot and killed in a hotel in Nepalganj. Manihar’s
son had been arrested the previous month in India, with large amounts of fake
currency in his possession. The son reportedly revealed Pakistan’s ISI role in
the counterfeit operation. Indian authorities assume that it was ISI operatives
who assassinated Manihar, fearing that he might cooperate with New Delhi, in an
effort to get his son released.
October 8: In the
Indian border state of Maharashtra, gunmen ambushed a group of 40 policemen,
killing 17 and injuring two. Ashok Chavan, Chief Minister of Maharashtra,
accused Nepali Maoists as the culprits. The gun battle lasted for four hours.
Several hours later, a “police informer” was beheaded. Maoists will obviously
deny any participation and so far no hard evidence has been brought forward to
substantiate the accusation. It would seem more likely that Naxalites (Indian
Maoists) committed the massacre. Naxalites freely roam Maharashtra and the
neighboring district of Chhatisgarh, one of the most lawless states in India.
But, again, the point is that the sheer volume of cross-border activity between
Nepal and India lends itself to such knee-jerk conclusions. The whole area is
out of control. Corruption is so pervasive that impunity has found very fertile
soil.
Yesterday, it was
announced that India and Nepal would be launching a joint operation along the
border area in an effort to reduce crime. The move is to be applauded, but the
task is huge and, in the past, Indian-Nepal cooperation has been a dicey dance.
AS INDIA
REEVALUATES NEPAL’S POTENTIAL THREAT, CHINA IS FORCED TO REEVALUATE NEPAL’S
INSTABILITY.
The volley of recriminations between India and China is commonplace and
Nepal is being dragged into the conflict. Only last week, the Indian government
accused China of setting up 24 “Nepal-China study centers” (most of which are
located along Nepal’s border with India) as spy centers. Ostensibly, the
centers were created to provide Nepalis with a deeper understanding of Chinese
customs, language and economical development. India’s external intelligence
agency, RAW, accuses the centers of being covers for monitoring Indian security
forces. RAW points out that most of the centers’ directors are former PLA
officers. Supporters of the Chinese, on the other hand, counter that RAW has
been spying in an on Nepal for decades, so who are they to complain?
What is important
for Nepal to remember is that, historically, Nepal has served both India and
China as a convenient buffer zone. It may be a curse, but it is also a blessing,
if Nepal uses this status to its full advantage. Because it is geographically
trapped between China and India, tiny Nepal will never be an entirely
independent nation. But Nepal can continue to exist as a sovereign state if it
is realistic about its own limitation: Its ability to survive is wedded to its
ability to maintain neutrality. (Recent attempts, for instance, to “play the
China card” against India is foolish and self-destructive.)
MAINTAINING
NEUTRALITY
In the 21st
century, maintaining neutrality is only going to become more challenging. Nepal should prepare itself: assertiveness from
India and China is only going to increase as their domination as world powers
accelerates in the upcoming decades.
And how can Nepal
maintain that precious neutrality? Taking a deep breath would be a good start.
Remembering what the goal of the 2008 elections was really about – to create a
new constitution that will adequately support the newest of the world’s
republics – is paramount.
And then proceed
from there. Restore law and order to the south. Encourage a judicial system
that can eliminate the prevailing attitude of impunity. Support the well-oiled
mechanization of the army instead of trying to bend it to ideological
preferences. Engage the southern district with dialogue and programs that will
foster security instead of additional armed-groups – thug outfits and
gang-bangers posing as political entities. Send a very loud message to would-be
terrorists (and the alarmed international community) that Nepal is no longer
friendly soil for their nefarious enterprises.
But first, get that damned constitution written.
The world is watching the clock even if the Constituent Assembly has
lost track of time.
October 4, 2009
click on images to enlarge
About a week ago, I ran into a friend by the name of Don
Farber. He’s a world-class photographer and he had just published his newest
photography book, which he happened to have with him. The book blew me away.
Don has been following and photographing His Holiness the Dalai Lama for the
last 30 years and his newest book is the result of that huge body of work. His
Holiness the Dalai Lama, published by
teNeues Publishers (Germany), is nothing short of a visual biography of perhaps
the world’s most famous spiritual leader. The book is very large in dimensions,
the images are sumptuous in their simplicity, and the content is historically
invaluable.
A few days later, I had the chance to talk to Farber again, only this time I inquired about the “back story” of many of the photographs. He gave me permission to publish some of the photographs, along with his memories of the moment when he snapped the shots.
In 1989, His Holiness the Dalai Lama gave a ten-day
teaching on the Kalachakra in Santa Monica, California. Farber took this shot
the day before the teaching in the city’s Civic Auditorium. The Dalai Lama was
nearly alone in the auditorium, (just a few attending monks), making preparations for the public initiation the
following day.
1989, Santa Monica: During the 10-day teaching, monks
from Namgyal Monastery created a Kalachakra sand mandala. At the end of the
teaching, His Holiness physically dismantled the mandala – a practice in
impermanence. Farber told me, “The monk behind His Holiness was either holding back
the folds of his robe, so that they wouldn’t touch the mandala, or perhaps he
was just holding the Dalai Lama to help keep his balance. Once the Dalai Lama
had completed his part, monks came around with little brooms to gather the
colored sand. The sand was then secured in a container. Then they all rushed out
and into cars waiting outside and drove to Marina Del Ray, south of Santa
Monica, where there is a dock jutting out into the Pacific Ocean. The Dalai
Lama poured the sand into the Pacific – a gesture and blessing to benefit the
nagas in the sea.”
1997, Dharamsala, India, home of Tibet’s Government-in-Exile.
Farber remembers: “It was the morning of the first day of Losar [Tibet’s New
Year celebration]. It is a tradition for His Holiness to acknowledge the crowd who converges to join in the
New Year festivities.”
In 1997, Don Farber received a Fulbright Scholarship to document the “religious life of Tibetan refugees” in India. The Dalai Lama assured Farber
that, sometime during the summer, while he was in Dharamsala, he would arrange
for the photographer to photograph him in various activities. “I was invited to the ‘Palace’,
which isn’t really a palace, but it’s what they call the Dalai Lama’s residence
in Dharamsala. I was asked to arrive very early in the morning before sunrise. These two
photographs were taken in his private quarters. He allowed
me to observe and capture his early morning practice.”
1997, Siliguri, India. “Siliguri is in northern India,
just below Darjeeling. His Holiness was giving the Kalachakra initiation and it
drew an enormous crowd. I was told 250,000 people attended. Tibetans from Tibet
came. Bhutanese came. The local hill tribe people came. And of course many
people from all over India and Nepal attended as well. The shot we are looking
at was of monks while they were receiving the initiation. You see that some of the monks have the headbands
covering their eyes. It is symbolic of their vow to keep the secrets of the
Kalachakra to themselves.”
2007, Washington D.C. “This photograph of His Holiness on
the steps of the Capital Building was taken on October 17, 2007, immediately
after the Dalai Lama had received the Congressional Gold Medal. It was a
thrilling day of course. The President of the United States, and all the dignitaries
were on hand for the presentation. Afterward, His Holiness went outside to give
his address. And I took this shot.”
2009, New York City. “Tibet House of New York hosted
this event in the New Beacon Theater. The date was May 4. His Holiness’
teaching was on the Quintessence of Compassion."
On Sunday, October 11, 2009, at 2pm, Don Farber will give a
live presentation about his new work at the Pacifica Asia Museum, located in
Pasadena, California. For reservations and full details click here: Pacifica Asia Museum
To see more of Don Farber's work, go to his website: www.buddhistphotos.com
....................................................................................................
September 17, 2009
In Buddha’s Warriors,
my history of the Tibetan freedom fighters, I wrote about the 1974 demise of
Tibetan armed resistance at Tinker’s Pass from the Tibetan point of
view.
A few weeks ago, however, I posted a never-before-published
photograph (by Lisa Choegyal) of the Tibetans’ leader, General Wangdu, taken a
few weeks before his murder at Tinker’s Pass. (Click here for article)
The article had the unexpected result of correspondence received containing
many new details about the Nepal Army’s role in nailing the endgame of Tibetan armed resistance – moreover, from
primary sources – Nepalis who either took part in the 1974 NA operation or who
are descendents of NA officers.
One man in particular came forward with an enormous amount
of information, now declassified, but long overlooked. He is now retired Lieutenant Colonel
Madan J. Sijapati, who, at the time of the Tibetan defeat was stationed in Jomsom,
Mustang. He was a young man in 1974, but served as Second-in-Command (2IC) of
Narayan Dal Company, an attach Independent Infantry Company (COY). (The Narayan Dal Company commander was Major Lok Bahadur Thapa (later retired as LTC.)
I’m also receiving invaluable archival photographs, which I will begin to publish from time to time. I encourage any Nepali readers who have additional information or photographs from that era to please pass them along to me. Eventually, all of the interviews, photographs, and other data I have collected over the last fifteen years while researching Nepali-Tibetan issues, will be donated to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which is quickly becoming the most valuable repository on this subject.
KAISANG: The Secretive Khampa HQs in Mustang
LTC Madan J. Sijapati was stationed in Jomsom at the time of
the final showdown with the Khampa warriors, who had been running their base of
operations in Mustang since the early 1960s. The Narayan Dal Company, of which
Sijapati was second-in-command, was separated from Kaisang by four hours of very
high terrain; Kaisang was General Wangdu’s Headquarters. Sijapati described the
Kaisang location (11,500 feet above sea level) as impossibly inhabitable. He
also remembers a 17,000 ft. plateau where there was a runway-like structure
used as an airstrip – or perhaps an airdrop used by the C-130s, which the CIA
Tibetan Task Force, in earlier years, sent to drop in supplies to the freedom
fighters. The Narayan Dal Company had been stationed in Jomsom for seven years
prior to the offensive.
In 1974, when the Khampas Disarmament was set into action, a
total of 9 different Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) units were mobilized from
Pokhara. All the equipment was carried on horseback and/or walked from Pokhara,
since an airport had not yet been built in Jomsom. A fraction of officers and
soldiers were chosen from these units. The main infantry units to be mobilized
were: Narayan Dal COY, Indra Dhoj COY, & SriNath Battalion (BN). Other
units that contributed soldiers/officers included the artillery unit Raj Dal
BN, signals unit Ganesh Dal BN, and Engineer BN – again, representatives from
these units were deployed, not the entire units. There was also one battalion
stationed in Lette as a reserve force. (Lette is on the way to Jomsom from
Pokhara.) The total number of RNA troops present in Jomsom to carry out the
offensive was between 1000-1200.
The over all field
commander was LTC Satchit SJB Rana (who later became Chief of Army Staff --
COAS). The Brigade Commander (and also the Operations Commander was Brig Gen
Singha Pratap Shah (who also later became COAS).
Prior to the
offensive, LTC Sijapati was assigned the task of carrying out intelligence on
the way from Pokhara to Jomsom. He traveled in disguise: He was dressed up as
an Aviation Dept's engineer carrying huge signal communication gears as he
traveled the route. Everywhere his team stopped for some tea and snacks, they
would be asked casually about their identities and their business for traveling
to Jomsom. He would answer that they were the Aviation Dept Engineers going to
Jomsom to collect data in order to build an air strip/airport. He was chosen
for the task because he was from the Infantry Signal Comms & Engineering
Section of the Army & could explain the technical aspects properly should
any knowledgeable person inquired.
In the meantime,
negotiations between the government and Wangdu were taking place, off an on, in
Kathmandu. But in Mustang, RNA troops had slowly started setting up
posts and patrolling in and around Jomsom. This significantly blocked the
communication link between the Tibetan sympathizers and the Khampas warriors.
Also, blockades were set up at intervals to block the main Pokhara-Jomsom route
that the Tibetans used to ferry food and other essentials – an effort the
government hoped would force the Khampas to surrender even before negotiations
were completed.
What the government was offering those who surrendered was
refugee status, interest-free loans, allocation of some land, and education for
the Tibetans’ children. Khampa distrust of the government stymied negotiations.
Simultaneously, Baba Gen Yeshi, who had served as the original commander of the
Mustang freedom fighters, but was booted because of corruption and embezzlement
of funds, had joined forces with the king’s government. Baba Gen Yeshi (and his
loyal followers) provided extremely vital intelligence to the Nepal government.
What he was actually paid for his betrayal of the freedom fighters has never
been substantiated.
Apparently, the government was not entirely certain of Baba
Gen Yeshi’s loyalty either. The RNA deemed it wise to back up Gen Yeshi’s
information with its own intel. RNA reconnaissance teams were sent out to study
Khampa positions in the Kaisang area, a natural fortress. Kaisang was in
between the bases of Mt. Nilgiri (23,100 ft) on the east and Mt. Tilicho
(23,400 ft.) to the west. 3000 ft. directly above Kaisang was a cliff and a
naked hill, which the reconnaissance team would scale at night and wait until
dawn to observe Khampa activity. Sijapati remembers that, “the Khampas were
definitely tough, highly trained, skilled, aggressive, and high-altitude
guerilla fighters. Thus, caution had to be taken by us while dealing with
them.” Baba Gen Yeshi was flown to different Khampa camps in the region where
he talked to the freedom fighters and described the benefit of surrendering to
the government.
Further NRA pressure was exerted on the Khampas by the
firing of rounds of Howitzer 25/75 guns, causing small avalanches around
Kaisang.
When the deadline for peaceful disarmament had passed and it
became clear that Wangdu would never surrender, the NRA began their offensive.
From Jomsom, they mobilized toward the Kaisang at 10 pm. Most of the unified BN
advanced towards the hills that lead to Kaisang and other troops moved towards
surrounding areas. Additional troops were mobilized in Jomsom and nearby areas.
By 4 am the next day, according to Sijapati, “The troops that had moved towards
Kaisang had made a cordon around the camp and were in full position. Of course,
they had with them local people who had good knowledge of the terrain, the
government administrative people, and the police. Nobody knew what the
intention of the Khampas was: whether they would defy the government's order to
surrender and engage in a battle or simply surrender.”
The troops waited and watched. There was no movement within
Kaisang that indicated that they were battle-ready. Nobody came outside the
camp and no troops entered the camp. Finally, at 4 pm, the order came for the
NRA to move inside the camp. The RNA troops ordered the Khampas to surrender or
to face the consequences. The troops also warned them that they would be
approaching their camp as mandated by the government and not to fire on them or
else they would be fired upon. The Khampas finally agreed to lay down their
weapons.
The first Nepalis to enter the camp were administrative personnel: police, and
RNA officers. After they were satisfied that the coast was clear, the troops
entered. A search of the camp was conducted for General Wangdu. Only then did
the Nepalis realize that Wangdu, along with a group of loyal soldiers –
approximately 18 in number – had already escaped.
It was not until two or three days had passed that a group of RNA officers and soldiers -- including Sijapativ
-- were sent out in search of the escaped general. Sijapati recounts that,
“there was a trail behind the camp in the direction of the base of the
mountains and a high plateau passing through very rough terrain. This was the
only way Wangdu could have escaped as all the other routes were blocked by our
troops. So we followed this route carefully and reached Ghami, a small,
high-altitude small village beyond Kagbeni and Jharkhand. In Ghami, we found
fresh blood and the fur and bones of a yak: Wangdu’s team had killed a Yak and
had carried its meat as food for them.”
The RNA troops were not dressed for the high altitude chase
that awaited them. Nor did they have the proper gear. Nor were they sufficient
in numbers to split up: They realized at Ghami that there were several routes
in different directions that could have been taken by Wangdu and his men. They
had no choice but to descend -- all of the troops returning to Jomsom except for Sijapati, who was ordered to return to Kaisang where his company remained for seven months.
When they returned to Kaisang, they saw that, “all weapons,
ammos, radio sets, different stuff were being taken under the control of the
Army. The weapons and radio sets and other technological things were all
foreign made and advanced and sophisticated by the standards of that era. Even
the RNA did not posses some of the weapons that they had - this can be verified
by visiting the Nepalese Army museum at Chuanni where the weapons seized form
the Khampas are at display.”
Sijapati’s Narayan Dal Company was selected to remain in
Kaisang along with the disarmed Khampas. The Company set up a perimeter around
the camp and guarded the Khampas. “The Khampas were not allowed to exit the
camp: They were like the modern-day cantonments in Nepal set up for the Maoist
combatants. We remained there until the resettlement process was carried out.
Not a single shot was fired in Kaisang. It was one of the most successful
operations in the history of the RNA.”
But meanwhile General
Wangdu and his men were crisscrossing Tibet and Nepal while trying to make
their way to Tinker’s Pass where the borders of 3 countries -- Nepal, India,
and Tibet converged – and where, it would later be discovered, Indian Para
Commandos were waiting to take the Wangdu’s group on to safety.
But the Nepalis
had no idea where Wangdu might have gone and the entire RNA was on high
alert. It wasn’t until Wangdu’s
team attacked and looted some weapons in a small police post in Simikot (Humla
district), that Wangdu’s escape route was discerned. It would prove to be
Wangdu’s fatal mistake. The police in Simikot radioed to Kathmandu what had
happened. The RNA was now in a position to track all possible routes Wangdu's
team might travel to get to India. Unusual movement by Indian Forces at Tinker
confirmed the RNA’s speculation that Wangdu would attempt to cross Tinker
sooner or later.
The RNA Operations
Commander in that area was Brig Gen Aditya SJB Rana. But Tinker’s Pass came
under the direct command of a Subedar of Aridhman Company. It was the Subedar
who conducted the ambush.
Two Tibetans scouts were the first into ride into view of the concealed RNA troops. They were allowed to enter Tinker’s Pass without being shot. But they were captured. Then came the majority of the eighteen Khampas. The RNA troops, who had been well placed for an ambush, carried out the offensive. All of the Khampas were killed. Now the problem was that no one knew what Wangdu looked like. So, they had to fly in Baba Gen Yeshi from KTM and have him identify Wangdu’s body.
I met Baba Gen Yeshi a year or so before his death. This was in 1999. He was by then reclusive and very frail. He emerged from his prayer room in full monk’s robes with a worn mala (prayer beads) dangling in one hand.
I asked him if he regretted anything. He told me there were not enough hours in the day to make amends for the life he had lived.
........................................................................................
Special thanks to Avinit Sijapati.
....................................................................................................................
September 3, 2009 
The global climate change has been prominent in the Nepali news recently.
The glaciers of the Himalayas and Tibet feed seven of the world’s greatest rivers
-- including the Ganges, Indus and Mekong – and supply water to 40 per cent of
the world's population. The rapidly shrinking Himalayan glaciers are already
affecting the lives of millions of people across south Asia. According to experts,
droughts, floods and landslides are increasing in frequency and intensity – and
nowhere more so than in Nepal.
It's encouraging to note, however, that Nepalis' awareness of their fragile environment has become a priority. I was just sent, for example, a three-minute film created and produced by a Nepali team of talented young filmmakers in Kathmandu. Please take the time to check it out on youtube:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PYg07h5PqVI
Maanavata (“The Human Race”)
Manoj K.C. “Samaya”………. narrator
Sanjay Rauniyar………….…... music
Balanda Rai ………………....…. studio recording, Kathmandu Music
Centre
Rasna Singh Dongol .……….. subtitles
Sanjay Maharjan ….……..…… assistant cameraman
Govinda Shrestha ………..…. production manager
Sunita Dongol ………...……… producer
................................................................................
September 2, 2009
“Politics in Terai is fragmented to unmanageable levels.
Most groups have a semi-militant character and there are allegedly 109 armed
groups operating in the Terai alone. Many armed groups operate in the belt,
with close ties with criminal networks across the border in India. The anarchic
set up provides space for international counterfeit currency and drug
trafficking.”
The Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) today called on the State Governments of Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar to take action against Nepal’s armed groups operating from Indian soil.
In its latest briefing paper, “Madhes: The challenges and opportunities for a stable Nepal” released today the ACHR stated that there are multiple Nepalese armed opposition groups operating from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and local politicians, not necessarily the Indian State, have been providing support to these groups.
The armed opposition groups in Terai, Nepal have been proliferating and about 100 of them are active at present.
“The improvement of law and order situation under Chief Minister Nitish Kumar in Bihar has also resulted in criminal elements exploiting lawlessness on the Nepal side, and collaborating with local operators to loot, extort, and kill. The cross border anarchic set up provides space to international counterfeit currency, drug smuggling and trafficking networks” – stated Mr Suhas Chakma, Director of ACHR.
While acknowledging India’s repeated insistence of not backing any extremist outfit from Nepal, the Asian Centre for Human Rights stated “Delhi complicates the situation further by attempting to micro-manage party politics and sending multiple and conflicting messages to different actors in Nepal.”
Asian Centre for Human Rights also called on the government of Nepal to recognize the rights of the Madhesis including their mother tongues and bring an end to the ongoing extrajudicial executions in the Terai in the name of maintaining law and order. There were allegations of over a dozen extrajudicial executions in recent past.
Warning about the deteriorating situation in the Terai, Asian Centre for Human Rights stated, “The debate over the Vice President Dr Parmanand Jha taking oath in Hindi may be over but another conflict may not be if the government of Nepal continues with its clumsy armed intervention.
ACHR has asked the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate the extrajudicial executions in the Terai region.
ACHR specifically recommended to the State governments of UP and Bihar (1) to stop any form of covert encouragement to extremist groups, using violent means, to push secessionist agenda in the Terai; (2) to not allow activities of these groups from Indian soil, and instead use leverage to push them to curtail activities on the lines of what had been done before the constituent assembly elections and (3) be vigilant about the potential of non state actors on the Indian side who provide such encouragement to extremist groups in the Terai, and take appropriate actions.
While it was at it, the ACHR might have admonished the Indian media, some members of which thrive on stoking their headlines with provocative and unsubstantiated allegations.
The most recent example was this week, when India newspapers “reported” that there was a sinister link between Pakistan-based terror kingpin Dawood Ibrahim and Nepal's former crown prince Paras. Specifically, the India media claimed that Paras was involved in running a fake Indian currency racket that distributed bogus currency manufactured in Pakistan to India. The sources for the allegation are unnamed, although the idea is that members of India’s Anti-Terrorist Squad have nabbed “yet another man with close connection with the ousted Nepal royal family.” Also, an Uttar Pradesh police officer is quoted as saying, “the diaries recovered from the arrested persons also contain vital information establishing their connection with some influential person in Nepal including some family members of King Gyanendra.”
How the press then jumps to the conclusion that Paras is
behind an international counterfeit ring is beyond this writer’s comprehension.
On Tuesday, an independent television channel, Avenues Television, said that a
photograph carried by an Indian television station, allegedly showing Paras
shaking hands with Dawood, was “manipulated”.
It rather reminds one of the 1991 incident, when Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil assassinated former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi – but not before India's intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing, had erroneously suggested that Nepal's then queen Aishwarya might have funded the assassination. The India press went wild with that headline, in spite of the fact that it was baseless.
In any case, the Nepali government should be congratulated for keeping an arm’s distance from the unverifiable allegations. There is enough on the home front to keep them very busy.
Highly recommended: For the full report issued by Asian Centre for Human Rights on the Indian border issue, click on the link below:
Report on Indian-Nepali Border
...................................................................
AUGUST 26, 2009
In the 1970s, General Wangdu
was the last leader of the thirteen camps of Tibetan freedom fighters hiding
out in Mustang. His murder – he was ambushed at Tinker’s Pass in 1974 – marked
the end of Tibetan armed insurgency against China’s People’s Liberation Army.
When I wrote Buddha’s Warriors, The
Story of the CIA-Backed Tibetan Freedom Fighters, the Chinese Invasion, and the
Ultimate Fall of Tibet, I sifted
through thousands of old photos kept by Tibetan refugees, in search of shots of
Wangdu, but I came up with only two. Several years ago, I mentioned to a friend
of mine – and longtime denizen of Kathmandu – how unfortunate it was that there
were so few images of Wangdu. My friend was Lisa Choegyal, co-author (along
with Gautam SJB Rana) of the recently published Kathmandu Valley Style. (click here for review) Lisa looked at me and
said, “You know, I photographed Wangdu a few months before his death. I wonder
where it is?”
Last week, Lisa happened
upon this long-lost and rare image of Wangdu and forwarded it to me. The note
attached explained that Wangdu had posed for Lisa “in front of the Annapurna
Hotel cacti. He looks so young to have had such a responsibility of leadership
on his shoulders. He was a commanding presence, even zooming around Kathmandu
on the back of a motorbike, which is what we did together, him never without an
armed bodyguard. Maybe that cord you can see around his neck is related to
carrying a
pistol? His English was not great, but you can see
his enthusiasm and the passion for life and his
committed cause in the picture. It was March 1974, and my memory
was he was in (what turned out to be) the last round of negotiations with the
Nepal authorities to cease hostilities with the Chinese - it was a frustrating
time for him, as he must have suspected the costs of his decision.”
For those of you unfamiliar
with the story, the freedom fighters of Tibet, called the Chushi-Gangdruk had risen in resistance to the Chinese takeover of
Tibet in the 1950s. They were estimated to be 80,000-strong at the time of the
Dalai Lama’s escape from Tibet in 1959. The sheer number of PLA deployed into
Tibet eventually forced the Chushi-Gangdruk to retreat to the Nepali area of Mustang, where they
continued to make incursions on the PLA throughout the 1960s. The first leader
of the Mustang forces was Baba Gen Yeshi, who proved to be corrupt. Not only
did he pocket funds intended for the troops, but bribed Tibetan refugees
attempting to escape Tibet through Mustang by having his subordinates
appropriate their sacred statues, thankas and other valuables.
Wangdu was brought to Mustang to replace Baba Gen Yeshi. Baba Gen Yeshi never forgave Wangdu and would eventually betray him and the Tibetan freedom fighters.
The story continues with an
excerpt from Buddha’s Warriors:
King Mahendra, who, in the
past had handled the Mustang question by simply looking the other way, died in
1972. The heir apparent, Prince Birendra, was eager to improve relations with
China. He had made a trip to Beijing the year before and – now that he had
become king – wanted the Tibetans out of Mustang at all costs. By 1973, 20
percent of Nepal’s much-needed foreign aid was coming from Beijing. Finally,
toward the insistence of the Chinese, the young King Birendra publicly demanded
that the Mustang guerillas surrender or face the consequences.
One of the commanders under
General Wangdu, Tinzing Jyurme, described the Chushi-Gangdruk’s reaction in Mustang:
I had been up there since
1960. What would you do if you had spent the last twelve or thirteen years
freezing your ass off? We were ready to fight. We were willing to fight the
whole Nepalese army, if we had to. We weren’t afraid of the Nepalese, and they
knew it.
It was Wangdu who calmed
us down. He reminded us that there were many thousands of Tibetan refugees
living in Pokhara and Kathmandu – many were relatives of ours and all of them
were guests of the Nepalese government. And there were a lot of Nepalese who
weren’t very happy about our presence anyway. If we fought the Nepalese Army,
we would only create additional hardships for our families. We knew Wangdu was
right, but I also knew that Wangdu would never just give up.
Nevertheless, King
Birendra’s ultimatum was temporarily – quite literally – put on ice. A brutal
Mustang winter arrived, and the accompanying snowfall closed off passage into
and out of Mustang. Nothing could be done until the spring of 1974. But even
after the March and April thaws had cleared the mountain passes, Wangdu refused
to initiate surrender.
It is possible that he was
waiting for some cue from the Dalai Lama’s Government-in-Exile in Dharamsala,
India. It is equally possible – during that last, desolate winter – that he
made the decision to go out in glory rather than admit defeat. Over the last
fifteen years, Wangdu had experienced Tibet’s organized resistance being
squeezed and shoved around by every conceivable outside force: First they had
been pushed out of their own country by the PLA; then they had been refused
sanction while on Indian soil; then they were abandoned by the Americans
because, apparently, Nixon wanted to make friends with Wangdu’s mortal enemies,
the communists; then they had been betrayed by the vampiric Baba Gen Yeshi – a
Tibetan and, even worse, a fellow Khampa; and now, finally Wangdu’s army was
being evicted by the Nepalis. One thing was certain: Wangdu was a warrior. To
imagine Wangdu simply giving up and settling down in the pacific squalor of a
refugee camp was unthinkable.
On April 19, 1974, Lhamo
Tsering, a Tibetan who had acted as the go-between the Government-in-Exile and
the Mustang troops, was arrested by the police in Pokhara and jailed – to be
used as ransom – his life in exchange for Wangdu’s. After Lhamo’s arrest the
word went out: Anyone helping the Mustang rebels would now be treated as an
enemy of the Nepali government.
In May, Baba Gen Yeshi had a meeting in Kathmandu with the brass of the Royal Army. He announced that he was prepared to identify all the Mustang commanders and provide the army with exact locations of the commanders’ respective magars. (Although the amount is debated, Baba Gen Yeshi was rewarded substantially by the monarchy.) A week later, forty-eight of Baba Gen Yeshi’s followers, acting as guides, led army officiers to Mustang and instructed them where the magars were located. [Note: the RNA officer in charge of the Tinker Pass operation was Brig. Gen. Aditya SJB Rana.]
Wangdu’s spies kept him
apprised of movement to the south, but, in the meantime, Wangdu’s scouts also
reported that a small contingent of Chinese troops had crossed into Mustang
from the north – dangerously close to where Tinzing Jyurme’s group had its
headquarters. Wangdu’s worst fear had become a reality: The Royal Army was now
working in concert with the PLA. To make matters worse, at Jomsom, the
southernmost town in Mustang, the Royal Army built a heliport, while ten
thousand troops marched up the Kali Gandaki Valley. It was a Sino-Nepali trap.
General Wangdu held an
emergency meeting. He told his commanders that they had no choice but to strike
a deal with the Nepalis before the PLA made their next move from the north.
They would surrender half of their weapons and ammunition on the condition that
the Nepalis released Lhamo Tsering, who was still in the Pokhara jail. Upon his
release, they would surrender the rest of their weapons. Two days later, half
the rebels surrendered their weapons in Jomsom. Wangdu waited for the news that
Lhamo Tsering had been freed. The news never came. The Nepalis reneged on their
half of the bargain.
In the meantime, the Dalai
Lama’s Government-in-Exile was being pressured by the Indians to intervene. The
Dalai Lama recorded a message on a tape recorder, which was then hand-delivered
to the Mustang resistance. From magar to magar, the rebels
heard the voice of the Dalai Lama asking them to put down their arms.
Tinzing Jyurme described the
rebel’s reaction:
Many of us cried when we
heard His Holiness’ words. In our hearts we couldn’t go against the Dalai
Lama’s wishes, but neither could we surrender after already losing so much.
Besides, if we surrendered, what would the Nepalese do to us? They had already
betrayed us over the release of Lhamo Tsering.
Rather than go against
the Dalai Lama, some of the guys committed suicide. Pachin, one of the five
commanders, cut his own throat. He did it with so much power that his head fell
off. Tsewang Gyapo, my personal secretary, also killed himself. He climbed up
to the top of an old rock building that was high above the river and just
jumped without saying anything to anyone. They wandered around crying, like
they didn’t even know where they were.
According to Tinzing Jyurme,
Wangdu was more afraid of Baba Gen Yeshi’s men than he was of the Royal Army or
the PLA: Wangdu knew that if he surrendered, the Nepalese would let Baba Gen
Yeshi’s men have their way with him. But I don’t want to give you the wrong
impression. At that point, I don’t think Wangdu cared if he lived or died. What
was really bothering him was that he had certain things he didn’t want the
Nepalese to get their hands on: an American wireless and important documents,
including ones that involved the CIA.
Roger E. McCarthy, the man
who created the CIA Tibetan Task Force later agreed with Tinzing Jyurme’s
explanation. McCarthy told me: “Wangdu did have key documents, including not
only records of the Mustang force, but names of those who had helped the
resistance efforts in various ways, plus financial records…Wangdu was intent
upon reaching India with this valuable cargo. That was his main motivation for
making a run for it. He was not the kind of man to concern himself with
personal safety. He sure as hell was not afraid to fight the Chinese nor, for
that matter, anyone.”
Wangdu sent most of the
remaining troops to Jomsom, which he hoped would stall the army long enough so
that he could escape to India. He and a small contingent of his closet
followers headed west on horseback. It was mountainous and hard riding. On the
thirteenth day of his escape, some Nepalis spied him on the move in Dolpo. The
news was radioed to Jomsom. Thus, the Royal Army knew he was headed west.
By late August, Wangdu and
his men had reached Jumla. In the interim, flight had been hellish. His route
darted back and forth over the Tibetan border, including several skirmishes
with small units of PLA. At one point, Wangdu pulled up short at a spot
overlooking a large Chinese encampment: He was forced to backtrack deep into
the Nepali mountains, which cost him time he could ill afford to lose. He and
his men had ridden hard the whole way, and his men were near exhaustion.
But in late August, the end
was in sight. Wangdu had one last mountain pass to cross: Tinker-La. On the
other side was India.
What Wangdu didn’t know was
that he was riding into a trap. The Royal Army had correctly intuited that
Tinker’s Pass would be Wangdu’s choice for escape. They had set up a large
ambush group toward the summit of Tinker-La.
About a mile from the pass, Wangdu’s men requested to
stretch their legs before making the final ascent. Wangdu allowed most of them
to dismount, but he took six men with him in search of forage and water for the
horses. The men who were left behind watched their leader disappear over a
small rise. A few seconds later, they heard gunfire. Without saying a word,
they remounted and galloped toward the shooting. They got to the crest of hill
just in time to see that all of Wangdu’s men were down and that Wangdu – the
only one still on horseback – was charging straight into enemy fire.
Wangdu was shot off his horse. His horse continued to gallop
without him. Firefights between the Royal Army and the remaining rebels
continued throughout the day. Sixteen Tibetans circled around the army and
managed to scale Tinker-La from a different direction, where a recess in the
mountain hid them from view.
A helicopter was dropped in. Wangdu’s body was identified
and flown back to Kathmandu.
Tinzing Jyurme recounts the rest:
King Birendra made a big show of his army’s victory.
Right in the center of Kathmandu, he set up a large tent so that the public
could see what the Royal Army had done. He had all of Wangdu’s personal effects
spread out on tables: his rings, his wristwatch, his gua, his sword, his rifle,
the wireless, some personal photographs he had carried with him – everything.
But the big prize was Wangdu himself. The king had his
corpse put on display. Thousands of Nepalese came and filed by his mutilated
body – this went on for several days before the stench got so bad that they had
to close down the show.
Tinzing Jyurme, Lhamo Tsering and five other captured
leaders were jailed for the next seven years.
Across town, Baba Gen Yeshi settled into a life of urban
comfort, surrounded by a score of ex-rebels who catered to his every need. His
business ventures thrived. He even created a little museum open to the public,
which housed first-rate Tibetan artifacts. Tibetan refugees could go in and
revisited possessions that had once been theirs.
The Tibetan resistance was over.
From Mikel Dunham’s Buddha’s Warriors
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Nepalnews.com just published the following article by Chiran Jung Thapa. While the government stalls, the army moves forward and Mr. Thapa offers an insightful and timely piece. Highly recommended for anyone interested in the security of Nepal.
One note: In terms of Chhatra Man Singh Gurung's qualifications, it should be added that he is a graduate of US Army Command and
General Staff College and a graduate of Chinese National Defense
University.
"Counsel to COAS" by Chiran Jung Thapa After
a sensational tenure as Chief of Army Staff' (COAS), General Rookmangud
Katawal is retiring next month. As per Nepal Army's (NA) tradition,
however, General Katawal will go on a voluntary leave a month ahead of
his retirement date. And if all goes according to the NA's rule of
hierarchical succession, the one poised to succeed him is the Chief of
General Staff (CGS) Lieutenant General - Chattra Man Singh Gurung.
General
Gurung will be taking charge during one of the most tumultuous episodes
in Nepal's history. While the fate of Maoist combatants languishing in
the various cantonments is yet to be decided, the number of other known
armed groups in the country has sky-rocketed to a staggering number of
109. As a result, insecurity is pervasive. The political forces still
remain woefully divided and the constitution writing process has hit a
menacing deadlock. Border encroachment is rampant. And the country's
future appears rudderless.
Amidst this chaos, when General Gurung dons the new insignia of COAS on his shoulder, he will also be shouldering great responsibility. The task of heading the largest security apparatus at such a critical period will be daunting but not insurmountable. And his dexterity and leadership will certainly play a pivotal role in determining the future of the NA and Nepal.
As far as his agenda as COAS goes, working on settling the issue of Maoist combatants should be high on his priority list. The Maoists want to merge their combatants into the NA. General Gurung should in no way allow the NA to absorb all the comrades. The wholesale merger of a politically indoctrinated combatants will not only defile the sanctity of a professional army, but it will also set an ominous precedent for the future. Given that there are 109 known armed groups in Nepal, one can easily deduce the implications if these groups too began making similar demands. A professional army should not become a dumping ground of the un-employed and malcontents.
But at the same time, recalcitrance too could greatly jeopardize the peace process. Hence, NA will need to find a balance. As difficult as it may be, General Gurung and his subordinates will need to come up with a palatable plan which simultaneously safeguards the NA's institutional interest and satisfies the interest of other interlocutors-mainly the signatories of the Peace Accord.
In order to accomplish this, General Gurung will need to be a shrewd politician but yet remain apolitical. Like his predecessor, his objective should be to keep the NA out of politics and the politics out the NA. Essentially, he will need to strike a balance between democratic accountability and institutional independence. Under his commandership, the NA will need to remain subservient to a democratically elected civilian government while maintaining its professionalism by avoiding the pitfalls of political patronage and cronyism.
Upgrading the NA's aviation capability should be another one high on General Gurung's agenda. The idea of upgrading the 11th brigade (NA's aviation unit) is already being mulled over. But it should not be limited to cosmetic changes like adding more personnel or shifting the command to the NA Headquarters under a higher ranking Major General. Instead, NA needs to focus on upgrading its assets and enhancing the training of the personnel involved.
To enhance its capability, NA will need to procure an optimal mix of both VTOL (Vertical take off and landing) and STOL (Short take off and landing) aircrafts to meet the varying "RST” (Reconnaissance, Rescue and Relief operations, Suppressive Fire-power, and Transport) needs. After procurement, NA must aim to minimize the downtime and increase operability of each aircraft. It must also aim to maintain an all time flying capability.
Another one in his priority list should be to improve the NA's intelligence system. One of the major setbacks for the NA during its counter-insurgency operations was poor intelligence. The NA already has a functioning Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). The unit simply requires more personnel with specialized intelligence training. General Gurung should seek assistance from other states with robust intelligence systems to revamp NA's intelligence unit.
NA's legal branch too needs revamping. Through recent experiences, NA must have realized that battles are of varying kinds. And legal battles have become a more frequent part of NA’s proceedings. The legal department's upgrade already appears to be underway. The promotion of the Brigadier General who headed the department to Major General appears to be carried out with the intention of upgrading the existing department into a directorate. If true, General Gurung should ensure that happens. Not only that, he should also ensure that the department is housed with more and capable legal experts.
It is not just legal or intelligence expertise that NA requires. In this modern era, all standing armies require experts in various fields. And so does the NA. General Gurung should explore the option of initiating the “Uniformed Intellectual Program (UIP)” in the NA. Through this program, NA can begin enlisting strategists, analysts, lawyers, public relations experts and even financial experts to bolster NA’s capabilities.
The other thing that would serve to uplift the spirits of mid-level officers is creation of a fast track promotion based on merit. Today, the promotion system within the NA is entirely based on seniority. Regardless of one’s performance, an officer or soldier gets promoted when his time comes. And the NA’s finest, especially those who attended the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) as cadets, have been hard hit by this bottleneck. If the NA is to retain its finest, then it must at all cost initiate a merit based promotion system. This would motivate the officers and soldiers to be more competent. And the good services rendered by these officers and soldiers in turn would enhance the overall quality of the institution.
Personality of the COAS certainly plays a great role in determining the functioning of the institution he heads. Within the NA, General Gurung is reputed as a professional and humble General. But his professionalism and humility stoke jitters. Given the political onslaught the NA has had to endure, many believe the next COAS will need the General Katawal like fortitude and resilience to safeguard its institutional interest. But many within the organization find his lack of assertiveness unsettling. The outgoing COAS had cultivated extensive links outside the NA. These links greatly helped the NA stave off repeated Maoist assaults. General Gurung, however, is said to have very limited political links outside the institution.
But the General certainly deserves a benefit of doubt. First, he is already making history by becoming the first COAS from an ethnic minority. Second, he has met all the professional requirements to take up command. He is the senior most General. He has served as the NA's divisional commander, completed both his staff college and National Defense College (NDC). And of course he has a Bachelors degree. Third, amongst the Generals at least, his physical fitness remains unparalleled. Fourth, his professionalism is unquestionable. And he certainly has the potential to utilize his attendance at the military academies of US, China and India to the NA’s advantage.
In summation, General Gurung will need to lead the NA, not simply command it. He will need to keep his troops regularly trained, highly disciplined, prepared for any contingency and in high morale. This is the way to prove the skeptics wrong. NA has a glorious history. The onus now is on General Gurung to secure its future as a professional army dedicated to the service of the Nepali State.
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June 14, 2009
During the last month, there has been something unsettlingly familiar about the swift shifts of Nepal’s political winds.
The Maoists pulled the plug on their own government after only eight months in power. The second strongest party in Nepal, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist) – UML, stepped in to form a coalition government with Madhav Kumar Nepal as its new Prime Minister. The Prime Minister named Bijay Kumar Gachhadar (of the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum – MPRF- party) as Deputy Prime Minister. Immediately after, the notion of a coalition was thrown into question: Upendra Yadav, Chairman of Madhesi People’s Rights Forum – the fourth strongest party in Nepal -- expelled the new Deputy Prime Minister Gachhadar from the party and withdrew MPRF support of the new government. The new Prime Minister also appointed two controversial figures for plum cabinet positions: Sujata Koirala (Nepal Congress party) as Foreign Minister and Kul Bahadur Khadka as the security advisor.
In the meantime, an endless succession of strikes plagued the nation. An underground Hindu fundamentalist army blew up the Catholic Church in Kathmandu, killing three and injuring many others. Acts of violence perpetrated by parties against other parties proliferated. A long-bitter border dispute between India and Nepal found new oxygen fanned by the shrill anti-India rhetoric of Maoist leaders Prachanda and Dr. Bhattarai, who blamed India for destabilizing their administration -- just as Delhi police announced that Lashkar-e-Taiba, (the terrorist organization responsible for the November 2008 bombing of the Taj Mahal Palace hotel in Mumbai) had run a logistical hub that funneled dozens of jihadists through Nepal, thus renewing the debate of the dangers of a porous border, wherever and if ever that disputed border locks in on a concise demarcation.
For the last four dismal weeks it’s been hard to know which way to look. One sandstorm after another. The residual effect is not only to lose sight – sight of what Nepal’s main goals are – but also to blur the memory of Nepal’s major achievement of having conducted the 2008 elections.
And in the meantime, the most important role the Constituent Assembly has to play – to pen a new constitution by the May 28, 2010 deadline – is no closer to a working reality than when the recent Maoist regime fudged this prime obligation.
The overall impact is corrosive, both in terms of the peace process and the general morale of the people. Analysts are beginning to ask: Have we returned to the 1990s, when there was a different government annually, which accomplished little beyond each successive ruling power succeeding in feathering its personal nest? A ten-year insurgency rose out of that cynical and selfish brand of government. It’s mind numbing to think that -- after all the effort put into the 2006 peace accord and the morale-boosting 2008 elections – the political parties are now simply drifting back to the reprehensible habits of the 1990s “me-first” politics.
A few days ago, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal (OHCHR) voiced its concern that “the growing number of acts of violence by political parties and affiliated groups, and subsequent threats of retaliation, could threaten the peace process.” But who cares what the OHCHR has to say? Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal has said that OHCHR´s role has become ineffective since it is more focused on politics than human rights violations. OHCHR will be gone by this autumn. Nepal has categorically turned down the OHCHR´s request to extend its term by three years.
Perhaps the country doesn’t require outside perspectives.
But the personal mirrors of Nepal’s politicians – from Prachanda, who blew a wonderful opportunity for rectification, to G.P. Koirala, whose dictatorial and dynastic bullying make a mockery of his professed love for democracy – their mirrors don’t seem to be providing much wisdom these days, and certainly no clarity.
Where does this leave the people of Nepal? Ashamed of their politicians, who can’t tear themselves away from their own reflections? Beginning to wonder if the future they envisioned when they walked to the polling booths last year was nothing more than an elaborate sandcastle peddled by the powerbrokers? Beginning to wonder if their participation in a “New Nepal” was not worth the hike to the next village?
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May 3, 2009
There’s a joke in Kathmandu Valley: When someone offers you his or her business card, you look at it for a moment as if you are confused, and then you ask, “Why didn’t you list your NGO?”
The joke is that having an NGO is socially obligatory in Kathmandu. But the subtext is more cynical: It’s the easiest way to make money in Kathmandu. The veracity of this assumption remains to be seen. Very little transparency or accountability is required to register an NGO in Nepal. People who donate to altruistic-sounding NGOs put their trust in the pamphlets given them, rather than the ledgers locked up in private offices. Even the number of NGOs in Nepal is an unknown, although 40,000 to 60,000 are the estimates one hears most often.
Obviously, there are many NGO’s that contribute greatly to the betterment of Nepalis’ quality of life. But the lack of accountability, the question of motive and the assessment of achievement have always seemed troubling to me. It was with this in mind that I sought out Dr. Arjun Kumar Karki, PhD, President of the NGO Federation of Nepal, the largest NGO umbrella group in Nepal. We also discussed the main stumbling blocks for NGOs succeeding in their development goals, given the current political situation.
DUNHAM: What exactly is the NGO Federation of Nepal and what is its purpose?
KARKI: The NGO Federation of Nepal is an umbrella organization made up of more than 4, 500 civil society organizations. Many of our members are working in the area of human rights, democracy, and development issues. Most of our members are very small, village-based, grassroots organizations.
DUNHAM: When was the federation created?
KARKI: It was established right after the big political change in 1990. [1990 marked the end of absolute monarchy and the panchayat system in Nepal, and the emergence of a new constitutional monarchy.]
Until 1990, most of the NGOs were, more or less, banned. Only the people who were close to the royal palace, royal family and the panchayat system were allowed to run NGOs.
So there was a very sudden growth of NGO’s after 1990 and we thought that we should have a federation of these new organizations based on certain criteria. From the beginning, our mandate was 1) to build the capacity of small village-based grassroots civil society organizations and 2) to serve as a watchdog or pressure group for governmental activity involving basic human rights – to promote human rights, and to advocate whenever human rights are violated.
In short, we have a two-pronged strategy: pressure and partnership. If the government comes up with a pro-poor, pro-people policies and programs, we partner with the government. And if the government comes up with an anti-poor, anti-people programs, we will work as a pressure group.
We also work with other federations so, on an informal level, we work as a confederation of different federations in Nepal. Internationally, we work with numerous campaigns and advocacy work. We are part of an international media campaign, for instance -- a campaign against poverty.
DUNHAM: So you represent 4,500 NGOs. How many NGOs are there in Nepal?
KARKI: That is very difficult to determine. Our government lacks the proper regulations to define what an NGO is in this country. There was no NGO act created after the political change in 1990. Since 1990, all the successive governments – not just one political leadership – all the governments that have been in power since 1990 have been very reluctant to introduce new laws covering NGOs.
As a result, most NGOs are operating on an old act that was enacted in 1974 during the panchayat system. The act is called “Organization Restriction Act 2034”. That law says that all organizations that are not a part of the government are considered non-governmental organizations.
DUNHAM: That covers a lot of territory.
KARKI: Yes. The act allows the inclusion of professional unions, prayer clubs, sports clubs, monasteries, temples, libraries, Syambhunath, Pashupatinath -- all belong to the NGO category according to Nepal’s legal definition. So it has really created a lot of confusion when one tries to determine the number of NGOs in Nepal.
In the NGO Federation of Nepal, we have created our own definition: An organization that is voluntary, non-profit-making, non-partisan, service oriented and not working for the interests or benefits of the people running the NGO. This is the kind of group that is allowed to receive membership in the NGO Federation. We don’t allow religious groups, sports clubs or professional unions to become members.
DUNHAM: How many NGOs -- groups that are not part of your federation – would you define as credible institutions?
KARKI: OK, there are some credible organizations that are not part of the NGO Federation. Maybe an additional 500 that are not part of the NGO Federation. I have to say that.
But if you read the local newspapers, they report that there are more than 40,000 NGOs in Nepal. But that number includes all the groups that the NGO Federation disallows, according to our definition of an NGO.
DUNHAM: So you are saying that, in a country with 40,000-plus NGOs, no more than 5000 are credible?
KARKI: Yes, something like 5000.
DUNHAM: And you say that you focus on small, grassroots organizations. Is that because you feel that small NGOs tend to be more successful?
KARKI: Of course. The small NGOs tend to be much more aware of the ground realities. They are locally initiated. They organize the resources themselves. So our main interest focuses on these small groups. We do have large organizations that are members – large national development organizations – including Rural Reconstruction Nepal [RRN], for example, which is one of the largest development NGOs in the country. RRN has a staff of more than 700, dispersed throughout most of the districts of Nepal. But the larger organizations are the exception rather than the rule. Most of the NGOs are quite small: they work in two or three villages at most – this is the typical NGO that we recognize.
DUNHAM: Can you give me an example of a small, grassroots NGO that has been particularly successful and explain why it works so well?
KARKI: Let me clarify something first. There are two distinct categories of NGO. One is large and one is small but they both have their own competitive advantages in their areas of specialization. Being large doesn’t, in itself, make an NGO bad. Many are doing wonderful work. They are capable of mobilizing large amounts of foreign aid and taking it to remote areas of Nepal that the government has failed to reach. Some of the large NGOs are also helping the smaller NGOs to build their capacity. In many cases, the small NGOs work in partnership with the large NGOs.
But the smaller NGOs -- many of them are autonomous, independent, self-funded --they understand the ground reality, they understand the local dynamics. That’s why they tend to serve people better than the large NGOs, which originate from somewhere else.
DUNHAM: Can you give me a specific example?
KARKI: OK, Begawan Youth Club, for example. Very close to Kathmandu. It’s in a village 30 minutes from Kathmandu. They have mobilized more than 15,000 members. They don’t receive foreign funding. But they run so many projects, including their own ambulance service for women and children. They have their own banking system: They have introduced their own kind of local credit card. I was very impressed when I was invited to their annual meeting held only last week. They work with women’s health. They do a lot of awareness raising. They even have clinical service in some cases. They promote homemade ayurvedic medicines. They work on the issue of gender injustice. The majority of their members are women. OK, many of their projects are like other NGOs that receive foreign funding. But what’s encouraging and impressive about Begawan Youth Club is that they are doing all of this without foreign help.
That’s one example. But there are thousands of examples where local groups are really excelling and doing so on their own initiative. Not many people are aware of them because you ordinarily have to go out to the more remote areas to see their operations.
DUNHAM: How do you monitor the NGOs who have joined the federation?
KARKI: We operate on the district, regional and national level, based on a code of conduct we have imposed on our member organizations. The code of conduct focuses on transparency and accountability. All members are expected to follow a basic minimum standard procedure that complies with the existing government regulations; but in addition, they must maintain certain international standards of transparency.
First, the organization must be autonomous, non-partisan and registered with the government. In addition, it has to submit an original financial statement to the government and the NGO Foundation of Nepal annually. It is also required to submit to us a yearly progress report. This is our monitoring system.
DUNHAM: What happens if they fail to meet the code of conduct requirements?
KARKI: The procedure varies according to the situation. Sometimes we give them a warning. We try to create awareness, first and foremost. We don’t just go in there and expel them. But we do expelled members who have failed to maintain the code of conduct over a period of time.
DUNHAM: If an NGO wants to join your federation, what’s the procedure? Do you join on a trail basis, for instance?
KARKI: No, but they must subscribe to the basic principles. Membership is open. Everyone is free to apply. If they meet the criteria, then they can receive membership.
DUNHAM: You mentioned earlier that you are represented in all of Nepal’s districts. Is there any specific region in Nepal that is in more need of NGOs than other districts? I’m thinking of the most remote districts – Humla, for instance.
KARKI: There are so many thousands of villages in Nepal. You mention Humla and the needs are great there. But the same thing can occur anywhere in Nepal. I was in Dolpa, for instance, only last month, and the conditions you are referring to are present in Dolpa, just like in Humla.
And you don’t have to go that far away! If you drive one or two hours from the center of Kathmandu, you’ll find numerous “Humlas” very close to the city – very similar situations.
The problem in this country -- so far, Nepal’s development planning or development approach has been very much Kathmandu-centric – confined among the political elites’ interests. The budgetary allocations have been based on the biases of political party leaders and their political interests.
DUNHAM: Can you give me specific examples?
KARKI: OK, for example, the amount of money allocated to the district from where G.P. Koirala was elected is double to that which was allocated to the Karnali district. Similarly, the amount of money allocated to the district from where CPN-UML leader Madhav Nepal was elected, was also double the budget for the Karnali district. During the time of the panchayat system and Surya Bahadur Thapa was in power, he used to bring resources to Dhankuta, his home district. When Sher Bahadur Deuba was in power, he concentrated on developing the corridor in the far west. If you go to the far west you will see that is far more developed than the mid-west, right? So this is the reality in Nepal. Nepal has very much a constituency-based politics and led by the interests of those who are politically in power at any given time.
All of these specific allocations have had a political impact on Nepal. For instance, although Marichman Singh was prime minister during the panchayat time [Marichman Singh Shrestha was prime minister from June 1986-April 1990], he was not able to bring a lot of resources to the mid-west, partly because we had USAID concentrating on the mid-west. And sometimes we call this the root cause of the eventual conflict: the failure of the governments to bring changes, improvements for the people in the mid-west which, in turn, created fertile ground for the [Maoist] uprising there.
But anyway, this is the reality. I’ve been to Karnali. I’ve been to Humla, Jumla, and Dolpa and, obviously, I agree with you that these are some of the most deprived areas in Nepal. And there are lots of possible geographical targets where we can bring more resources to address the needs and demands of the people.
But so many big political changes! We had a big political change in 1990. And again we had a big political change in 2006. But the expectation of the people toward the political elite – in 1990 and 2006 – are quite different. In 2006, the people thought, “OK, our leaders have learned a lot, they have changed, they’re not going to make the same mistakes twice, the leaders will be more pro-poor, they will not waste their time in-fighting, and there will be a big peace dividend for all of us.” That’s what people thought or hoped.
But after the big political change of 2006, not only our government, but also our donors expected something big.
And if you say to the political leaders in Kathmandu, “OK, let’s resolve the larger political issues first, then we will address the smaller problems in the villages,” you get nowhere.
The ongoing peace process, to me, has faltered because it remains a Kathmandu-centric process, confined to the political elite. There is no sensible effort to build peace from the common people upward. It is the remote villages that were hardest hit by war, but what have they gained since 2006? How have their lives improved? This is the big challenge for the NGOs.
DUNHAM: Reconciliation seems to be a big stumbling block.
KARKI: What kind of reconciliation are you talking about? Reconciliation between G.P. Koirala and Prachanda? Reconciliation between Prachanda and the UML or any other party you care to mention? They are always talking. Even in wartime, there was always some sort of dialogue going on between the parties –they were meeting each other. But while the political leaders talked, outside in the countryside, the cadres and government forces were killing each other and destroying the rural infrastructure, which left the people no choice but to flee their villages. Where’s the reconciliation there?
So now we tell the displaced people, “You can go back to your homes, we have peace now, there is no risk there.” But the truth is that their land has not been cultivated for the last several years. Their irrigation canals are not functioning. Their drinking water system was damaged. Their school systems were used as military barracks. Their health posts were used as training centers for the armed groups. In some cases, the infrastructure was damaged by the Maoist; in other cases, government forces created damage.
And now we ask people to just go back and live there! “There is peace. There is no danger,” we tell them. The problem is obvious. Prior to 2006, there was only one armed group: the Maoists. Now there are 27 recognized armed groups in Nepal. There are so many incidences of violence taking place in Nepal that it is very difficult to get to the bottom of each incidence: Who had done what? We never seem to get to the bottom.
And my understanding of this continuing violence is that it is due to the frustrated expectations of the people. It has nothing to do with ideological orientation of any particular political or philosophical movement. It’s the people’s frustration: They are unhappy with the political elite and so they are vulnerable to the mobilization of any disgruntled group. This is what is happening.
Therefore, we badly need a peace agreement with our people. Our political elite got a peace dividend from the 2006 peace agreement. There had been a price tag on their heads in the past. Now, they became prime minister, ministers, members of Parliament and the Constituent Assembly. They were rewarded. But what about the ordinary people living in Humla, Dolpa, and even Rukum-Rolpa, which was recognized as the capital of the Maoist uprising? They were not rewarded by the peace agreement. They received no reward.
Peace building from the bottom up is what is so badly needed right now in Nepal. I’m not saying that the peace process that is taking place in Kathmandu is bad – it is also important – but peace building in the villages is just as important. Both need to take place – not one at the cost of the other. That is the only way that there will be a lasting democratic peace in this country. This is what our government and all donors need to be looking at.
DUNHAM: There are also the obstacles of widespread impunity and absence of rule of law. Recently I spoke with Matrika Yadav, for instance. The lawlessness that is going on in the southern part of Nepal is very unsettling. I guess what I’m trying to get my head around is: How can you ensure development if the country does not respect rule of law and allows impunity? Which brings me to my next question: To what extent do the NGOs of your federation face extortions, intimidation?
KARKI: We haven’t received any reports from our NGOs, since 2006, about extortion or threats to their development projects. But there are so many other threats. For example, there are regular strikes that make progress so difficult; you can’t really move or go where you need to go. That kind of threat is ever present and makes development in Nepal impossible.
But I agree with you about the issue related to impunity – a gross and systematic violation of human rights – it is pervasive at this moment. The Federation is very much bothered by this. Of course, we should remind ourselves that we are going through a serious political transition and some of the lawlessness can be attributed to the management of that transition. It has happened in other countries as well. But beyond that, there is growing political anarchy everywhere. People have high expectations. Every section of our society wants their demands met now. There is no patience. So the ultimate tool that they use to fulfill their demands is the strike. This is what they do. They burn tires in the streets, throw stones at the shops and buildings and shut down the economy -- whatever they feel like doing and with impunity. And this is the everyday phenomenon in Nepal. And it very much bothers and interrupts the development work of the NGOs in our federation.
But it’s more complicated than that. It must be remembered that, whenever there are major political changes -- when we fight for democracy – the people have no choice but to also raise the issue of civil and political rights. We must demand our rights so that we will be in the position to exercise democratic freedom. We have been under the rule of autocracy and absolute monarchy for so long and we are trying so hard to change the direction once and for all.
But, after 2006, what I think is this: When you talk about human rights, you shouldn’t overlook the fact that having the right to develop and improve your life is also a basic human right. That particular right is being ignored everyday in this country. The right to development should be given equal importance. And that might just address the frustrated expectation of the people, which has not been accomplished so far. This is the issue that our government and our donors and our NGOs need to look at seriously.
DUNHAM: And has the present Home Minister accomplished the task of creating a better atmosphere to nurture development in this country?
KARKI: I wouldn’t personally blame the Home Minister. This is much more widespread. This is the everyday-everywhere phenomenon prevalent in our country right now. There is such a pervasive lack of governmental presence in our lives – in every sphere of our lives -- at this moment – perhaps every developing country has the same experience. But one thing is certain. Lawlessness in this country is a huge problem. The government is failing to maintain law and order. Anarchy threatens all strata of Nepali society. It goes far beyond a Home Minister.
DUNHAM: So what is the solution? Peace building beginning with your small grassroots NGOs?
KARKI: That is one of the solutions.
But there should also be a very firm political commitment among the political elite to maintain rule of law. Look at the way the sister organizations of all the major political parties behave. They engage in violence, they engage in breaking the law – how can you have rule of law in a country, if the parties themselves – the parties that wield power in the country -- ignore rule of law?
Dr. Karki also serves as President of Rural Reconstruction Nepal and President of LDC Watch. He is currently conducting research on issues related to agrarian relations, rural social movements and the peace-building process in Nepal. His most recently published works include The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspective, The People's War in Historical Context and Movement from Below: Land Rights Movements in Nepal, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies.
To contact or learn more about the NGO Federation of Nepal:
http://www.ngofederation.org/
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May 30, 2009
The Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal celebrated its first Republic Day on Friday -- a country that, while still in its infancy, has already witnessed two prime ministers.
Over the years, the turnover frequency of Nepal’s prime ministers has taken on a kind of flavor-of-the-month quality. Few were in power long enough to produce sustainable legacies, the (until quite recently) Maoist prime minister being no exception. Entrusted with the orchestration of the framing of a new constitution – the nascent republic’s most important task – Ex-Prime Minister Prachanda watched progress languish while being preoccupied with other matters.
The newest prime minister is Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML) leader Madhav Kumar Nepal. Mr. Nepal has his work cut out for him. The deadline for writing a constitution is one year away with a six-month extension admissible; beyond that time, the legality of anything the Constituent Assembly might deem to pen becomes dubious. Obviously, a show of unity between the parties has never been more crucial, but so far there is very little evidence of sincere intercourse. Instead, on display is the embarrassing inter-party squabbling and jostling for the plum Cabinet posts suddenly left vacant by the departure of the Maoists, who seem to have found fresh oxygen by resuming their original role as outsiders. From outside and from within, Prime Minister Nepal inherited an unruly mess. At this juncture, no one cares to lay odds on how long he will remain in power.
Recently, I spoke to Surya Bahadur Thapa, the 81-year-old politico who knows more about the impermanence of Nepali leadership than anyone: He has assumed the role of Prime Minister a record-breaking five times. Among other things, we discussed the difference between the political climate of today and 60 years ago, when he personally witnessed Nepal opened its borders for the first time to the outside world.
DUNHAM: What was the political atmosphere like in the 1950s, when you began your political career? And how does that atmosphere differ from today’s political scene?
THAPA: It’s quite different today. When I was a young man, the major power was the king. The parties, still testing their wings, were struggling to be represented in the government. The parties just weren’t very strong.
Prior to 1950 and the Ranas’ fall from power, there was the Praja Parishad party. [Nepal’s first political party established in 1935– a secret society fueled by Kathmandu intellectuals but supported by a broad spectrum of castes and ethnic groups, dedicated to ushering in democracy to Nepal.] The Praja Parishad’s reach was basically limited to the Kathmandu Valley. They were an underground group. They had to be. If the government caught them, they were imprisoned and silenced in that way.
By 1950, the leading democratic party was Nepali Congress. It had a socialistic base and had entered into an armed struggle to overthrow Rana rule, which resonated throughout the country. But also there was a communist party in Nepal that was growing rapidly. And there was the Gorkha Parishad party, [a party formed in 1951 by a group of Rana revivalists – no longer existent]. When the Rana dynasty was overthrown, the Rana clan created the Gorkha Parishad in reaction to the governmental shift. They attempted to project democratic concepts, but it was too rightwing, too old-school to gain much popularity. There were other parties emerging, though with less impact than the ones I have mentioned.
And that was basically the political scene: It was an uphill battle for all the parties to gain ground. The king had a very strong power base. The concept of the monarchy, as well as the king himself -- both were popular with the people.
DUNHAM: I’m interested in the 50s because it was a remarkably dynamic and transitional time for Nepal. Up until the 1950s, Nepal’s borders had been closed to the outside world. Suddenly, there was an influx of Western notions coming in. What was it like, to experience the dramatic infiltration of outside cultures?
THAPA: Yes, prior to that time, the Ranas had maintained a closed society. The only outside presence to be found in the Kathmandu Valley was the British legation. Then after the Ranas were overthrown, we suddenly felt the impact of Indian presence. They had just gained their own independence from the British a few years before.
But beyond that, at least for the first few years, there was not much additional foreign presence felt here. Treaties were made with America, Russia, China and some other countries. Embassies followed. But there was no tourism yet. There were no roads leading out of Nepal yet. There was a small airport that was constructed but the influx of foreign presence remained extremely limited.
Then the first road was built: Tribhuvan Rajpath, which linked Kathmandu with the border town of Birganj. It was constructed by the Indian government. This, of course, allowed a significant flow of traffic from India. But I must say that, even then, the introduction of foreign culture into Nepal remained limited.
The Kathmandu Valley is, historically, very rich, very dense in culture and religion. And those foreigners who came to Nepal, didn’t try to influence or alter our customs.
Socially, on the other hand, there was definitely a shift. Many advisors and experts arrived, especially American advisors, who set up residence here. They didn’t socialize with commoners. They mixed with the privileged classes and within that group you could see that a social fusion was taking place. Our social customs began to reflect some of the Western ways. There was also an introduction of various political ideologies that had a significant impact on Nepali intellectuals. And people working in Nepal’s government were sent abroad for training –especially to America and, to a lesser extent, to Britain and India – and that had a big impact in so many fields: administration, agriculture, technology.
Remember, during most of the 1950s, there was still no university in Nepal. Naturally, many young people began going to the universities of our nearest neighbor, India. And that experience -- getting an education outside Nepal -- colored every aspect of their lives. It was profound. They learned other languages, cultures and attitudes of foreign societies. And when they returned to Nepal, there was a huge impact here – the social structure of traditional Nepali society began to expand -- slowly at first, but continually reaching out to a broader community. And eventually, foreign social elements became more and more acceptable to Nepali society. What I want to say is this: When you ask about the modernization of Nepal, those early years of our young people going abroad to study – that was what really got the wheels turning in a new, more modern direction.
DUNHAM: One of my major interests in Nepal is the impact of its youth – both now and in the past. I’ve interviewed so many young people here. Today, the effect of brain drain on Nepal is increasingly significant. So many talented and intelligent youths are leaving Nepal and not coming back, to the detriment of Nepali society, which needs all of its human resources to build a stable, modern Nepal. What’s your take on this? How can Nepal’s leaders, whichever party is in power, reverse the pattern and persuade the youth to remain in Nepal?
THAPA: Yes, you are right about its significance. But to be fair, I think this is a phenomenon prevalent in all the third-world countries.
Still, that’s no excuse for what is going on here in Nepal. It’s true. We are facing a problem with our youth that we didn’t have in the past. Just as we were discussing: In the early days, after the youth received their higher educations, they came back to Nepal to help with its development. They contributed to all sectors of society: political, economic, health, education -- all sectors.
But now we are facing a different trend. Job opportunities in Nepal? Where are they? Show them to me! There is a stalemate here – wanting to keep our youth here but failing to be able to offer them opportunities here. Complete stagnation – that’s what the youth see. The youth see their future in job opportunities in America, or Australia or Europe. Those who are brilliant and studied abroad and find themselves competitive with the job opportunities in that country, will remain there. Not being able to keep our youths in the country is one of Nepal’s weakest points.
I see two problems. Until and unless we create an atmosphere of political stability in Nepal and until Nepal’s economic horizon is broadened, we do not have a persuasive argument to keep our youth in Nepal. And who wants to stand in the way of their children’s opportunities? The dilemma actually falls into the category of human rights, if you think about it. The youth should have the right to pursue a better standard of living; if a better standard cannot be offered here, what right do we older people have to prevent them from going elsewhere?
If we could provide political stability and economic opportunity for our youths, they would certainly return. But first and foremost, we must be able to honestly tell our youths that the country is politically settled and in a state of permanent peace. With peace established in Nepal, economic opportunities can follow and the youth will want to remain here.
DUNHAM: Then the next question is how do you achieve political stability? Obviously rule of law must be firmly established and the tradition of impunity must be reversed. But what about the integration of the Maoist army into the Nepal army? It would seem that nothing will move forward until that problem is solved – the Maoists won’t allow it.
THAPA: This is such a sensitive topic in Nepal. And it’s not the first time it has happened here.
Looking back in history, after the Ranas were overthrown, there was a similar problem with what to do with the armed faction of Nepali Congress supporters. They too came into the Kathmandu Valley and needed to be offered some sort of future. But the difference was that they were not trained ideologically. They were simply against the Rana rule. They did not espouse any sort of dogma that had been taught to them by party leaders. They were just open like common citizens, except that they were trained to raise arms against the Rana government. So they came here and when Nepali Congress came into office, they were then trained to serve in the police force. And the amalgamation process was a successful one. Some of the armed people even managed to join the national army, without negative results.
Of course those who were allowed to join the army had an entirely different background than the Maoist rebels today. Back then, the Nepali Congress armed fighters had fought in the Burma War during the era of World War II. They were top-notch soldiers, trained by the British in a completely professional fashion. So they could be integrated into the army and the police force without bringing into question their levels of proficiency in military expertise. Even more important: There was no problem because they didn’t come to the army with ideological differences.
The Maoist rebels came completely equipped with an extreme brand of communism. The Maoist command trained them first in ideology and second in military skills. That was the order of importance.
What happens if the ex-combatants are integrated into the national army? If you want to make a communist country, if you agree to have an extreme communist military force here, there is no problem. You can integrate them into the regular army. In five or six years, there will be a first-class revolutionary army in Nepal.
But just now, the Nepal army is very much independent from communist ideology. They don’t adhere to any ideology. They are a professional army, trained by world-class officers. If you compare army officers with civilian professionals who have, more or less, the same level of expertise in their fields, you will find that the army officers are far superior. Why? Because of their exceptional training. They have been sent all over the world for training: Britain, America and India.
And if you try to integrate the PLA into this highly trained organization, forget about having a professional army. So the people have a choice: they can choose to have an ideologically based army or a professional army. But they can’t have both.
More important: Does Nepal want a Maoist country or a democratic country? You can’t have both.
This is a vital question, particularly while the constitution is being written. The Maoists are very clever. They can make very beautiful speeches about democracy, but their real intentions lead in an entirely different direction.
Outside of the Valley, throughout the countryside, the Maoists have been able to control the people through the YCL -- by threats and intimidation. And no one has tried to prevent them from doing so, including our neighbor to the south. The Indians underestimated the Maoists. Before the election, the Indians never dreamed that they would, overnight, have an open border with a neighbor that was Maoist. India was not alert.
The army is the only institution that has remained alert. And that is why Prachanda was so determined to get rid of General Katawal – to break down the professionalism of the army. The Maoists are not interested in real integration.
DUNHAM: The Supreme Court supported General Katawal, but it is being attacked by the Maoists as well.
THAPA: Yes, and the democratic parties must be very cautious about these attacks and come to the defense of the Supreme Court. That’s one thing. The second thing is the international community should be defending the Supreme Court as well. This is no time for the international community to remain silent.
DUNHAM: Yes, to take my country as an example, for instance: America. It’s been interesting for me to watch the difference in diplomatic approaches -- between Nancy Powell and James Moriarty. Moriarty, the former ambassador, never failed to speak his mind -- especially when it came to the Maoists. It’s been the very opposite with Ambassador Powell. The current embassy is very discreet.
THAPA: And I think this is a problem. Since there is no political mandate in Nepal, the people who want to see democracy work in Nepal, very much look to three countries -- USA, UK and India – to support their democratic ambitions. They want to hear theses countries’ voices.
Perhaps, to some extent, the Nepali government – whoever is in power – is to blame for international silence. Our politicians always like to give the impression to their constituents that, “We are a very independent country and we can judge and determine what to do without the interference of international powers.” But the reality is different. All parties, including the Maoists, are at least partially dependent on the attitudes and wishes of the three countries I mentioned. Those countries inspire much of how Nepali politicians proceed in governmental activities.
You mentioned, the previous American ambassador – Mr. Moriarty. He was very frank. He said what he thought. Now, whether it was diplomatically correct for him to do so or not is not for me to say. But personally I never regarded it as interference with our government.
I do understand that, in the diplomatic world, there are norms that cannot be stepped over. If a democratic government in Nepal is strong enough, then the foreign powers can act significantly to support that government. But if the international powers are watching how an unstable, tentative government proceeds, they will be hesitant to go too far in making their voices heard.
Still, given the current situation here, I find the international silence disturbing. In principle, it is OK to say that each sovereign country should make its own decisions, but in practice, these countries’ goals are to safeguard democracy throughout the world, so they should speak up.
DUNHAM: Your position -- as I understand it -- your desire is to bring the moderate parties together to create a meaningful block, as a response to the Maoists.
THAPA: Yes, as I’ve been watching this transition, what I’ve seen is that the Maoist have not come to Kathmandu to surrender their basic ideology. And if you think that is not the case, then you will be surprised one day. So in Nepal, just now, the democratic forces – and I’m not talking about any particular party right now -- all the democratic parties must speak up as one voice – to create a strong opposition to the non-democratic parties.
As it stands now, the democratic parties are off-balance and the Maoists are taking advantage of them, as well as the common people, to see how far they can go. If there were a strong democratic block in Nepal, the Maoists would be automatically checked.
In particular, I am asking Nepali Congress to get unified. There are many good, young people in the Nepali Congress party who understand the dynamics of the situation. Unfortunately, they are still not in the positions of power. They are not part of the upper echelon of the party hierarchy. But I’m telling the Congress party to please take the initiative. And I think what I am saying is beginning to have some resonance within the party. But without Koirala’s consent, no one can do anything. So it all hangs on what GP Koirala will do.
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May 26, 2009
With all eyes on the newly appointed Prime Minister, the judiciary remains besieged. The foundation of law and order is grounded in a nation’s constitution; the writing of the constitution – the signal responsibility of the constituent assembly – has been put on hold yet again. The Supreme Court, which has several crucial decisions pending, continues to be attacked from various factions. And security continues to reveal its soft underbelly with such condemnable acts as last week’s bombing of Kathmandu’s catholic church, resulting in two deaths and fourteen injured, with little expectation that the culprits will be brought to justice.
The previous Maoist Prime Minister had his showdown with the judiciary and ended up tucking his tail and beating a hasty retreat. The Supreme Court remains a power to be reckoned with. But the fact remains that Nepal’s judiciary system – like every other public institution in Nepal -- faces an extremely precarious future until and unless the drafting of the new constitution becomes a reality.
About a month ago, I spoke with Bishwa Kanta Mainali, President of the Nepal Bar Association, about the importance (as well as the shortcomings) of Nepal’s judiciary system. (No one envisioned at the time of the interview that the Maoist government was about to implode.) He brought with him an impressive and sometimes controversial array of perspectives to the discussion – historical, cultural and ethnic observations -- that brought a multi-faceted overview very much worth considering: Now more than ever.
In addition to being President of the Nepal Bar Association, Bishwa Kanta Mainali serves as a Senior Advocate at the Supreme Court. Among other accomplishments, he advised the 1990 Constitution Drafting Commission and helped frame enactments such as the Consumer Protection Act, the Human Rights Commission Act as well as working on various amendments to the constitution. He also served as Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of "Jan Jagran", a vernacular weekly newspaper, is a founding member of Nepal Eye Hospital, Nepal Law Society and is affiliated with numerous other organizations. Mainali holds degrees in Economics and Law from Tribhuwan University and is currently a visiting faculty at Nepal Law Campus. He is also very proud of his Nepalese heritage, identifying himself as a member of the 19th generation of Mainali hailing from Nepal.
DUNHAM: Let’s begin by discussing your background and how you became a leading spokesman for Nepal’s judiciary system.
MAINALI: I have been a practicing lawyer in the judiciary for 37 years. Indirectly, I was also involved with bringing democracy to Nepal: supporting early on the political parties and defending their cases.
DUNHAM: What cases?
MAINALI: During the period of autocracy in Nepal, there were no lawyers who dared to take the cases of leaders in the political parties, who were charged on citizen, criminal, moral, arms and ammunitions cases.
Before I joined this profession, I was a lecturer of economics in Tribhuvan University. Some politicians came to me and requested that I enter law school so that there would be someone to defend their cases. Basically, that’s why I joined this profession. Prior to that, I had no interest in joining the judiciary because it was one of the most neglected organs of the State. I saw its deficiencies firsthand. There were already many of my family members who were in the judiciary: they were lawyers, judges of the District Courts and judges of the Supreme Court.
So I joined the judiciary on the understanding that my practice would be restricted to pro bono service – just to help the people restore democracy in Nepal. That was my ambition. I didn’t join the profession for money and certainly not for prestige! When I became a lawyer in Nepal there was no dignity associated with this profession. Society looked down on lawyers and characterized them as tricky, untrustworthy people.
But beginning with my generation, we helped to build the reputation of the judiciary. Today, society as a whole has grown to respect us. Today, both cadres and political party leaders are in need of our services and we have come to their aid while valuing and upholding the dignity of the profession. We really are trying our level best to uphold rule of law in this country.
But going back to the early days, in the 1960s, when there was a coup d’etat led by the king, and then the elected government was dissolved after 16 months, parliament was dissolved – I was a school student having just joined the law college and witnessed the upheaval, at least to some extent through my father’s eyes. My father was a freedom fighter in 1950. He was with the Nepali Congress and a friend of B.P. Koirala and that’s the kind of family I grew up in. He was against the Rana regime and the Panchayat system. And like B.P. Koirala, my father felt animosity for Nehru’s party and was in opposition to India’s control over Nepal.
During the 1990 democratic movement, I took a leading role as a civil rights activist and human right’s lawyer. I was imprisoned at that time. By then I had adopted some leftist inclinations. I was disenchanted with Nepali Congress because of their rules and behavior and their dependence on Indian politics. I still don’t like that aspect of Nepali Congress. I accept all of their principles, but I oppose their dependence on Indian politics. And even though I come from a landlord family – a wealthy, upper-middle class family, my leftist inclinations stem from the fact that I live in a country that is very poor. When I see the future of so many poor, marginalized people in Nepal -- all the people who are excluded from mainstream politics on the basis of caste, gender, ethnicity and region – I find it insupportable. I take objection to the injustice that arises from that discrimination. Everyone must have equal rights in the political power. Otherwise the country cannot develop. And in that sense, to some extent, Marxist ideology interests me. Although we must follow the independent line of freedom of thought, expression and rule of law, we must also follow the socialistic pattern of economy. This is my view: The two lines must be followed. At the cost of economic development, we cannot sacrifice our personal freedom; at the cost of personal freedom, we cannot allow the people to be deprived and marginalized forever and ever.
DUNHAM: So you began your career as a human rights activist lawyer?
MAINALI: Actually I was a founding member and president of the Forum for Human Rights, which is one of the first such organizations, initiated during the Panchayat-autocratic regime. And based on my experiences, the political and civil rights and the economic and social and cultural rights are indivisible.
DUNHAM: And you have been jailed a half dozen times over the course of your career because of your views?
MAINALI: That’s correct.
DUNHAM: As a president of the Nepal Bar Association, what is your assessment of the health of the judiciary system in Nepal? How does Rule of Law play out against a persistent disregard for the written law, for instance? Has this been a pervasive problem regardless of which political party is in power? And if so, how can the trend be reversed?
MAINALI: In a nascent or fragile democracy such as Nepal’s, the judiciary is very weak – especially if the ruler feels that he is above the law. Rule of law must be inclusive. By that I mean that everyone should have to answer to the rule of law. No one should be above the law.
But I would like to begin by placing your question in an historical context.
250 years ago, before Prithvi Narayan Shah united this kingdom, this country was divided into many principalities – more than 100 tribal groups and small isolated states -- -- very underdeveloped. Feudal lords ruled over these various ethnic communities. It was an extremely crude form of rule of law.
Prithvi Narayan Shah, the direct ancestor of the recently deposed king, initially ruled the small state of Gorkha. He was young, bright and proved capable of uniting all the principalities. And after his death, Prithvi’s brother and son continued his work by adding additional principalities in what was then regarded as part of northern India. Nepal became much bigger than it is today. The border of Nepal abutted the area of Kalimpong to the east, Kashmir to the west, the Himalaya to the north and the Ganges River to the south.
But at the same time Britain was expanding its control over India. In terms of Nepali boundaries, this culminated in the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814-16, when the British forced Nepal into the Treaty of Sagauli. There were both positive and negative aspects to that treaty. Positive: Britain recognized Nepal as an independent state. Negative: We lost many territories in the bargain.
Now let’s jump ahead to the post World War II era, which had a huge impact on India and Nepal. India gained independence from the British Empire, profoundly impacting Rana rule in Nepal. Up until that time, the Ranas had been able to enjoy good relations with British rule, but now they were left out in the cold. Suddenly the Indian political landscape was completely new. It forced Nepal into thinking differently about itself. And this was what made possible the dramatic changes that occurred in Nepal in the early 1950s.
Nepal wanted to have independence from Rana rule and tried to have a multi-party system. But it was too fragile to really take hold; it could not be sustained under the major changes that had taken place in the Nepal government. Prior to 1950, the monarchy was very weak. Suddenly, there was a reverse in fortunes and the king became very strong and popular. Also, the leaders of the political parties were immature and made the mistakes of newcomers. They lacked vision and they were not fully committed to the huge task at hand. To begin with, they were fighting and uphill battle in a profoundly feudal country that had very little idea what a democracy was all about.
In 1960, democracy again looked like a possibility. We had a multi-party election and Nepali Congress party received a sweeping two-thirds majority. The leader of Nepali Congress, B.P. Koirala was very charismatic – huge character. Still people remember him, myself included, as a man with vision. But the main stumbling block of his career was that he had a conflict of interest with India. As I said before, B.P. and Nehru did not get along at all. And that’s a good thing. If B.P Koirala had allowed himself to become the stooge of India, the sovereignty of Nepal would have been over.
Still, Nepali Congress rule was not very acceptable to the Nepali people. There was unrest and insecurity. Civil unrest grew. The people still had great faith in the monarchy. And King Mahendra took advantage of the frailties and failures of the political parties and ultimately introduced the one-party system [Panchayat], which was operational for the next thirty years. Once again, democracy was foiled.
With this in mind, we should pause for a moment to discuss Nepal’s political, social and judiciary cultures.
First, as I indicated previously, Nepal’s political culture has always been a very autocratic on. What needs to be said is that, even today, nothing has changed. Nepal still has an autocratic culture. Second, Nepal still doesn’t have political stability. It continues to be in a state of flux, which has, in turn, made it impossible for true democracy to function here.
People try to put an optimistic spin on political stability in Nepal. Most of the donor agencies -- NGOs and INGOs – seem to have come to the conclusion that Nepal is in a post-conflict situation. But personally I don’t agree with that view. We are still in a conflict situation.
DUNHAM: Why do you come to that conclusion?
MAINALI: Because, according to Foreign Minister Yadav, 42 small-armed groups are operational in Terai, using hit-and-run methods. They take shelter across the border in India. Most of these groups have criminal backgrounds and strike out at the Nepalis like criminals: Kidnapping, asking ransom money, looting and extortion in the name of politics. In addition, various ethnic groups in the Terai and eastern hilly regions are preparing for independent states. And these groups are also armed.
So this criminalization of politics is the most dangerous thing. I already mentioned to you that the politics of Nepal is not free from the impact of Indian politics. Indian politics is so much criminalized. And in Nepal, now, also it is very much criminalized. It’s very difficult to separate between the criminals and the politicians. So many people agree about this that it’s as if the criminalization of Nepali politics is taken for granted. That’s the political culture we are living in.
DUNHAM: You also mentioned that Nepal’s social culture compromised the judiciary. Why?
MAINALI: Because our social culture is basically feudal.
DUNHAM: Even today?
MAINALI: Even today -- a fusion of autocratic and feudal cultures. This fusion is the biggest hindrance for rule of law. This fusion is the main enemy of development in Nepal.
DUNHAM: Could you explain?
MAINALI: In the first place, autocratic and feudal attitudes have prevailed in the minds of the rulers -- but not just the rulers. The various political parties must be included. It doesn’t matter if they advertise “democracy” or “social democrat” in their party names; the autocratic and feudal attitudes within the parties have prevailed. In addition, there is an identical attitude among the individual citizens of Nepal. Even among the poorest people in Nepal – who have no political clout -- they have this tendency to think autocratically and feudally.
Rulers, political parties and individuals – none of us have been able to change our feudal attitude. And until we free ourselves from this attitude, we will never be able to have rule of law in Nepal.
DUNHAM: Is this what feeds the prevalence of impunity in Nepal?
MAINALI: Absolutely. Our attitude prohibits a law-abiding culture. We actually feel proud if we can break the law. We feel glory, breaking the law. And none are more proud of this that our political leaders and their cadres.
But again, let’s step back for a moment and look at the history of the judiciary.
Before 1950, we had a family autocratic rule. It wasn’t until 1952-3, that we established an independent judiciary. Before that, the judiciary was merged with the executive – the Chief Justice and the Prime Minister. That’s a very brief history, if you think about it. We have had a very short history of an operational judiciary with the law profession serving as the manpower behind that organization.
People speak of the revolution of the early 1950s. The change was not revolutionary. It may have looked like that to the people but it was merely a political transference of power from one family, the Ranas, to another, the Shahs. In fact the people’s movement joined with the autocratic government, preventing it from becoming a true revolution. Nepali Congress was the party that led the people’s movement at that time, and it was made supportable by the Peace and Friendship Treaty signed with India.
And it did nothing to clarify the rule of law in a modern state.
This is a serious challenge not only to Nepal, but all to all developing countries around the world as well. To have a truly modern State, a country must understand the importance of maintaining separation of powers – separation of the judiciary from the executive branch – and the mutual respect that goes with that.
This kind of understanding and respect is not present in Nepali leadership. When the Supreme Court comes down with a decision, it is the executive branch’s duty to respect that decision. The decisions inform the government as to what they can and cannot do. Instead, in this country, we see constant examples of the executive branch trying to inform the Supreme Court what it can and cannot do.
Nor are the decisions upheld. For instance, the Court has imposed many fines on politically connected men. Based on those judgments, millions and millions of rupees are supposed to be collected in fines. But do the convicted pay? No. The fined people ignore the decisions. They know they don’t have to pay. If the court passes sentence on a man for murder – let’s say life imprisonment – if that man belongs to a political party, not only will he not serve time, he will be seen traveling in a minister’s car or even finding shelter in a political leader’s home.
So you see, if the political parties – especially the leaders of the political parties – don’t respect the law or the constitution, how can one expect the common man to respect the law and the constitution? There is a famous saying in Nepal: “The law is a privilege for the people who are rich and have the power, but the law is a curse for the people who are poor and helpless.” Unless and until the government respects the law and the judgments of the court, unless the government respects the judiciary, there will be no real rule of law in Nepal.
DUNHAM: So the politicians are to blame?
MAINALI: The kingpin of every State is the politics. The political parties control the political workers. If political parties refuse to instruct their followers to respect rule of law, what can the rest of society do?
DUNHAM: Let’s cite specific examples: I’m thinking about Dr. Bhattarai, when he lambasted the Supreme Court recently about the ruling on General Katawal. Apart from it being non-productive, it’s also duplicitous. When Dr. Bhattarai and Prachanda recently visited foreign countries, they promulgated the notion that they supported democracy. And yet when they return to Nepal, they immediately tear into the judiciary or, in Prachanda’s case, the media by calling them “smugglers”, etc.
MAINALI: That was very hurtful, all of that. I immediately called a Nepal Bar Association executive committee meeting. I condemned this kind of governmental reactions to Supreme Court decisions. There is such a thing as due process of law, which the government seemed to have forgotten. If you disagree with rulings, you go through the legal system to change the existing laws. If a person, who is dissatisfied with a court decisions, he has the right to appeal. On the other hand, if you simply go to the street and authorize the parading of effigies, if you disrespect the authority of the judiciary, then how can you follow the rule of law? What you have done is to exemplify an extremely anti-rule-of law posture. And if you happen to also be a leader within the government, then how can you claim that you want a democratic constitution?
The Bar Association condemned the remarks you are referring to. Many political parties also condemned those comments, including Nepali Congress and UML.
But we also have to take into account the background of the Maoists.
It is my observation that the Maoist party has not yet fully accepted the Western idea of democracy. Remember that they embodied an insurgency for 12 years in the name of a very dogmatic, classical communism. The leaders were brought up with that kind of communism. But not all of them are such hard-line communists, in my opinion. So some of the leaders, when I have talked to them, I have found some changes in them. They have come to understand the ground reality that classic Stalin-like communism simply cannot prevail in a country like Nepal and that, at some point, rule of law must be address.
DUNHAM: How have the ethnic communities played their part in the fragility of rule of law?
MAINALI: In a way, all groups in Nepal are ethnic. No civilization was created in Nepal. The Burma-Tibetan tribal culture seeped down from the north, while Aryans, like my forefathers, migrated up from the subcontinent long before the British Empire came and placed the “India” stamp on what was really a conglomerate of separate independent states.
Nepal has always been a fusion of different cultures – never its own unique culture. So the basic problem for us is in defining “ethnicity”. Who is really indigenous in Nepal? Who is ethnic? It’s very confusing. We lack a scientific formula to make these calculations and deductions.
Take the Sherpas, for example. History tells us that they didn’t arrive in Nepal until the 16th-17th century. They have not been residents of Nepal for more than three or four centuries. Originally, the Sherpas were a Khampa tribe from southeaster Tibet. They moved south into what is now Nepal. There was no border system at that time, of course. People could migrate wherever they liked. So the Tibetan Sherpas came down from Kham. Even the Tibetan language defines them as migrants: Sher means “south” and pa means “residence” – in other words, “Tibetans who moved south”. And yet here in Nepal they are widely regarded as an indigenous people! The Sherpas are just one example.
Conversely, while tribes were moving into Nepal, other tribes were moving out of Nepal. Take the migrants who moved to Assam, for instance.
This coming and going of communities is nothing new nor is it unique to Nepal. It happens in many places where there is a no concept of “State”, or at best a disregard of “State”. If you visit the Afghan-Pakistani border, there are many places that are still under the control of tribal rulers. They don’t follow the rules of Pakistan. They have their own rules and sense of national boundaries means nothing to them in their daily lives.
But in Nepal, the most pressing ethnic problem in the 21st century is the ethnic problem arising in the south, in Madhes. The Madhes have been excluded from the Nepali power structure, no doubt about it. The question is: Why?
The history behind this exclusion is that there was never a recognized state of Terai. There was never a Terai king, or any sort of Terai ruler, for that matter. It was always the hilly people to the north of Terai who ruled the various communities in Terai.
In short, Madhes, as a concept, lacks an historical premise. Actually, the meaning of Madhesi is “those people who came from Madhya Pradhes – the middle province -- of India”. The word indicates Indian origin. It’s not dissimilar to your country’s usage of compound nouns to identify groups who have migrated to the United States: You have African Americans, German Americans, Irish Americans, Nepali Americans and the list goes on and on.
The usage of “Madhes” is a fairly new phenomenon. According to Nepalese historical documents, you will see that the southern area of Nepal was referred to as “Terai” – a word of Tharu origin.
So the question arises: What constitutes authentic ethnic identity?
In March, the Nepal Bar Association’s held an historical conference, which was inaugurated by the President; the [then] Prime Minister and all main political leaders were speakers. The association’s intention was to bring the leaders together in a spirit of unity for framing the constitution within the designated timeframe.
And I asked the leaders, “When you just talk about ethnic identity, what exactly to you mean? Do you want to recognize these various groups, as they were 300 years ago, or 500 years ago? The Raos, for instance: Do you want them to return to the jungle life the led 100 years ago? Or do you want to bring them downtown and develop them into civilized people? What do you want to do with these recognized ethnic communities? If you intend to support the ethnic people, then you have to help them define themselves, but also allow room for the creation of a modern identity.”
Likewise, here in Nepal, we need to define “indigenous”. Yes, there is a universal definition, but for Nepal, we have to redefine the term. The government can easily declare some 60-65 indigenous groups but the identification must be scientific, not emotional, which is often the case in Nepal. We are easily drawn into to provocative stances that are not based on research. Provocation leads to disaster.
We have seen what happened in South Africa, Rwanda, and the Congo -- how ethnic disputes turned into genocide. In South Africa, they handled the problem very wisely. In 1993, I was an international observer for the South African elections. I visited some of the tribal communities and they were seething with vengeance. You could see it in their faces and hear it in their voices. There was an appetite for white massacre. And it could have easily taken place. But with the help of international groups and the wise leadership of Nelson Mandela, the crisis was averted.
During that conference, we also talked about federalism. How did the notion of federalism get introduced to the Nepalis? Out of 200 plus countries, there are only 25 countries that have federalism. United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, Switzerland – these countries and others have managed to combine small states to become a perfect union for development. The holding-together concept can backfire, however. Just look at the former Soviet Union: A powerful empire conquered all the different states but when the central power grew weak, the states wanted to peel away and go on their own.
For Nepal, I hope that we can “hold together” as much and as long as we can. We can separate and every group can have self-determination anytime you like. So you have two things going on in Nepal: One is combining smaller states to make a more perfect union and the other is the separation of groups. If we are dragged into the separation of groups, it will be because of Maoist and Indian influence. That’s why there is rampant confusion about ethnicity in Nepal.
Federalism doesn’t mean ethnic-based states. The supremacy of any ethnic community is abhorrent to the Nepal Bar Association. We, therefore, advocate any ethnic supremacy because Nepal is a multi-ethnic, cultured country. That is the beauty of Nepal. We have a mosaic culture. Furthermore, more than 80 of the listed ethnic groups have a population of less than 100,000 members. Only 10-15 ethnic groups have more than 1,000,000 populations. So what that means, if we have an ethnic-based federation, the larger ethnic groups will profit while the majority of the ethnic groups will suffer.
During the time of insurgency, when the Maoists talked about class struggle, it really didn’t take hold among the people. So what they did was they took the class struggle issue and mixed in the ethnic, regional and language issues – the three most sensitive aspects of any society. And it caught on with the ethnic communities. The Maoists promised all the ethnic groups that they, the Maoists, would in effect return the control of ancient principalities to the original ethnic groups that had been conquered by Prithvi Narayan Shah 250 years ago. The restructuring would take on a modern form, but it was still a return to old ways. This was the Maoist promise.
So how can they withdraw that promise now? Within the rank and file of Maoist supporters, they still cling to that promise. Many of the cadres have criminal backgrounds, were neglected by society and family, were vagabonds or street people –a disadvantaged group that can easily be worked into frenzy and persuaded to commit all sorts of inhumane acts.
But civilized, intellectual leaders know that they cannot simply get by with a force of guns – certainly not in the 21st century.
The Nepal Bar Association wants the nation to tread very carefully with the ethnic issue. We want a very democratic, pluralistic, and inclusive nation, which we believe will lead to a permanently peaceful and developing nation. The reason why we support federalism is so that those were historically excluded by the power structure in Kathmandu can now be included -- not marginalized as in the past – equality for the poor and ethnic communities so that they can see their quality of life improve from now on. We want a nation in which all people can enjoy a prosperous future.
DUNHAM: You spoke of the criminal element existing in the Maoist rank and file. Would you care to amplify on that?
MAINALI: Criminality has always been an element within the Maoist rank and file. During the time of the insurgency, the Maoists fueled their hatred and recruited criminals, frustrated youths, disenfranchised ethnic groups and religious extremists – as a means of strengthening their ability to eliminate the despised monarchy and feudalist State.
The king is gone. But once you have fomented this kind of emotion, it is difficult to reverse the process as well as ceasing to utilize criminal modes as a mean of getting what you want. It takes time. It is their dilemma.
DUNHAM: But it’s not just the Maoists’ dilemma, is it? A remarkable number of politicians, regardless of the party to which they belong, have, or have had criminal charges leveled against them. You yourself have represented an astounding number of political leaders in court cases.
MAINALI: True. Any time you bring about changes in a country, there is someone who is breaking the law. If you succeed in bringing about changes, you are labeled a hero. If you fail, you are labeled a criminal. This is the history of the world.
Nepal was a feudal country. Nepal is still a feudal country. To bring about changes, evolutionary changes are not possible. Only when there is political stability is evolutionary change possible. When there is no political stability and you have to change one system to another, you need force. Force means struggle. You can give it any name you like. In a struggle, you use arms, muscle, money, power -- anything you can get your hands on.
Nepali Congress, in 1950, used guns to change things in Nepal. The Panchayat used guns to change things in Nepal. The Maoists used guns to change things in Nepal.
Even in European and American history, guns were used during the process of major political change.
The more important question is: What is your motivation for using force and power to change society? If you are struggling for the good of the people and nation, if you are a leader who has a vision and if you are broadminded, then that country will develop and make a new and better nation. But if you are political leader who is self-centered and selfish and motivated by your own interests, your country will surely continue to suffer.
DUNHAM: Let’s move on to another question. How good are the odds that the Constituent Assembly will frame the constitution in the allotted time?
MAINALI: There’s no easy answer. Nepalis never follow the process. And Nepalis are always compromised in their actions by India and China.
India always wants an independent Nepal, as long as they have control of security and water resources. They don’t want to grab Nepal like they did to other principalities in the 1950s. Even then, the nearby presence inhibited India’s advance on Nepal. And anyway, today in the 21st century, it’s not so easy to just grab a country and call it your own. But India continues to expect Nepal to serve India’s security interests. And they do want to have control over our water. In the 21st century, water will be like a blue diamond. The scarcity of water will increase until it is more valuable that petrol.
As for China: The most unstable area within China is Tibet. The Western world, with the help of India, wants to use Nepal to support the efforts of Tibetans. So China is very much careful about this matter. Besides, China now has multiple interests in Nepal.
So these two regional powers have conflicting interests in Nepal.
To make the matter more complicated, the international community tends to see Nepal through a New Delhi window. American ambassadors, UN representatives like Ian Martin and others -- all of these leaders seem to have to go have consultations with Delhi.
Regional and international interests are very much here in Nepal.
Second, the political parties who are in CA have various philosophical and historical backgrounds. Their interests clash with each other. These conflicts may prolong the actual writing of the constitution. If the conflicts aren’t solved, it is not possible for the constitution to be written on time. But if the CA can unify, and if the regional and international interest permits us to make the constitution, the members of the CA can write the constitution overnight.
With that in mind, there are still three main problems facing the Constituent Assembly in framing the constitution:
1. Identity. Each ethnic community wants recognition of their identity in the constitution – their language, their culture. The leaders of the ethnic communities are demanding this.
2. Development and quality of life. A man cannot survive on ethnic identity alone. He needs a good quality of life, a means of bettering himself and his family, a way of improving his economic conditions. How should this be written into the constitution?
3. Devolution of Power. Every citizen must feel he or she has equal power, dignity of life, no matter what part of Nepal he or she lives in. He or she must have full right to explore his potential. Equal opportunity.
Above all, it should be remembered that the constitution is the fundamental law of the land. I want to see a nation that realizes the importance of the supremacy of the constitution -- not the supremacy of any particular party or individual or ethnic community.
First, we must adopt certain constitutional principles seen around the world. Universal rules. The United Nations has declared many common principles -- political, social, cultural, economic, human rights issues – that Nepal should adopt. Second, we need to look to our neighbors India and China: We must learn from the economic success of China and the civic and political rights successes of India. We have to adapt the best qualities of both nations.
Representing the Nepal Bar Association, I have visited many districts in Nepal for in an effort to collect the aspirations of the people. The Association also had the help of the Canadian Bar Association; we had a joint project regarding the making of the new constitution. What the Association discovered was that there are 99 challenges the CA has to resolve in order to write a new constitution. We counted 106 ethnic communities in Nepal. Now, even I’m getting information that there are 111-113 ethnic communities. There are 155 languages, dialects, and sub-dialects. The Association, after gathering this information, submitted the 99 challenges to the CA, with the request that the members think over our report and come to a consensus over the numerous challenges.
The dialogue within the CA must go something like this: How many issues are we already in agreement of? How many differences do we have? How can resolve these differences? This kind of dialogue would significantly shorten the process and would make it much easier to frame the constitution in the given time.
And if some of the differences are not possible to resolve amicably, then the only democratic process, which is mentioned in the constitution also, is to go to a referendum – the people’s verdict. That is the only solution. That is the most democratic process. Or the CA needs a 2/3 majority for each article, to pass the constitution. Try to use the democratic process. Above all, don’t resort to guns, muscles, money and power.
If you try that method again, there will be a big conflict in society.
Let me go back a little. The 1990 constitution was one of the best. There were some problems. It lacked the devolution of power to the individuals. That was not written in. Inclusion of the excluded Nepali groups was not written in. These were shortcomings. But we could have incorporated the omissions, over the course of time, through the process of amendment making. Instead, the people weren’t allowed to feel ownership of their own constitution. They didn’t see their aspirations reflected in that constitution. So the constitution ultimately failed because our rulers were self-centered and never practiced democracy within their own parties, they were not broadminded, they were haughty, they didn’t take the advice of experts, they never thought that perhaps others possessed wisdom, that they knew best for everyone.
Unfortunately, there is no such thing as a think-tank mentality in Nepal.
Conceptually, one of the most beautiful aspects of a constitution is that it is understood that no constitution can be a perfect document as it is passed down from generation to generation. That’s what amendments are for. You amend a constitution according to the time and need.
But our leaders in the 1990s failed to listen to the people’s aspirations and to amend the constitution accordingly.
Let me ask you this: Why has the United States’ constitution prevailed for 250 years? Because it is one of the shortest constitutions in the world. In its brevity, it neither bars, protects nor imposes the values of the previous society. And the values are allowed to shine through according to the generations.
In contrast, the Indian constitution is one of the lengthiest in the world. And it has been amended more than a 100 times! Granted: India is constantly swamped with big problems, but it does become clear that a big constitution such as India’s doesn’t automatically mean a better constitution.
The bottom line is this: A constitution doesn’t lie in the statutes. A constitution lies in the hearts of the people.
DUNHAM: But my concern is about over-optimism. If leaders insist that the constitution will be written on time, over and over again, and if they fail in their promise -- what about the impatience of the people, the people who put their trust in these politicians? What’s the fallout?
MAINALI: This is a very serious question.
The interim constitution has clearly mentioned that the present CA can extend the time of writing up to six months. Beyond that, the very legality of the Constituent Assembly will come into question.
Suppose some of the political parties agreed to frame the constitution within the given time, but unseen and unhappy forces chose to intervene: There will be 60 armed insurgency groups that will appear inside Nepal – not only the 42 already identifies within Nepal – the unseen power will support the insurgency groups, which will disturb the whole nation. Nowadays, the 42 groups in Terai are silent. They have been advised to be quite for the time being. But that could change.
The basic security problem for Nepal is it’s open border with India. The hit-and-run methods of these groups – after they cause problems here, they know that they will find safety on the other side of the border. And the truth is that if India wished to control this movement, they could. During the time of the 2008 elections, the border was effectively sealed off and it was completely under control.
Frankly, the current scenario for the constitution is very unpredictable. The Nepalis are not the masters. Seeds of conflict are still sprouting up in many direction. Some of these conflicts are arising for the single purpose of destroying the harmony of Nepalese society.
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May 18, 2009
The career of Nepal’s first vice-president pivots on a single initial event that became a national lightning rod of controversy; the result was verbal contrition, then silence and finally near invisibility.
Paramananda Jha hails from the Saptari district of eastern Terai, the breadbasket of Nepal that extends across the Indo-Gangetic Plain. It is also known as Madhes. The vice-president’s Madhesi roots explain part of the controversy. There is an ongoing argument among Nepalis as to whether or not the Madhesis are Indian or Nepali. Culturally and linguistically, they are certainly bound to people on the Indian side of the border.
For many centuries the southern jungles acted as a buffer between Nepal and India. In the mid-20th century, eradication of malaria and large-scale deforestation made the suddenly fertile plains attractive to migrants both from the northern hilly regions of Nepal and from southern Indian neighbors who moved north into Nepal. Since then, the mainly uncontrolled migration from India has been of concern to the Nepali government and it was reluctant to grant civil rights even in the second or third generations. What is clear is that about half the Nepali population now live in the Terai and a considerable proportion of the Terai population is of Indian decent.
Paramananda Jha’s qualifications came readymade with controversy. He was a former Supreme Court judge who resigned in December 2007 following allegations of drug smuggling. But the matter seemed to have evaporated, especially after he joined politics by becoming a member of the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum, which eventually led to his appointment by the Constituent Assembly as Nepal’s first vice-president.
Instead of taking his oath of office in Nepali, Jha spoke in Hindi, the official language of India. The nation was shaken to the core. Demonstrators poured into the streets for seven days, deepening the rift between Indian-origin Nepalis and others. Transportation and education strikes effectively shut down the nation. Property was destroyed. Protesters demanded his resignation and/or a public apology. Neither came, although he did express his regret in a statement, adding that he had signed the oath document, which was written in Nepali.
For many, he seemed suitably chastened and, in any case, there would be a myriad of other more pressing problems that would leave the vice-president’s dust-up forgiven if not forgotten. His role has been one of obscurity ever since.
I spoke to Jha – two weeks before Prachanda stepped down from office -- in the old Rana palace that serves as the Vice-Presidential headquarters. He granted me the interview on the condition that I would steer clear of anything that might aggravate the public sore spots he had come to know so well.
DUNHAM: Mr. Vice President, my first question is about the Madhesi situation because, only three years ago, most foreigners had never given cause to think about the southern swath of Nepal. For most of us – with perhaps the exception of tiger safaris in Chitwan – Nepal conjures up pictures of Mt. Everest, the Kathmandu Valley and Pokhara -- but beyond that, our knowledge is limited, particularly when it comes to the importance of southern Nepal. Now, we are beginning to understand how important Madhes is, not only economically but also politically.
JHA: “Madhes” is not a new word. It was mentioned in the regulations of the Madhesi Sawaal Act -- an act that came into being during the Rana rule. Terai is the word for any plain. So in the past, people in the government sector only used the Terai word. But a few years ago, “Madhes became more common usage. Some people say Madhes and some people say Terai, but what is clear is that, ever since Prithvi Narayan Shah conquered and unified Nepal two-an-a-half centuries ago, the southern part of Nepal has been the only place in Nepal where rulers went and took the income and the agriculture production of the land, but failed to provide help or relief of the people of that land. There has always been discrimination in Terai. And that is the main reason for the present situation of hostilities and discontent. Even after the panchayat system, the situation remained the same. Then after 1990, after democracy returned to Nepal, the succession of governments—Congress, UML, etc—the government didn’t make any moves to help the people of Terai. The people of Madhes remained discriminated against and overlooked and neglected.
Then, during the recent insurgency, the Maoists very successfully penetrated and permeated the Terai region and awakened the people about their basic rights and what could be done to better the welfare of the Madhesi people. So the primary credit of outlining the problems in Madhes goes to the Maoists.
But when the Maoists actually took control of the government, the feeling of the Madhesi people was that the Maoists had completely forgotten about them. Their support of Madhesi issues was fifty-fifty, actually. Sometimes they supported Madhes and sometimes they ignored them.
Upendra Yadav, the leader of the Madeshi Janadhikar Forum, which began in 2003, took Madhes issues throughout the Terai. And he told the people “We are like people in a colony. So this is the right time to fight for our rights. Fight for your rights to have property, water and jungle. Fight against discrimination from the hilly people and government.”
Then there were the general elections in 2008. The Madhesi Janadhikar Forum ran candidates just like the other parties. And it became quite clear that we were a group to be reckoned with.
I would like to give you a picture of the discrimination –- what it is like to live in Madhes as a Madhesi. Madhesis are the majority in southern Nepal and yet we are not treated like a majority. Hilly-people landlords own 81% of the fertile land in Terai. Only 19% of the land is controlled by Madhesis. Even in government services, people from Madhes are only represented by 4-5% involvement. In the military, we are not represented at all. In the police sector, there are very few Madhesis. If you look at the Gorkhas, Nepal’s most famous armed personnel, who are renown and serve all over the world, the Madhesi have never been allowed to join. Zero persons. Our land is so fertile, but everything we are growing -- fruits, rice paddy, wheat – is sent to the hilly regions. We Madhesi people are used by the rest of Nepal – used like tenants.
These are the factors that the people of Madhes are feeling and experiencing from the very beginning and up to now.
DUNHAM: And now, since the Maoists have take control of the government, is there better representation of Madhesi people in the police, the army and the other sectors you mentioned?
JHA: Actually, in terms of the Madhesi and other indigenous groups in Terai, the government has signed some understandings or agreements. In the agreements, there is one clause that stipulates that government services—equal proportions on the basis of the population in Madhes, they will get proportional representation in government, military, everywhere. We have a public service commission. And the government has made an amendment in the public service commission regulation that is inclusive of Dalits, Madhes, women, backward tribes, etc. So I think now it has been included in the rules, but in practice, it hasn’t changed much.
DUNHAM: Then it still has a long way to go before there is true proportional representation in Terai.
JHA: Definitely. It will take -- we are very much hopeful, because this time the government has made the promise -- but in practice it may or may not be actualized or effective before a few years from now. But some things should be changed sooner than that. The Chief District officers, for instance -- the main administrators of the districts: the question is that why aren’t Madhesis appointed in the districts? But so far the government hasn’t found Madhesi people to fill these positions. Why? Because prior to the present, the Madhesi weren’t allowed the opportunity to take leadership roles -- to serve in responsible positions. That situation remains a total vacuum. From the other sectors -- the educational, agricultural sectors -- they have not brought in people from Madhes either.
These are the problems with this government. But as I said before, it will take time. We must hope that everything will go in a good way.
DUNHAM: This is a time in Nepal of unprecedented transition. Never have things changed so quickly, so radically. Please talk a little bit about the problems and challenges that this rapid transition has created—how the government hopes to overcome these problems.
JHA: I think the first thing is that the mindset of the people of Nepal is that this is the perfect time to make their various demands. The constitution is being written. Remember, before Prithvi Narayan Shah unified Nepal it was divided into many, many principalities -- from Mustang to Madhes. Now that the government has announced a federation, the various groups of ethnic backgrounds are demanding their own states. They see the opening for this kind of discussions and they want to discuss it now. The main problem with that is that all these demands are coming in from all sides at the same time. It has become an overwhelming number of demands from the people. That is the main thing we are struggling with.
The other thing is that the previous government of Nepal under GP Koirala -- that government made various agreements with the Maoists -- the way in which the peacemaking process would unfold, for instance. The government agreed to the PLA integration with the national army. It included conditions and terms for that integration. But these things are still in dispute.
What happened was that during the period of the Maoist insurgency, the infrastructure of the country -- schools, VDC offices, electricity powerhouses – all of the infrastructure was destroyed. All of that destruction must be developed yet again. So from every corner of the country, groups are demanding that the infrastructure – and in many cases there is no infrastructure -- in their area be addressed immediately. Security forces were concentrated in stations, but during the war, everywhere, the security moved to district headquarters. So now people are demanding that that pattern be reversed, for instance. How can the people feel secure, if they don’t see security in their remote villages?
Another problem is that the people gave the mandate for the members of the CA to write the constitution in the allotted amount of time. But I think that every political party has a different mindset – they are using this time for their own benefit, to strengthen their bases. And the clock is ticking. The parties are allowing themselves to be diverted from the main focus. I still believe that they will write the constitution in time, but even the intellectual community is not assured of this and they remain skeptical.
DUNHAM: Do you think it would be better for the government to get the constitution written before they attempt to solve all the various issues you have been discussing? Would that be better in a perfect world? The Tharus, the Madesh, everyone wants their demands met now, but is this the proper time to expect that to happen?
JHA: The problem is that the people in the remote areas are illiterate. They don’t know what should be in a constitution. They only know that they need education, health and food and, therefore, their only real concern is that education, health and food should be mentioned in the constitution. So this is the first problem – the limited scope of understanding within the groups of people of the remote areas.
In the intellectual sector, we used to say that the first thing that needed to be decided was whether or not our constitution would be lengthy or brief. Thus there is a provision that has created numerous committees to go out and collect the data and opinions of the people. And these committees have scoured the countryside to collect this information. But the information – “we want education, health and food” – has not proved to be very helpful input. It’s a long way from the original plan to, first and foremost, decide how long the constitution should be, as well as other basic questions that still need to be determined.
DUNHAM: What is the best way to assure the people that the constitution will, in fact, be completed by the 2010 deadline? I’m thinking about the inter-fighting between parties, which is obvious to anyone who cares to examine the situation.
JHA: Yes. The only obstacle is lack of cooperation between the parties. The results of the election showed that the Maoist got a majority of the votes, but not a mandate. The other parties – Congress, UML and the others – have used this against them and have therefore called this “an interim government”.
This government must focus on the main problem: to write the constitution. They don’t have the right to make major agreements with other countries or to make big promises to the voters of this nation. We have to write the constitution. But that’s not the reality. The parties are utilizing the time to strengthen their party bases. And we will all suffer for it.
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Gagan Thapa may be the best argument yet for old politicians in Nepal making way for young blood. Wise before his time, down-to-earth, articulate, passionate about the major issues plaguing Nepalis -- whatever their backgrounds or ethnicity -- Gagan has quickly emerged (from leading Nepal Congress' youth organization) as one of the most insightful officials elected to last year's newly created Constituent Assembly.
Our meeting took place several weeks before Prachanda stepped down as Nepal's first Maoist prime minister. My questions included Maoist leadership, brain drain in Nepal, the writing of the constitution and shortcomings within Gagan's own party. His answers were, as always, generously seasoned with candor.
DUNHAM: How much headway has the constituent assembly really been able to achieve in creating a new constitution? Should the people be concerned that the constitution is not going to be written by the deadline next year?
GAGAN: Yeh, let me start this way. The first four or five months of this new constituent assembly was, in a way, wasted. If you look into the use of the time during that initial period, it was a complete waste in terms of the writing of the constitution. We managed to address organizational matters of the new government -- we elected a president, that sort of thing. But it took five months to get to the creation of fourteen different committees to begin the process of writing the constitution. Out of the fourteen committees, eleven were subject committees and three were technical committees. Had we created these committees at the beginning, by now, we would have concluded at least the first part of the constitutional writing.
After the formation of the committees, it took another two months to lay out the outline, discuss the issues with experts, and then we decided to go to the public and seek their opinions. But thing is, this aspect was not well discussed in advance. The procedure we adopted to seek public opinion wasn’t very scientific.
To begin with, the questions posed to the public were so complicated that lawyers would have to spend five hours to answer the questions that arose from the technical language used in our questions; especially the people living in remote areas could not understand the language because of all the technical jargon.
Another problem was the criteria for sampling public opinion. It was done on a more-or-less ad hoc basis – no consistent system had been adopted. We distributed over 300,000 questionnaires but it doesn’t look as if anyone knows how to process the information. Any number of people have expressed their views in different ways – that is to be expected – but the question remains: How should the information be processed? Only now is the Secretary of the Constituent Assembly discussing this issue with the Central Bureau of Statistics. “Is there any way to help us out?” But the bureau has responded by saying that it doesn’t have any specific answers as to how to resolve this issue.
Now we have collected the questionnaires and now we have only one week left. Within this week, all the eleven subject committees have to finish writing the concept -- the first draft for each subject committee. It means that the next week is going to be very telling, extremely crucial. It will indicate if we are on the right track or not.
As a member of the CA, what I’ve observed is that it’s easier for some of the subject committees – those that are dealing with less controversial issues -- to finish this task on time. But for the committees that are tasked with issues like creating new states within the nation or deciding on the intricacies of the electoral system, the work is much more difficult.
And then there is this: We have already spent almost a complete year sitting across the table from one another, but so far, the members of the various political parties have discussed these issues only among their own party members, not the other parties. We have been listening to various experts, both domestic and international. We have been listening to the people’s opinions. But we – the various political parties – haven’t talked to each other. So no one knows: We only know the public position of our own political party. It remains to be seen how flexible the parties will be on any given issue.
The law says that two-thirds of the CA has to endorse each and every article. It means that there must be consensus among the major political parties – the Maoists, Congress, UML, the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum – only if we can achieve consensus among ourselves can we move forward. Let’s take an example: The Madhesi Janadhikar Forum – it is their political position that they want one single Madhesi province. Congress is set dead against it. UML has a different viewpoint. The Maoists have a different viewpoint. So far, these are the parties’ positions. But to write this into the constitution, you have to arrive at a consensus. In order to do that, you have to start talking to each other and determine how flexible can one party be, what can be the common points of interest. This crucial process hasn’t yet begun.
Another thing that I have observed is – honestly – it’s again the issue of the political parties. We have 601 members in the CA, from diverse backgrounds. We represent diverse communities, diverse interests – that’s one side of the coin. But the other side of the coin is that again we are members of different political parties. My observation is that the parties still hold sway over their CA members, not the communities whose interests the politicians are supposed to represent.
My point is that it’s not only what’s going on within the CA. The most important thing is what’s going on outside the CA. I mean, the Maoists, Congress, UML, the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum – forget about what’s happening inside the CA. Let’s imagine that all the various parties were right now in good working relations with one another, that they were moving forward with a common aim within a framework of a particular time, that they were listening to each other, trying to make compromises – then it’s going to influence what’s going on inside the CA.
But what if it’s not happening like that? The problem is that the working relationship within the major political parties is getting worse, not better. There is stark polarization between the parties. The truth seems to be that the writing of the constitution is not a priority in the CA.
DUNHAM: If that’s the case, what happens, psychologically, to the mindset of the Nepali people, if the deadline for the completion of the writing of the constitution, in May 2010, comes and goes without the CA’s task having been achieved? Granted, there’s a stipulation that the time can be extended for another six months. Nevertheless, the people are sitting, waiting, watching -- listening, time and again, to their political leaders assuring them that the constitution will get written on time. What happens to the general morale of the voters who put stock in the member of the CA to get the job done? Isn’t there a real danger of the public just getting fed up with the whole process?
GAGAN: Exactly. Just after the election of the CA for the declaration of a republic, people had such high expectations. They were expecting some difference in their own lives – positive indications that things were going to be better in the coming days. That was the public mood. But so far we have been unable to deliver on these promises. People are not very happy with what has happened in the last year.
But is spite of that, there remains a hope, stemming from the mere presence of the CA, that it is making enough progress that life – in spite of growing skepticism – is going to get better. But once the public concludes that the CA is incapable of writing a constitution, people will become so disenchanted with the peace process, as you said, that things would become really difficult for political parties to control.
DUNHAM: Then things get really ugly. The blame game. Maybe the Maoists going back to Plan B, for instance – the unfinished revolution, all that.
GAGAN: Then things get really ugly. But I’m more worried…I mean look at all the new political groups. Look at the eastern districts where groups are demanding an autonomous ethnic province. You can see this all across the country. Right now, these demands aren’t getting organized to the point that people are rallying around them – right now they’re not getting the public support that they would like. But once the public realizes that the CA is not getting the job done, then these people will cease looking for the big political parties for help and they will take the lead within their own constituencies. They won’t wait to see what the CA will do. This will lead to a kind of political anarchy. The parties that were main players in the peace process will be elbowed to the sidelines. That is my worry.
I have traveled all over the country in the last one year. I have seen this mood. In the western part of Nepal for example, Tharus are demanding a separate province. As it stands now, it’s the CA that is supposed to decide this issue. Still, the Tharus continue to organize so that they will be in a better position for bargaining with the CA. That’s fine. There’s nothing wrong with that. But if they conclude that the CA is incapable of doing its work, the Tharus will stop demanding anything from the CA. They will claim their province on their own – with or without the CA’s approval. This kind of thing might not only lead to political anarchy but civil war as well. That is my worry.
DUNHAM: Something else that I find worrisome is recent Maoist belligerence – I’m thinking of Dr. Bhattarai’s public attack on the judicial system. My belief is that the judiciary should always be kept separate from the political arena. Other political parties have registered objections to Bhattarai’s attack, but it takes more than an objection or two to put an end to such lambastes – to safeguard the independence of the judiciary. Do you agree?
GAGAN: I do agree. We’ve been discussing this situation in my party as well. We have been disrupted in parliament for the last twenty days because of this. We would like Bhattarai to come to parliament and make a statement as to why he condemned the Supreme Court in public and to make it very clear what his party’s position is about judiciary independence. That was the issue we have been distracted by instead of addressing other issues involving the YCL and all of those things – principle issues.
Clarification will of course help the entire peace process as a whole. Again, the Maoists have to commit to what they agreed to in the peace agreement and they have to express their commitment to respect the independent judiciary. But unfortunately neither Congress nor UML has pressed this issue. Instead, they have focused on less vital issues.
DUNHAM: What about freedom of speech? Freedom of the press? The press has been under attack by the Maoists, coming, I guess, on the heels of Prachanda’s son being photographed dead drunk. The Maoists reacted by castigating the press – calling them everything from foreign lackeys to smugglers. Mustn’t they also be held accountable for that, if they support a democratic society?
GAGAN: Mikel, there is one interpretation that, in a very planned way, the Maoists are trying to weaken all institutions -- the press, the judiciary, the industrial sector, the military, and the school system – everything in a deliberate way. That’s one interpretation. I still don’t want to believe it. We have to wait for the coming days to see whether this is true or not. But there is a pattern emerging – the back and forth.
After the Prime Minister came back from his European tour, he condemned all the political parties. The next day the characterization of the press as “smugglers” came out. The next day, in one particular program, a senior Maoist leader challenged the rival political parties by saying, “If you’re going to change the government, you’ll have to face the consequences.” Then, Prachanda came to parliament, completely conciliatory, and said he was ready to listen to any political party – this backward and forward – this has been the pattern for the last six or seven months. Neither have the Maoists stopped attacking institutions, nor have they stopped making the conciliatory statements.
DUNHAM: A well-choreographed plan to create confusion and maintain confusion? When people are confused, they don’t act.
GAGAN: True.
DUNHAM: Is it a fishing expedition to see how far they can push the envelope? I’m including here the recent attempted enforced retirement of the generals.
GAGAN: The generals are quite a different case because G.P. Koirala did the same thing after he became prime minister after Janandolan II. He didn’t extend the period for a few generals. So that’s why it doesn’t really allow the moral ground for other parties to come out and object. That’s one thing. Another thing is that the impression of the national army hasn’t been completely positive. That issue will have to proven, resolved in the coming days. But you’re right about the confusion.
What I’ve found, when I travel to different districts, is that there is a kind of frustration even among the Maoist cadres – not just people like us.
When I talk about “us”, I mean the people who did not vote for the Maoists. But when the Maoists first came into power, I personally thought, “OK man, they are going to run the country in quite a different way. They are going to set some principles and standards that we will have to follow. And it’s going to benefit the whole political system. The parties like National Congress and UML will have to meet those standards. They will have to democratize themselves, look for different perspectives – the Maoists are going to change everything.” That was my expectation.
There was another thing going on -- during the build-up to the election -- before Prachanda was elected. The country was expecting an ongoing high level of charisma from that individual. The people of Nepal have seen Koirala leading the country, Deuba leading the country. The general population was thinking, “This man is going to make a difference.” And since then, Prachanda has disappointed a large portion of the public.
But, in traveling to the various districts I’ve seen that, even though some of the Maoist cadres are disappointed and frustrated, the Maoist party, itself, doesn’t bother itself too much about all these things. They are so busy in their expansion of their organization -- they are so busy in penetrating certain established organizations -- that they are giving the impression that they don’t care about the popular vote.
DUNHAM: Then what do they care about?
GAGAN: They care about the strength of the party itself.
Right now the Maoists can beat any of the other political parties, as far as the number of active cadres, the resources, the capacity of mobilization are concerned. And this is what they are focusing on, rather than addressing or influencing a large portion of the population with good policies and programs. They are more concerned with expanding the organization.
DUNHAM: Expansionism is one of their superlative talents.
GAGAN: Yeh.
DUNHAM: Their ability to define who they are for public consumption is also very impressive. Someone told me the other day that – someone who loathes the Maoists: “The brilliant thing about the Maoists is that they are perceived by the public as having a plan. What’s the Congress’ plan? What’s the UML’s plan? It doesn’t matter if it’s true or not. The point is that the Maoists have won in the perception game that they are the party with a plan.”
GAGAN: It’s not only the outsiders who are saying this. Even inside our party, we are so concerned about Nepali Congress being out of power, that our effort is focused on getting back into power and mobilizing our cadres and instigating party programs. Why are we doing all this? We want to win the next election. We need to make all the proper preparations to win the next election. That’s all obvious.
But my question to party leaders is, “What are we going to do, once we regain the office? We don’t have any plan. Let’s discuss this. We are just discussing that we are worried that we are out of office. Are we going to repeat the same mistakes that we have made in the past? Have we ever discussed that, after getting democracy in 1990 – when everywhere in the worldwide communist movement -- Russia was collapsed, even in China, the communists were reforming themselves – and yet in tiny Nepal, the communists exhibited new life! Why is that? Have we ever discussed that within our party?”
So it’s not only about looking at the Maoists. It’s also about looking in the mirror. In 1990, we, the Nepali Congress were the major political party; we were running the government. So where did we fail?
It was the weakness of our programs. It’s always about the programs, Mikel. Even in the most recent bi-elections, what we have seen is that the constituency that used to be ours, the Nepali Congress’ – the poor, the disadvantaged, the Dalit – they are no longer with Congress because they believe that Congress, even if they came to power, would no longer serve or address their needs. That’s the public’s perception of Congress.
Does the perception fit the reality? Does Congress accept that perception? Does Congress think of itself as a party that does not offer solutions to the ultra-poor? Have we become more about serving the interest of the middle-class?
If you look at our election manifestos, we are still described as a party with a socialist approach. We define ourselves as social democrats. Really, if you compare our manifesto with the Maoists’, there’s not a significant difference. But what about our policies? How can we make people believe that we’re not the same old Nepali Congress?
DUNHAM: Well, why would anyone change their mind about Congress as long as G.P Koirala is leading the party? He represents the past and all that went with it, not the hope of a better future. When I think of G.P., I don’t think of a new Nepal.
GAGAN: Mikel, what I’ve seen during the recent bi-election and student elections is that -- although Congress wants to portray itself as the party that is for the democratization of Nepali society, that we abide by democratic principles, that we want to democratize all institutions, that we take credit for bringing in the Maoists from the underground into the peace process and convinced them to accept all the norms of a democratic polity -- people haven’t trusted our claims.
Why? Because G.P. Koirala controls all the party decisions. It’s a one-man show. It’s a one-man party.
DUNHAM: Autocratic. The perception is that Congress is autocratic.
GAGAN: Yeh. And people have read this in the newspapers, they’ve seen it for themselves, they’ve observed it, and so they don’t trust our party’s claims to the contrary. How can you trust a “democratic” party that is saddled with an undemocratic inter-party process? How is such an organization going to democratize society as a whole? Prior to 1990, the party’s internal process was limited to private sympathizers, but today the party’s actions are a public affair. In the 21st century, people have come to expect transparency in party matters – party affairs are no longer regarded as a private affair.
You cannot control the thinking process of any individual. These days, an individual will judge for him or herself, if a party serves democratic goals. That judgment will be based on the party’s working style. And Congress’ non-democratic style is it’s major defect.
Honestly, the whole peace process is suffering from Congress’ defects. Had Congress been stronger, it would have helped to keep the Maoists in check. Keeping the Maoists in check would have helped the whole peace process. Even if the Maoists had had some sort of secret game plan, a strong unified Congress could have forced the Maoists to abide by the peace agreement.
DUNHAM: Let’s talk about unity. What are the key issues that prevent Congress and UML from uniting to create a majority rule?
GAGAN: This is the irony. The UML has already proved that, as far as the political system is concerned, it doesn’t have a different stance from Congress. You cannot doubt UML’s commitment for multi-party democracy. It maintains a communist ideology, but you cannot put the UML and the Maoists in one basket. Therefore, there is room for Congress to start a meaningful dialogue with the UML.
But again it’s this thing of one party trying to prevail over the other. And what has happened is that the two parties are, in fact, drifting apart, not coming closer together. I always see the room for a genuine dialogue to exist, but the parties aren’t picking up on the opportunity. There again, on the UML’s part, it seems so unified, but there are very different viewpoints within UML leadership.
DUNHAM: Are we talking about ideological differences?
GAGAN: No. What I see is personal issues. Power games within the party. But again, instead of blaming UML, I prefer to get back to Congress, which also has issues with personal power struggles.
NC claims to be a watchdog for democracy, for helping UML to get on board with the democratic process. So it’s in NC’s court to initiate a dialogue with UML. The differences are so few between the parties -- except that the UML wants an executive Prime Minister, who would be directly elected by the people, while Congress wants a parliamentary democracy in which parliament elects the Prime Minister. But 25 parliamentarian members of the NC came out with a different proposal, which was identical to the UML proposal for the election of the prime minister. It’s not a major difference, which proves that we can discuss this. It’s just about a model. The difference is not insurmountable.
But let’s return to the most basic question: What is the constitution about? The constitution is about the foundation of society. What foundation do you want for a new society? And it’s the same: the NC and UML proposals are the same. We both want a welfare state that takes care of health, education, employment, and the right to private property – even if the state doesn’t run the business, it must still oversee the operation.
You will not find a single difference between NC and UML. We can come together but we have not. That’s the irony.
DUNHAM: What would it take to induce NC-UML unification: A major controversial development coming from the current government? And if so, might that not be too late?
GAGAN: Yeh, exactly. It would be wiser if the two parties took the initiative, rather than to wait for a common threat. Otherwise it could be too late and just a political reaction. Let’s say UML and NC could form some kind of alliance: It shouldn’t be against the Maoist; it should be tailored to take the peace process to its logical conclusion – exerting enough pressure on the Maoists to abide by the previous peace agreement. Such a partnership between UML and NC would really boost both parties in the esteem of the Nepali people.
DUNHAM: Again, back to the general public’s perception of politics. The image that sticks in my minds is one in which all the parties are standing in a straight line, shoulder-to-shoulder, looking at each other, pointing the finger at each other, instead of lifting up their feet and stepping forward. Of course issues arise that must be addressed – I’m thinking of the recent Tharu movement here – but the parties must also keep their eye on the prize: peace in Nepal. The parties are far too easily distracted, in my opinion.
GAGAN: But there are issues that must be addressed. One of the issues that is really pressing on Congress and UML alike is the integration of the Maoist combatants into the national army. A party with an army cannot be compared with non-armed parties. It is a primary concern. You cannot just expect the Maoists to say, “OK, the army has been dismantled, don’t worry about integration.” That’s not the reality and, in the past, we recognized this as a primary issue in the peace agreement, in which we stated that the combatants would be kept in cantonments and dealt with in a very thorough process.
We can doubt Maoist motives. OK, fine. But we signed a 12-point agreement promising to deal with the issue. Why did we do that? Why did we agree to Maoist-inclusive elections? So now, why do we drag our heels in dealing with an issue we agreed on? Until and unless we satisfactorily deal with the question of army integration, we cannot say that we have concluded the peace process. We have to deal with it. We have to open the basket.
But what do the Maoists really want? They have been saying different things in public. They have been saying one thing to the civilian community and they have been saying other things to the combatants. So we have to address the problem once and for all. This is not going to just go away. There is no magic wand that can be waved around to fix the problem.
DUNHAM: True. But to what extent have the combatants been asked to help solve the issue? Has anyone really gone to them, without coercion, and asked them what they want? Have they been given real options, or are they just sitting there waiting for Maoist leadership to tell them what to do? How many of them want to remain in a military?
GAGAN: International groups, including the Indian government and the World Bank, discussed this. Both groups offered the Maoists all the financial assistance they needed in order to give these combatants real options: Option A was to given them enough money that they could reestablish themselves in the community; Option B was to join the national army; Option C was to open up new avenues for them like working for the police, the armed police, or creating a new industrial security force. These were real options.
But there was skepticism that, as the Maoists have complete control over the combatants, very few would risk accepting the options -- that they would be too intimidated by the desires of Maoist leadership.
But my view is that, if you don’t offer the options, how can you ever hope to know what the combatant would like to do? Simply crouching behind skepticism doesn’t answer the question, does it?
DUNHAM: Say the integration does take place. What happens to the professional fabric of the existing army and the morale of the regular soldiers?
GAGAN: From the Maoist perspective – what they argue is: “Yeh, it’s a professional army and they’ve proved themselves on a global standard, but the Maoists fought them and the army didn’t win the war.” So it gives the Maoists a kind of confidence to argue that a colonel in a rebel army can match a colonel in a professional army. But I completely agree with your concern about the fabric of the Nepal army being compromised. Otherwise, it could create new complication.
But the thing is that we still have to begin the discussions, including what the army has to say. The army will say, “OK, it’s not our decision, but we have these conditions. A rebel combatant has to go through the institutionalized steps like everyone else. A rebel has to earn merit for each level of service.” Then the Maoists will provide their conditions. Then you look at common points.
But my point is that Maoists don’t really want the integration process to be resolved within the next few months. They don’t want it and we’re not supporting a resolution within the next few months. Just yesterday, the Prime Minister stated in parliament that in the next four months this issue is going to be resolved. I don’t believe that.
And the NC and UML are, unknowingly, supporting their interests.
And the question of integration is not just a local issue. India is very concerned about this. Other members of the international community are concerned. And the Maoists have assured the international community that the professionalism of the army will be kept in tact while integrating the rebels into the army. But at the same time, Maoist leadership has been assuring their rebels, “Don’t worry, you’ll get everything.” So the Maoists have been playing those games. That doesn’t serve the peace process. So let’s bring the Maoists to the table and create a genuine discussion. Let the Maoists define what their real stand is.
DUNHAM: The various politically affiliated youth organizations just had elections and the NC didn’t do all that well. How does Congress plan to reverse the trend of youth feeling disenfranchised by your party? So many of the youth are just sick of the political process in general. I’ve spent the last few weeks talking to youth and, in fact, most of them are just trying to get the hell out of Nepal. They are very cynical about politics in Nepal and see their best shot abroad, not here. They don’t see the parties having their best interests at heart – any of the parties. And yet 60% of the population is now under the age of 30. What group should Congress be concentrating on, if not the youth?
GAGAN: I traveled to a number of campuses during the student union elections – both in and outside the Kathmandu Valley. I was able to pull in huge crowds and talk to them for hours. And they listened to me seriously. They found my arguments convincing. But they didn’t vote for our student union even though they apparently like me as a person. Why? Because I don’t represent Congress Party to them. I’m still perceived as a sidelined Congress member who doesn’t have influence in policy making.
At Tribhuvan University, for instance, I spoke for an hour in front of 3,500-4,000 students. I started speaking at 6:30 at night. There were no lights. They used their mobiles to record my speech. But in the end, the number of votes my party got was less than 2,000. Obviously, the crowd is not convinced that the NC is in tune with the youth. You’re right; we have to find a way to regain their trust.
The second thing is that just giving promises to the youth will no longer work. 250,000 youths leave Nepal each year. Every day, 556 young people leave Nepal, from the international airport. Most of them are going to the Middle East for jobs.
You cannot keep these young people here, in Nepal, with mere promises. We have to create meaningful, sizable projects and jobs – enough so that a kind of hope will be generated in them that things are getting better for the youth. Promises don’t fill people’s stomachs.
It’s not that we don’t have the money to invest in such projects. If you look at the commercial banks in Kathmandu, when they made shares available to the public, the applications overtook the available number. It means there is money here. Look at the skyrocketing prices for property in Kathmandu. We’ve got the money. But there’s no appetite for investing in the kinds of projects that would keep Nepali youth in Nepal because there is no security in investing here.
We are not building new hydroelectric projects. We are not building new infrastructure. We are not opening up new industries. We are not reforming our international trade. We’re not commercializing agriculture. We are not creating new markets. We’re not doing anything and every year Nepal is getting more and more young!
The youth of Nepal is the very strength of Nepal and we’re not using it to our advantage. India, Europe, the United States, the Middle East are getting the benefit of our demographic bonus.
Sometime back there was a discussion about this in parliament. The Minister of Water Resources was there and I asked him about a provision in the constitution in which it states that, while building micro hydropower projects, the government is encouraged to hire local people to participate, thus giving some share of the money back to the local people. And I asked the Minister, “Is the government following this provision?” His reply was, “No, the locals don’t have enough resources, so we have to look for independent investors.”
Then I said, “I went to Qatar and met lots of young Nepalis under the age of 30 working in 50 degrees Centigrade conditions. And I asked them, “How many hours per day do you work?” And they said “eight to ten hours.” I’m not talking about sophisticated jobs. They’re working on construction sites under the sun. Such a miserable life there. Their families are far away. And with all this, they hardly save 8-10,000 rupees a month. And then I asked these guys, “How much did you spend to get to Qatar?” And the reply was, “Around 100,000 Nepali rupees.”
So I told the Minister, “One guy spends 100,000 rupees to leave Nepal! If you got only 100 local guys spending 100,000, you would have one crore Nepali rupees investment power. So how much does one of your micro-hydropower projects cost?” And the Minister replied, “Less than one crore.”
So there is one crore local investment power, right? But it goes far beyond that. Remember, these 100 guys were under the age of 30, able-bodied and ready to work eight hours a day on, let’s say, a micro-hydropower project. That’s 800 work hours per day.
So the potential is here, the financial resources are here, right here in Nepal, for young people. All you have to do is be able to assure the youth that the government is behind them.
The government has talked about big projects -- fast-track roads and railway projects, 10,000 megawatts in ten years – dreamed about such big projects. And Nepal has some of the cheapest labor in the world. If a guy is willing to work in 50 degree Centigrade in Qatar for eight hours a day and only save 7-8000 rupees, just imagine how willing he would be to could come back home, be close to his family, and work ten hours a day for only 5,000.
But it all goes back to the struggling between various parties. Congress and UML are scared that if the Maoists create projects, they will take the money and it will end up in the pockets of their own cadres – so the other parties put hurdles in the Maoists’ way. To some extent, the Maoists have themselves to blame for this mistrust. They have failed to gain the trust of the other parties. All of this lack of understanding between parties, finally, is at the bottom of the government’s failure to address the needs of the young people in Nepal. It’s all connected.
A better future for the youth of Nepal? From my perspective, it’s not just a distant dream. We can give them that better future. The youth are here, the human resource is here, right now, waiting for jobs. Let’s talk about tourism potential. You can hire 100,000 young people in that project. 10,000 megawatts: You need to employ two lak Nepali engineers. Health as a fundamental right to each and every citizen: that means the construction of a considerable number of hospitals, which in turn, require a lot of human resources. The opportunity is here in Nepal just waiting to be tapped.
People are ready to invest in Nepal. What they don’t have is the assurance that their investment is going to be secure.
And that’s what the Maoists have to understand. They can’t perform magic here. The Maoists like to talk about the “people’s constitution” and I used to ask them, what is the special feature of your “people’s constitution?” And the Maoists told me, “The people will get free food, free education.” And I told them, but that’s already in the interim constitution, the one that exists now. There is a provision already that says that health is a fundamental right, education is a fundamental right, employment is a fundamental right, environment is a fundamental right, food source is a fundamental right – all of this is clearly stated in the interim constitution.
So I asked the Maoists, “What’s stopping you from implementing programs that are already guaranteed by the interim constitution? You don’t have to wait for a ‘people’s constitution’, they provisions already exist. But you also know the limitations. You can’t do it overnight, for one thing. It needs the mobilization of all the resources. New projects need to be introduced.”
And where are we today, since the Maoist took the leadership? Look at the tourist industry, agriculture sector, the trade sector – everything is the same. Nothing has changed.
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May 9, 2009
The Asian Human Rights Commission has just released an abridged transcript of the controversial videotape, in which Nepal's former PM Prachanda is captured mocking and defying the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that he signed with Nepal's political parties on November 21, 2006.
The tape, leaked to the media, came on the heels of Prachanda’s May 4th resignation from office after his determination to sack Chief of Army General Rookmangad Katawal was scuttled by President Ram Baran Yadav. The video intensified the vitriol of street demonstrations already beleaguering the peace process.
The video was filmed during a speech Prachanda made to Maoists’ People's Liberation Army commanders sixteen months ago (January 2, 2008) at Shaktikhor Cantonment in southern Nepal. Prachanda’s speech offers a rare peek into the Maoist ploy to politicize and take over the national army. But it also documents Prachanda’s successful plan to inflate the actual size of the PLA in an effort to hoodwink the UN’s verification process – a strategy designed to boost monetary assistance to the PLA fighters sequestered in UN-monitored cantonments.
Highlights from the speech are as follows:
On national army:
Integration will not happen before the Constituent Assembly elections. It cannot happen. You just have to look around, and you will know. Do you understand? This is the reality. Nowhere does it say that integration has to happen before the elections – there is no decision, no agreement and no understanding. We have said that it will happen after the elections. About the elections, either the Congress will not let it happen, or we won't. Let us say that somehow it does happen. We cannot say it will not happen, 100 percent. Marxists do not say such things.
If it looks likely that the Maoists will capture power before the elections, they may be compelled to go for elections, thinking it will allow them to last for a few more months. If we do well, then we can implement socio-economic change under our leadership, with our majority. If we win, then the current verification will not be considered to be the criteria. Please explain this to all of our friends. Once we become the rooster – please pardon expression – once we have won, why would we need to obey the verification? When we win, we will just create a new law that includes our people and eliminate those from the other side. When we have already won and have the upper hand, why would we obey the current verification?
We will have integration – in a way that decreases the size of the army. From the start, I have said that we do not need such a large army. Let's keep it between 30,000 and 50,000. We will bring it down from 100,000 to 50,000. Ours may drop from 20,000 to 10,000, let's just say. You heard what Katawal said the other day. Even if the army absorbs only 3,000 Maoist combatants, that the whole army will be finished. Did you read that? He said a mere 3,000 could destroy their 100,000. That is true.
If we are going to place 10,000 combatants in the army, the whole force will come under our influence. It will be Maobaad-maya, under our total influence. I fully believe this. We will introduce our agenda in there at that time. The issue here is not about more or less; it is about awareness. We have concepts, policies and vision. They do nothing but bang their boots. The enlightened ones will eat up the boot-bangers. The 3,000 will swallow the rest.
If there are no elections, we will win through a movement. We will first capture power, and then work on integration. We will not throw out all of them, as it will be necessary to keep some of them. We will reduce them systematically, and bring the army under our leadership.
You expressed worries about continuing the revolution. This is how it will happen. It will happen in a new way. Please don't look for examples from Russia or China, or Vietnam or Cuba. Our solution will be specific to Nepal, but it will happen. Integration will happen in this way. It will not happen one-by-one, on an individual basis. We will do it unit-wise. Our battalions and theirs will be separate, under one command. Our people will also be in command. The plan is to 'democratize' the army, which means to politicize it. It'll take five to seven years to do that. If we are really going to have integration, the way to do it is unit-wise, so that our units remain with us. This is important: if we do it unit-wise, we can react if we are betrayed. I have had talks with the army leadership about going about this on a unit-wise basis.
On funds, arms and elections:
We have said that for elections to happen, the martyrs' families must receive relief, information on the disappeared must be gathered, the injured receive relief, and the combatants be paid. Elections cannot happen without these conditions. Over the last 3-4 months, the world has been repeating our formula; it has been accepted all over. They've been saying the Maoists are right on this. Believe me, I have seen it all. This is great for us; this will take us to the top. When we insist that we will not go to elections without money for the families of martyrs, they all say, "Yes! Yes!"
Now a relief package is being promised to the martyr families by Magh (Jan/Feb). For now, this is one lakh [one hundred thousand], though the full compensation is 10 lakh. Now don't think this is just money; it is politics. We will distribute this money in mass meetings. We will make a plan from the top and go district to district. All of this is not preparation for elections; it is preparations for revolt. With the money, our relationship with the people will improve. They will feel this is their party. And we will say, "One lakh is not enough, we will get you the nine lakh." Of course, we will not say, "Take this and go home."
Now, about the 60 crore [one crore is equivalent to ten million] for the cantonments, we will use this for the revolt. We need money to prepare for the revolt. Remember my point about the need for 10 crore, to bring it all in a truck. We need money for what the truck carries; nobody gives it for free. We don't have enough money for that. Of the 60 crore, you will take a little bit, and about 20 crore will come to us. Just imagine the preparations we can do with 20 crore.
To make good battle plans you need money. With lots of money, we can make good plans. We need quite a bit for a revolt. So, it you only look at the form, it may look like the party is heading towards agreement. Look deeper and you will understand how the brave party is preparing for revolt.
On combatant numbers and verification:
Revolution calls for renunciation, penance, and sacrifice. How is today's situation different from during the people's war? Talking of form, earlier you were holding the machine gun, killing or being killed. Today, it seems like we are sitting at the table with the enemy, chatting and sipping tea. The form is very different. But the gist is still the same: we are both taking the revolution forward.
Did you see the Naya Patrika the other day? It says that B. P. Koirala said that if he had been able to keep just 500 soldiers in 1960, the Panchayat takeover would not have happened. That seems correct. If they had not dissolved their insurrectionary force, Mahendra would not have had the guts to act. Because we have thousands in the People's Liberation Army, nobody has the guts to challenge us.
Your position today can be called renunciation, penance or sacrifice. I would say you are doing penance, for revolution. Our actions in Baluwatar, Singha Durbar, inside and outside the country, have been successful only because of you. Without you, nobody would listen to us. Because we have an army, everybody is petrified, even now. The Congress and UML don't want to admit it, but they feel the fear.
Earlier today, the UML's Bam Dev called, saying that our friends in Kavre had badly beaten up their party workers. I said yours are hardly better, they beat us up yesterday. His reply was, "We can hardly hurt you. Yours are all trained, and they beat hard." They are terrorized by us – everyone is. I have also talked to the top officers in the other army, and they too feel terror, great terror. They fear our numbers.
You say our numbers have decreased. That's not true. Our army has grown significantly. Where is the shrinking? You must understand strategy and tactics. Tell me, how many of us were there earlier? Speaking honestly, we were few before the compromise. We were at 7,000 to 8,000. If we had reported that, we would have had 4,000 left after verification. Instead, we claimed 35,000, and now we have 20,000. This is the truth. We cannot tell others, but you all and I know the truth.
How can anyone say our numbers have decreased? Look how wisely our leadership took a 7,000-person army and made it a 21,000-person regular army. That is what you are now. We have not shrunk; we have grown. And on the outside, we have created the YCL infrastructure, and we have thousands in the YCL. So we have built a lot, and are still building. It is true that there are some complexities, but they are still a strength. About our friends who did not make it through the verification process, there is a fear that they are done. But arrangements will be made.
On Constituent Assembly elections:
What will come of the elections is not agreement but revolt. First, let me assure you that elections will not happen. But we cannot share this understanding. We must insist that the country needs elections that it is the only way out. If we show enthusiasm, then they will stop the process. You may remember that in June, before the peace process, I said that if it looks like we will win they would not let it happen. And if it looks like they will win, we will not let it happen. Either way, I have said there will be no elections. I was never confused about that.
If it looks like the Maoists are going to win, the reactionaries, America and India, will together prevent the elections. If there is an anti-Maoist conspiracy making things difficult for us, we will not let the elections happen. Before we had the meeting with the UML, you may recall that I told them, "If you go above board on this, we can break the legs [of your candidates] across the country. We can destroy your elections." This, then, is our line today. It is the only line that prepares us for revolution. One cannot have a revolution by panicking and merely wanting it.
[The Asian Human Rights Commission, founded in 1984, is a Hongkong-based non-governmental organization that monitors human rights issues in Asia.]
FALLOUT FROM THE SPEECH
The leaked footage created an outcry from the opposition Nepali Congress (NP) party, who said it proved that the Maoists had no moral authority to lead a new government. An indignant Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (UML) also pressed Prachanda for a clarification.
Prachanda’s response was as swift as it was dismissive. “I made that speech one and a half years ago,” Prachanda told journalists on Wednesday. “Things were different then. We were an underground party with a price tag on our heads. …There are innumerable such videos.”
He also took the offensive by saying the tape scandal was simply a red herring to deflect attention from the “unconstitutional” step taken by the president, which put the army “above civilian supremacy.”
Interestingly, some analyists are saying that Prachanda’s resignation this week -- the embarrassing video notwithstanding -- actually works in the Maoists’ favor. John Narayan Parajuli wrote this week in Kantipur:
Apart from measuring the preparedness of their adversaries, these conflicts provide a big propaganda victory for the Maoists. First, it keeps the cadres united and prepared against the "enemy". Second, every reaction or criticism is an opportunity to highlight how "regressive elements" are working to scuttle the aspiration of the people. Dahal's resignation shows to what length they will go to keep the party united. But they have killed two birds with one stone. They have managed to bury their poor performance with a political drama that ended with Dahal appearing to be resigning over a principle.
In the event, Maoists are not pleased with the leakage of the video. They have detained an unknown number of “suspicious people” for interrogation, according to Image FM. These suspects include the videographers who filmed the speech in January 2008.
And outside the Kathmandu Valley, away from bothersome photojournalists, Maoists have stepped up attacks on other political parties, specifically the CPN-UML and NC, who are working on forming a new coalition government to replace the now defuct Maoist government.
This week Maoists thrashed NC and the CPN-UML supporters in Ramechhap and Rolpa districts. In Ramechhap, the Maoists Ramechhap district committee ordered NC and UML activists to leave their village by Saturday. In Rolpa, over a dozen NC workers were beaten.
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A Youth Initiative group discussion hosted by Mikel Dunham
Shangri-La Hotel, Kathmandu, Nepal
May 7, 2009
Members of the panel included: Daman Katuwal, Balram Yadav, Bikki Yadav, Jagrit Rayamajhi, Bishnu Panthi, Manish Pokharel, Ashis Luitel, Madhav Dhungel, and Bhusita Vasistha
DUNHAM: As youth leaders of Nepal, you come from disparate backgrounds. And yet I’m sure that you have experienced many similar situations growing up in the distinct Nepali culture. I’d like to begin by having you identify yourselves, what group you represent, where you were born and what were some of the basic problems you encountered while making a place for yourself in this society.
DAMAN KATUWAL: I am the General Secretary of the Nepal Progressive Student Federation. The student wing is associated with the CPN-United Marxists. I am trying to help solve students’ problems.
My birthplace is Udaypur district [south-eastern Nepal]. My village is Rampur Tokshila VDC. It is a very remote area of Nepal and there is still not a single hospital in the VDC. It wasn’t until last year that a secondary school was established. I passed my school level in that village.
Like the other children in my village, I faced many problems. [Daman is from the Dalit community; Dalit is a generic term reserved for what was previously called the “untouchable” class.] My parents are poor farmers. We have no other income. The problems of rural poverty still exist in my village. Nothing has really changed in the last two decades. There were no facilities in the village so it was a struggle -- not like in your country, America, where there are so many facilities.
When I finished my lower schooling, I entered Tribhuvan University, at the Dharan campus. I studied Management and Commerce. I rented a room in Dharan for study. My college life was also a struggle.
My involvement in politics began early on, in 1990, when I was 13 years old. The local political leaders of our impoverished village told us that the only way we would free ourselves from class oppression and our endless state of poverty was if we fought for democracy. That promise attracted me and made me join politics.
It’s true that, since my childhood, certain societal advancements have been made in Nepal. But not in my village; we still don’t feel that change. Improvement has come to people from the higher classes but not the lower classes. Advancement has come to leaders of the big parties, but not for the little parties. The lower classes are still miserable, trapped in poverty and feel the full sting of neglect
By 2001, the Maoists had gained a great deal of popularity. I, too, was attracted to their message that the political and social environment of Nepal must change. But ultimately I rejected their party because their means to gain power was not right: Shooting people to gain power is not right.
BALRAM YADAV: I’m with the Madeshi Youth Forum of the Madeshi People’s Rights Forum. I am from Rajbiraj in Saptari district.
My childhood was a struggle because of the language issue. We would have understood much better had we been taught in our native tongue instead of having been forced to learn in Nepali. Recent research has proven that those students who are taught in their native tongue perform much better scholastically than those who are forced to learn in Nepali. Our marks in science and math were much better than our marks in language. The Madeshi Youth Forum believes that if we should be able to go through secondary school using our mother tongue; other languages, including English could then be introduced in college.
DUNHAM: But if you don’t learn Nepali, won’t you be penalized later on? Won’t it curtail your chances of getting better jobs in Nepal?
BALRAM: Yes, but only because of the government policy that has been in place up until now. It doesn’t have to be like this. The government is talking about federalism right now. If federalism is achieved, then we hope that the people who speak in their mother tongues – no matter what that language is—will have equal opportunity for good jobs and place in this society. However, the government has not moved to make that a working reality for us.
As of now, the new state of federalism isn’t possible. I really doubt that, as things stand, there will be a change into federalism. The language problem is not just in the Terai. It’s also in the hilly regions. For example, the Tamang people, who cannot speak Nepali, are nevertheless forced to learn in Nepali. The results there are the same as in the Terai. According to recent data of Tamang school dropouts, those students who don’t speak Nepali are much more likely to drop out.
DUNHAM: As a Madhesi child, did you feel discriminated against whenever you were in contact with the hilly people? Were you treated was if you were their inferior?
BALRAM: I studied in a remote Madeshi village where there were no hilly people. Therefore I was unaware of discrimination at that time. But when I entered college, I felt alienated because the majority of the students were from the hilly regions.
DUNHAM: Where did you go to college?
BALRAM: I studied in Biratnagar. I was held back from a scholarship even though I had only one paper to finish. But those who were close to ANNFSU [All Nepali National Free Student Union of UML] or NSU [Nepali Student Union of NC] got the scholarship even though they were failing in all their subjects.
In another incident, when the Morang campus conducted entrance exams for the BSC [Bachelor of Science], the students from the hilly regions were automatically granted 10 extra points, whereas the Terai students got only 5. This was done to tip the balance for scholarship eligibility. When we Madhesis protested to this unfair practice, the authorities said it was because the hilly people were poor. We asked, “Are there not poor people among the Madhesi?” But they didn’t answer.
Also, we Madeshi students were not allowed to stay in the Morang college hostel. The rooms were given to the hilly people, regardless of their academic achievement or their economic background. We are victims of internal colonization in Nepal. Madhesi are totally colonized. The country is going toward federalism, but in the hilly people’s mind, the colonization is still justifiable.
BIKKI YADAV: I am the central president of the Nepal Student Front and represent the Nepal Sadbhawana Party, [another Madeshi party that was the first party to bring up the issue of Madhesi inequality]. Like Balram, I am also from Saptari district in Terai.
I hail from a very poor family. After school, I had to go home a herd buffalo. I didn’t know anything about nutrition: We just ate buffalo and drank buffalo. I spent my childhood in a remote area where, even today, there are still no telephones or electricity of road network.
I studied in my village until my ninth grade. I didn’t understand Nepali until then. I learned by rote, but I didn’t understand what I was saying. I was not really aware of discrimination until the ninth grade. But I had witnessed in my Madhesi community that, even if there were only one hilly person in the village, he would be selected as the village leader.
I changed schools – Sirasha Bashtipur --in the 10th grade. That’s when discrimination became very clear to me. Education, hospitals, everything was controlled by the hilly people, even though they were a minority. And when I discovered that Madhesis weren’t allowed to participate in the school sports, that’s when I really felt personally discrimination against for the first time.
So I became politically active. I was attracted to the communist party.
Even after I finished my SLC [school leaving certificate], even after I had a clear understanding of what discrimination was, I still thought I should not react against it, but rather go with it because there was discrimination everywhere in the world. That was my rationale at the time.
You see, even though I was from an impoverished rural district, I had high ambitions. I wanted to become a doctor. It was the only thing I dreamt of. I hoped to go to China to study to become a physician. In order to do that, I had to produce various forms of identity, including a copy of my citizenship, which has to be notarized at the office from which the certificate had originate. . But the Chief District office refused to notarize my citizenship certificate because I didn’t have any inside connections in the office. They wouldn’t even look for my records. I tried several other offices in my district, but no one would help me. So I went to the Education Ministry and quarreled with the secretary of the ministry. Almost 100 other applicants got to go, but I didn’t because I was Madeshi and couldn’t get my document notarized by the hilly officials.
Eventually, they notarized my document, but by then it was too late. My application for going to China had passed the deadline.
The process completely defeated me. I thought, “Well, what good would it be for me to become a doctor, if I can’t get an official identity?”
So that is when I joined my party and entered politics.
The Sadvhawana Party was the only party at that time that was raising the issue of regional identity, ethnicity and discrimination. This was in 2001. At that time, the student’s movement against the monarchy had begun and I participated in it. I am proud that we were able to create a platform among the various student wings of the political parties. I represented Madesh in these various enterprises.
Today, you can see the result of the student protests. We have a democracy.
JAGRIT RAYAMAJHI: I am Vice President of the ANNISU [All National Independent Student Union - Revolutionary] student wing of the Maoist party. I’m from Daman in Makawanpur district [east from Chitwan]. It’s one of the most beautiful places in Nepal, from which you can see 44 different peaks of the Himalaya.
I hail from a middle-class family background. Both of my parents had small jobs but my family really didn’t have to struggle to survive.
There used to be quite a strange left-leaning leader from my village by the name of Rupchandra Bista. He was -- is my political hero. He used to come to my house frequently, which sparked my interest in getting involved in politics. At the age of 11, I was already a representative for a student union national conference—at which time I couldn’t even talk nicely. I cried while I was at the conference because I missed my family, but still I had the feeling that I had to be in politics. I had no knowledge, just determination. My family was political, which helped me.
Basically, I got into politics because of the rampant discrimination within Nepali society and the atrocious autocratic nature of the panchayat system [a one-party system designed to serve the monarchy]. I couldn’t think of anything else -- politics, speech, rallies, participation, etc. became my life.
DUNHAM: Did your parents have a problem with that? Did the resist your activism or try to persuade you to pursue another career?
JAGRIT: In the beginning, they encouraged my political enthusiasm. But eventually they had second thoughts. After. I was a full-time activist, my parents told me they wished I would return to my. But they never tried to force me to stop. In fact, at one point I tested them by suggesting that I might stop politics. They backed down immediately.
BISHNU PHANTI: I am Vice President of the Nepali Student Union, which is the student wing of the Nepali Congress party. I’m from Ghulmi district in western Nepal.
I went to high school in my village. At that time, there were few boarding schools in Nepal. My father was a teacher so scholasticism was very much a part of my upbringing. I came to Kathmandu to attend college.
Democracy in Nepal actually goes back many decades. Nepal had the beginnings of democracy in the 1950s, through the efforts of the Nepali Congress party – that was when the atrocious Rana regime was brought down. In the very first elections in Nepal, one of my family members, Nilambra Phanti, was elected as a member of parliament from the Nepali Congress party; he was my inspiration to get into politics.
But two years later, King Mahendra imposed the panchayat system on the nation and democracy was placed on hold. Then in 1990, all the parties protested, and we regained democracy for the Nepali people.
In the mid-90s, the Maoist conflict begin and, towards the end, NC, UML and the other parties joined hands – and also the Maoists joined hands with the seven-party alliance, which led to the second popular movement. Democracy has returned to Nepal and I have been involved with this long process. Since the 1970s, the NSU [Nepali Student Union] under the guidance of NC, has been participating every step of the way – either on our own, or jointly – to achieve viable democracy in the country.
DUNHAM: Any problems in getting your voice heard as a youth? How much autonomy was the NC really allowing its student wing?
BISHNU: This is a matter of the old generation vs. young generation. In our party, the perspective of the youth is being implemented. Our voices are being heard. When new ideas are raised by the youth, the party implements them. The NC party has accepted our demands, and the party has reflected our voice in this politically critical time. Freedom of justice, freedom of press, community development, democratic growth, human rights, freedom of expression, judicial supremacy – these are the points that we are advocating for and trying to protect. The NC adheres to international norms and values of democracy. Our leader, G.P. Koirala is very old now, but he accepts the youths’ voice and revolutionary character. That is why we young people are satisfied with what our party is doing.
MANISH POKHAREL: I am a freelance journalist and, politically, I’m not aligned with any political party. I’m an independent. I was born in Khotang district, in the eastern hilly region of Nepal. My family was farmers.
Today, infants have to go for vaccinations. But going back to my youth -- when I was a baby -- I didn’t receive those vaccinations because there was no hospital built in my area. Health-wise, it was struggle for all the people in remote areas. When I was four, for instance, I fell from a roof and broke an arm. I had to depend on local traditional treatment. I couldn’t get modern medical attention.
Traditionally, Nepalese education utilizes the old-fashion rote method. It is not a good system. When I was studying in class 1 or 2, our teacher carried a long stick to frighten students into learning things by heart. I was scared of that stick and I used to skip classes because of my fear. In fact, when I was in class 3, I ran away from home because I wanted to be free of all that – not only the primitive education but the hard work that I was required to do when I wasn’t in school. My grandfather made me herd and care for the buffalos in the shed and I was punished if I didn’t do as I was told. I was scared of him too. So I ran away from home. But after several months, my parents found me in a bazaar and brought me back home.
But I was still scared of going back to school. But after one year, our school organized an open poem competition. I wrote and read my poem and received first prize. That inspired me to change my opinion about going to school.
There was no freedom in my school, particularly in the younger years: the senior classes got all the positions in sports, for instance. We had to wait our turn. But once I got to play sports and I was able to score a couple of goals, I got the opportunity to play with the older students.
I’m still in college -- a student at Kathmandu University. It’s a school where political activities are prohibited. I’m informed about politics, but not a part of it. I do admire BP Koirala, who was the first elected Prime Minister of Nepal in 1950. He was also a poet and writer. I have read all of his books, which inform me about politics.
ASHISH LUITEL: I’m also a student at Kathmandu University and, politically, an independent. I’m studying electric and electronics engineering. I was born in Okhaldhunga; it’s the district next to Khotang, in the eastern hilly region of Nepal. I completed my secondary schooling in a government school. My parents were government jobholders.
I have a keen interest in politics. However, I have never been actively involved in it for two reasons: First, I fail to see how it will benefit my future career. Second, politicians repel me because they have a bad reputation. To become too involved in student politics is a distraction from my personal ambitions. For example, if NSU organizes a protest program, it will not be for the welfare of students, but because it is on their mother party’s agenda. If this trend continues, I doubt that I will ever become actively involved in politics. I would love to share my ideas with the parties, but the fact is the parties have never listened to the youth. A certain leader rules them and it is like an autocratic system. Once the leaders attain power, they cease listening to the common people.
Talking about freedom to chose: I secured the maximum marks in high school. Because of my high marks, I was pressured by everyone – family, teachers and friends -- to do nothing but study; not participate in sports or politics or other social activities. I would love to have participated but I was always discouraged to do so. Also, the students who had attended boarding schools regarded me as inferior; I was always reminded that I had only attended a government school.
MADHAV DHUNGEL: I am the General Secretary of ANNFSU, the youth wing that is -- theoretically and morally attached to the UML [Unified Marxist-Leninist] party.
I come from Pakarbash, in the Ramechhap district [hilly region two districts east of the Kathmandu Valley].
I completed my SLT in my home village. My parents were farmers. My village had a lot of political activity as I was growing up -- lots of panchayat leaders came from my village. That trend of political activism in my district has continued even after the 1990 democratic movement.
I’ll tell you a little about the unfairness that I experienced in school.
I studied with the daughter of the chairman of the school management committee. Even though I was the smartest guy in the class and had secured the highest marks, I was never recognized as such. Instead, the daughter of the chairman got the recognition. This was when I was in grades 4 and 5. The unfairness of that incident made me dig in my heels and intensified my ambitious to be recognized in the future. It also created a distance between the school administration and me. I regarded the school negatively. Eventually, it transformed me and inspired me to enter into politics.
In 1990, with the advent of the popular uprising, and when I was in grade 7, the police was hunting a senior from our school. He came to our house and asked for refuge. We hid him. He was carrying pamphlets in his bag that protested the panchayat system. It was I who swayed my parents to hide him. The police didn’t find him. That evening, he gave me some of the pamphlets and told me to distribute them in every class of the school the next day. I did just that. He also asked me to report back to him and recount how the people reacted to his pamphlets.
The teachers’ reaction was of utter fear and panic. They collected the pamphlets and burned them.
I passed on the information to the guy hiding in our house. He was in the same student party that I am in today. It is that simple and small event that brought me into politics. From that time on, I became the leader of most of the student activities – debate competitions, speeches, and essays, that sort of thing – and I won many district level awards. I was the founding secretary of this student wing in that school.
I studied at Mohendra Morang Campus, and then transferred to RR campus in Kathmandu. I also returned to my village and taught for a year. The school was a stronghold for the NC during that time, but I helped convert NC sympathizers into members of the UML party.
Eventually, I decided to quit my teaching job and join politics full time – something my parents didn’t want. But as I climbed up the political ladder, my parents gradually accepted my career change. That’s where I am today.
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DUNHAM: My second question entails the problem of brain drain in Nepal. So many young men, if given the opportunity will leave Nepal, often permanently. As young leaders, what your ideas on reversing this trend and who have the political parties either addressed the problem or ignored it? DAMAN: Brain drain begins with the inferior educational system offered in Nepal. The youth would stay in Nepal if they were offered competitive opportunities here. To make matters worse, we are doubly hobbled by the insensitivity of the main parties and the instability of the government. When the government is instable, their policies are not stable. That directly hampers the attempt to improve the quality of education.
Recently, the Finance Ministry introduced a program to provide 200,000 rupees per person -- designed for people who want to create a small business but lack the capital. It’s a good idea. A program like this, which is in a test phase right now, could be expanded in the other youth fields as well. For instance, students could and should be given loans without collateral. These kinds of programs can generate enthusiasm among young people to remain in the country instead of what we have right now, which is an atmosphere in which young people are determined to leave Nepal. If the government doesn’t implement such youth-oriented programs, the youth will continue to leave. Maybe 10% will return but most will try to stay away from Nepal. BALRAM: There are two kinds of youth who are migrating: the educated and the uneducated. To keep the educated youth from leaving Nepal, we definitely need to improve both education and research. The government lacks a significant youth policy. The government should create a powerful youth commission, inclusive in nature – inviting young people from different ethnic, linguistic, political and geographical backgrounds – which could then shape future youth-empowering policies to be implemented by the government. Including different geographical backgrounds is crucial. There is the Kathmandu Valley and there is the rest of Nepal. Our government has a long tradition of identifying the problems of rural areas from a boardroom in Kathmandu.
The proposed commission should include young political leaders as well as youths who represent various regions and organizations dedicated to empowering youth. Also independent, not-party-affiliated youths should be included. BIKKI: A government is ruled by politics and the youth should be able to trust their political leaders. But the youth of Nepal regard politics as a dirty game. All the same old politicians, who continue to lead this country and who have failed for many years to earn the trust of the youth, create this attitude.
There have been many movements that have taken place, dedicated to achieving true democracy in Nepal. They occurred in the 1950s, 60s, 80s, 90s and 2006. But the youth aren’t convinced that enough has been accomplished. We are now wondering if another movement isn’t necessary in order to achieve a secure democracy.
Until the youth have confidence in the country’s leaders, and until the leaders rise above shouting empty slogans and promises – until they get down to the tough work of creating job opportunities and creating an environment in which investors will want to open factories which will, in return create jobs – jobs that will directly benefit even the youth who aren’t affiliated with any particular political party – the brain drain in Nepal will continue. The youth need real change, not talk.
Just take a look at India. India used to have the brain drain phenomenon. But once good jobs were created and became available, the youth began to return to India in large numbers.
The youth must organized and join forces in order to create pressure on the government -- like the situation in 2006, when we forced the king to step down. JAGRIT: In the past, all political struggles were based on four sequential goals. None of the goals were achieved, regardless of which political system happened to be in power.
The first goal of the Nepali people was to abolish the elitist establishment, represented by the monarchy.
The second was to end the conflict [the Maoist-led ten-year insurgency] – a conflict that existed before the Maoist conflict and which continues to exist up to present time.
The third goal was to change Nepal’s social, economic, and cultural structures.
The fourth goal was to create a government in which the people of Nepal could make their own decisions without the influence of outside powers. In the past, the successive governments have danced to the music of foreign governments.
It’s important to mention that the student political movement in Nepal is very strong. No significant political changes have been made in Nepal without the participation of the student political movements – not since the 1950s. And the student movement in Nepal is unique in the world. The people rely on the students to support their grievances such as price hikes and other social difficulties.
But so far, despite the success of the youth movement, we have not been able to effect change in the education system. We have failed to address youth issues. This is very unfortunate for the youth and the country as a whole.
If we categorize the problems surrounding the youth and students, the first is poverty. 2.25 million children are still unable to attend school because they must go to the jungle to herd their families’ cattle.
Lack of education – the second problem -- is therefore directly connected to poverty. Within this category, there are several root causes.
The first involves those youth who are unable to attend school; we must create an environment that includes them.
The second involves our elitist system, which is completely impractical. For example, our educational system still teaches the youth that a person from the Brahman caste is a person of virtue, which may or may not be true. In school, our history lessons dwelled on people of high caste. We had to study about kings and ranas and how many wives they had. This was the history we had to study. We have to remove such elitist excesses in the educational system.
The third involves a disconnect between our present educational system and the realities of the workplace, once we get out of school. The truth is that our schools have become factories to produce unemployed children. Each year, about 300,000 children pass their SLC, but only 30-40 governmental positions are available.
The fourth involves the dual nature of our educational system – boarding schools versus government schools. Boarding schools seem to be producing better-educated children, but the students in boarding schools care only about themselves, not society.
The fifth involves the cultural anomaly in which the youth simply aren’t required to consider the society-as-a-whole. Instead, we are encouraged to think about our future careers. We are living in a culture in which we are groomed to think about ourselves, not the wellbeing of others. This is because we have been influenced by the poisonous values of Western culture.
In addition to these major problems are secondary issues involving sports, HIV/AIDS, disabled youth and drug abuse – none of which have been adequately addressed.
In coming up with solutions, we must first deal with the youths’ hopelessness in regard to procuring jobs. I’ve visited many parts of the country to study this phenomenon. Other than in the urban areas, I have found that – with the exception of Ilam district [in the far east] -- youth are not living in the rural regions in significant numbers because there are no jobs. Why have the youth in Ilam not left? Because of the tea plantations -- there is plenty of work for the youth there.
Creating hope among the youth, through initiatives such as the recently announced self-employment project, can work. Some 700,000 youths have applied for those loans. I think the government should focus on programs like this, which will definitely instill hope in the youth.
In short, Nepal cannot afford to overlook the problems of the youth and students when addressing the political problems of our country. BISHNU: In my view, the brain drain problem is a problem created by globalization. But globalization can also be regarded as an opportunity for Nepal. Our colleges, universities and other schools are producing quality manpower, employed all around the world. The question is: why are these same young people not being employed here, in Nepal, in our own society? This is a problem arising from shortcomings in our governmental policies. As mentioned before by other panel members, the government must create an environment that not only produces educated youth but also provides them with jobs and positions within Nepal, to encourage them to remain here instead of looking elsewhere.
Natural resources, which include human resources, should be regarded as a powerful source for national development. Instead, our problem is that when Nepali youth gain skills that could help their country, they leave the country in search of more lucrative employment.
There is also a problem of national and regional security in Nepal. Without security, investment in this country will not happen. Political instability, governmental instability, and lack of policy to keep skilled people in the country are our nation’s biggest problems.
It’s ironic: this country is so poor. The government always begs foreign powers for money for various programs. But the government never asks foreign countries for aid in producing young skillful workers. The youth leave the country because of jobs. The youth would return to this country if jobs were available.
Another problem is that we gain knowledge through our education, but it is not placed in a social or value-based context. We educate the children in the classroom only. The process does not bring them closer to our society. Clearly, the educational system we are now using will not solve the problem of brain drain.
If the government concentrated on tourism development, agricultural industrialization, hydropower, and other programs that encouraged skilled workers to remain in Nepal, the brain drain problem would be solved. This cannot happen without peace, security, and rule of law, political stability. This also cannot happen if, when a business becomes successful, political powers insist on donations from the successful business, which discourages investment in commerce. MANISH: First of all I would like to say that our country is poor but we have the capacity to generate 83,000 megawatts of electricity. But unfortunately, we are facing 16 hours of load-shedding every 24 hours, every day. In another context, what good is it if every Nepalese family has a motorbike or a vehicle, but there is no road drive on? These are the things that are making Nepali youth frustrated.
As an alternative, the youth are spending 6-700,000 rupees per person to move to European countries to work, and 1-200,000 rupees to go to the countries in the Middle East.
If these people had opportunities and salaries here comparable to the Gulf countries, they would stay here. Like one of our colleagues mentioned, the youth in Ilam are not leaving because they have opportunities there to work and to earn. We have plenty of rocks to smash in Nepal. If we could duplicate Gulf salaries given to smash rock, we would smash our own rocks, not theirs.
The main reason why youth go abroad is economics. Those who go to Europeans countries think only of dollars as a means to develop and improve their futures.
To stop the brain drain, the government can play a major role by creating a country that has adequate security and implementing programs similar to the self-employment program. Such programs will create jobs among the educated youth.
Another problem for Nepali youth: Everyone is migrating to Kathmandu. But Nepal is not only Kathmandu. It is also the hilly, Himalayan and Terai regions. These are big, productive areas. And the workforce is empty of youth. If the youth had a reason to return to their home areas – like the self-employment program—they would not only develop Nepal in general, but they would specifically develop themselves—even those highly educated youths with diplomas in their hands.
Another key is to reach the 83,000 megawatts of electricity, sell it to India and China, which would in turn give us the money to fully develop Nepal – instead of having only 8 hours per day of electricity which is where we find ourselves today.
Youths going to Europe and America: Their first goal is to study and their second goal is to earn money. They may get a green card or a PR [Permanent Resident status], and only 10 or 20% of them will return to Nepal. If they do decide to return to Nepal, they will buy a car, a house and property, but very quickly they will get frustrated because the country itself is not progressing at the same pace as their personal progress.
One last thing: I remember Prachanda saying before the 2008 elections that he would turn Nepal into an Asian Switzerland in 50 years. I would like to say that Nepal is already more beautiful than Switzerland. They only thing we don’t have is money. If we had money, Nepal would be twice as beautiful as Switzerland. ASHISH: Perhaps we should first define the word “opportunity”: Opportunity for youth in this country is compromised by four obstacles: the brain drain, the traditional society, the ineffective politics and the fashion trend. Leaving Nepal is not only a practical trend among youth –it has become socially fashionable as well.
About politics affecting youth in Nepal: If politics is stable, society is stable. The trend of brain drain is totally reduced if politics is stable. But as it stands now, leaving is preferable because the political situation here is anything but stable. I personally am going to go to America in two years. So I am part of the trend. I would not follow this trend if Nepal had political stability. Cause-effect: Political instability creates frustration, which creates brain drain. Frustration must be replaced by hope in this country. If we had hope, we would remain in Nepal instead of going abroad.
The idol of Nepali youth is Mahabir Pun. [Pun won the Myagasese Award, the Asian equivalent of the Nobel for introducing Internet technology into schools located in remote areas where there was no electricity or telephones.] We need more leaders and innovators like Pun.
In terms of information technology, Nepal is surrounded by India and China. India is rich in software and China is rich in hardware. Nepali youth go to China because they know they can get jobs in factories that manufacture computer hardware. But we buy that same hardware in Nepal as a Chinese product! With our cheap labor, we should be manufacturing those same products here in Nepal. As for India: I have a friend who works in India, creating software. So if I want to buy my Nepali friend’s software, I must buy it as Indian software.
Our political leaders have a tendency to blame away problems, always blaming someone else. Everyone here who is with a political party is blaming their political foes for the brain drain problem. Blaming is just an easy way of scoring political points, but it doesn’t help the youth of Nepal, not at all.
Instead of blaming others, we should be looking at who we are and what our own shortcomings are. We have examples of youth who are working in Nepal but are gaining a name for themselves internationally…like Pun. You youth political leaders sitting here at this panel discussion have done nothing nearly as important as Pun. All you do is talk and blame.
In fact, looking around at this table, I am depressed by politics because of you youth political leaders. If I protest in front of a college and burn tires, it’s not so that my science lab will be improved. It’s because I want to help strengthen the power of the party I’m attached to. Your demonstrations never really help the youth in Nepal.
We need to join hands instead of blaming each other. Opportunity is not here in Nepal because we are too busy blaming each other to have time to create opportunity. We youth only think about being employed, but we never think about being the employers o f a new Nepal. That’s the problem. We need solutions, not blame. MADHAV: Thank you Mikel Dunham, a citizen of America.
America is still ruled by a constitution that was written by a 52-members constituent assembly that represented the original 13 states, back in 1786. Today, 225 years later, Nepal is exercising the same process, with a 601-member assembly.
A long-term struggle for political changes and the establishment of fundamental rights have waylaid us, so we haven’t yet been able to properly focus on development issues that impact Nepali youth. Political stability, development and opportunity are related to each other.
A successful person embodies five qualities: happiness, health, humanity, hopefulness and creativity. All of these qualities are developed if a person has a good education. Skills are created by a good education. Opportunity and self-confidence arise if the country can employ the skills picked up by the youth. Opportunity creates the environment crucial to retaining the youths of a country – to stop the process of brain drain.
Nepal is now in a transitional phase of political stability. Let’s take a moment to look at the history of other countries in the world. Britain, for example, became a great world power with the help of an oceanic network and steam engines. America became a world power in part because of its geographical location. To the east and west, two oceans protect it. To the north and south, two non-hostile neighbors, Mexico and Canada, protect it. America has never had to deal with the fear of direct foreign invasion from neighboring powers, and thus development has never suffered.
My party believes it is time to tap into Nepal’s natural resources. Water resources, tourism based on the beauty of our natural resources, mines, herbs and agriculture are the five main natural resources and natural capital that Nepal has available to it. If we refocus our educational system so that it concentrates on these five elements, we believe that the manpower and skills produced by that system will provide enough opportunity to keep youth from leaving the country for better jobs elsewhere. To achieve this we need to form a common understanding on what is needed in educational development – that, along with political stability within the government.
There are a lot of issues that need to be included in the constitution-making process. Various Nepali youth and student organizations need to be included in the process. A strong youth commission, represented by youth, should be implemented so that their visions and ideas and insight can be employed in the decision-making process. This commission should be given real authority, not just token authority.
Nepal needs to formulate a 20-year education plan, supplemented by foreign aid. Such an educational plan, with proper funding, can definitely work here in Nepal.
Unfortunately, India, our neighbor to the south compromises all of Nepal’s hopes and plans. We are landlocked. India denies us the right to access to the sea. In addition, India has encroached upon our southern border in 62 places. We have had to spend far too much time opposing India’s encroachment. India dominates Nepal and attacks our national interests and we do not have the power to declare war on India. This has been one reason why our country has not developed the way it should have. If we can improve our relations with China, however, it will benefit Nepal by providing a counterbalance against India’s domination.
If we carefully implement the ideas I have discussed, we can create the environment to accommodate the youths in Nepal with opportunity and prosperity.
My thanks goes out to Youth Initiative, a non-party youth organization that, over the last few years, has made great strides in encouraging Nepal’s young people to organize themselves into a real force to be reckoned with. Many of the best and brightest young women and men belong to the organization. It’s been my privilege to be associated with them. Youth Initiative assembled the eight young leaders who talked to me.
To find out more about YOUTH INITIATIVE, go to its website:
http://www.youthinitiative.org.np
telephone: (977-1) 204-1674
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With concluding thoughts by Dibyesh Anand
April 4, 2009
Today, when the Maoist government collapsed, it tumbled with all the hushed rapidity of a riffling house of cards.
It took Prachanda a mere thirteen minutes, in his televised address to the nation, to announce his dénouement, precipitated by his failed attempt to fire Chief of Army General Katawal. In the previous 48 hours, two major allies of his coalition government had pulled out, the President of Nepal had ordered General Katawal to remain in office despite his dismissal by the Prime Minister and, in what would be Prachanda’s final cabinet meeting, the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum and the Communist Party of Nepal (United) – the last remaining allies of the Maoists -- boycotted the proceedings, leaving it clear that Prachanda had come full circle in successfully, unilaterally, isolating himself from Nepal’s political multi-party power base.
Anger and frustration in Nepal had been building for months. Power shortages of 16 hours per day had become the norm. Fuel shortages were equally vexing. Industrial output had flat-lined. And prices for food and other necessities had continued to rise in spite of Maoist claims that the economic situation was being properly handled.
Many people in Kathmandu were forced to huddle in hushed groups around the facades of TV shops in order to hear their Prime Minister resign; they had no electricity in their homes.
Prachanda’s brief speech claimed moral high ground. He told his audience that he had struggled to serve the public but that the Maoist party had been “barred from leading the government for four months. …I announce, through this address, my resignation from the cabinet I have chaired so as to put an end to this difficult situation and create a positive environment for salvaging democracy, nationalism and the peace process that are currently at risk.” Then he pointed the finger. He blamed the CPN-UML party for creating a series of obstacles: First the UML had consented to the Maoists’ wish to sack the army chief but then later retracted their support. He blamed the president for breaching his constitutional limitations by ordering General Katawal to stay in office, in direct contradiction of Prachanda’s order. He blamed foreign powers for sticking their noses into Nepalese domestic affairs.
What Prachanda did not address was the possibility that he and the Maoist party had painted themselves into a corner by making promises to their rural voting base that were never realistic; that the Maoists had behaved as if they had garnered a mandate during the elections, instead of a simple majority that would require cooperation and consensus with the other parties; and finally, that he had grievously misread the tealeaves when he determined that he was powerful enough to oust Nepal’s Army Chief.
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT IN NEPAL?
Some of the more high-spirited bloggers are already sounding the death knell for democracy in Nepal by either predicting that the Indian government is going to reassert itself within a new “old” power coalition of Nepali sycophants, or that the Maoists will join forces with their Indian counterparts, the Naxalites, thereby creating hell on earth in southern Nepal and the Indian states of Bihar and Bengal.
The latter scenario seems particularly unlikely to this writer, at least at this juncture, because there has been no persuasive argument put forward to suggest that Maoist leadership has procured an appetite for abandoning constitutional politics.
It seems more likely, then, that the Nepali Congress and the Communist UML party, with the help of other smaller groups, will form a new coalition. The Maoists may or may not choose to lead an opposition party.
Street protests of varying degrees of severity can be expected. If they reach a certain level of volatility and violence, any coalition party would find it nearly impossible to proceed with the drafting of a new constitution and the other hurdles set down as key parts to the 2006 peace deal.
Economic stability, already under fire from external conditions, will continue to fight for its life.
Fresh elections could be ordered. But what party in Nepal is currently ready to risk the outcome of free elections?
One thing is certain: Nepal now finds itself in an unprecedented political mess and the peace process has never been more unlikely. Prachanda may have exited quietly, but the rumblings can already be heard in the distance.
DIBYESH ANAND
Dibyesh Anand, a young British-Indian writer based in London, has written an impressive piece in today’s London Guardian on what the Prime Minister’s resignation may mean to Nepal’s fledging democratic process. Its thought-provoking content is worth republishing here:
Nepal is an important crucible for the idea of democracy. Can democracy as a system accommodate, moderate and discipline political forces that owe their existence to revolutionary violence and populism directed against an authoritarian establishment? Or will democracy unravel itself amid irreconcilable differences? Western democracies' stability is ascribed to a certain level of socio-economic development and broad agreement over the fundamentals of the political system. In the absence of such conditions, are postcolonial democracies like Nepal doomed to be forever fragile?
The ongoing political crisis in Nepal – the sacking of the army chief by the Maoist government, followed by the president's declaration of the act as unconstitutional, and then the resignation of the powerful prime minister Dahal (more commonly known as Prachanda) – comes as a jolt to the international community. The absence of Nepal from international news circuit in recent months provided a false sense of satisfaction that democracy and peace had won there.
The sequence of largely orderly elections, Maoists moving into the government and working along with other political parties, the abolition of the monarchy and the constituent assembly's declaration that there will be a new constitution by May 2010, had indicated that a democratic system was finding its feet in the shifting sands of Nepalese politics. But beneath the surface lay the unresolved tension over the basic principle of statehood – monopoly over legal violence. The key question was and is, who controls the armed forces?
The tricky task for the new government headed by the Maoist-led alliance was to integrate the former rebels into the army. Stable representative systems require the civilian government's control over armed forces. In Nepal, the peace process left the two fighting sides – the army as well as the Maoist rebels – fully armed and, more crucially, in distrust of each other.
The army chief in question, an establishment man to his boots, acted in defiance of the orders of the government by continuing a recruitment drive while keeping former rebels out. His behavior must be seen in the context of the old establishment's contempt for the Maoists' victory in democratic elections, divisions within the governing coalition over the pace of change and the tacit disquiet India had with the Maoists' warmer relations with China.
The crisis was in the making for weeks, but finally blew up because the Maoists in power were being made to look weak against the defiant army chief. By resigning, the prime minister has clearly decided to play the game of brinkmanship rather than compromise for he was losing credibility within the Maoist rank and file.
While the Maoists would like to project themselves as the injured party facing insurmountable obstruction from the conservative establishment, they are not blame-free. They had the option of avoiding this debacle, yet lacked caution and patience. They could have waited for three more months for the general to retire or persevered with coalition allies opposed to the immediate sacking. Democratic process is about compromises and deliberations, and the Maoists clearly haven't made a full transition from their mindset of being in revolutionary opposition where all other political parties are branded as stooges of the establishment.
The big powers in the neighborhood should resist the temptation to meddle in Nepal's internal affairs and let the various parties sort out the mess. By taking the dispute to the streets, the different sides are attempting to flex their populist political muscles, but by doing so, they are playing for very high stakes indeed – the very future of peace and stable democracy in Nepal.
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May 3, 2009
Today, Nepal has plunged into a fresh political crisis, after Prime Minister Prachanda fired Chief of Army General Katawal.
Deputy Prime Minister (and Home Minister) Bam Dev Gautam, Minister for Water Resources Bishnu Poudel, Minister for Local Development Ram Chandra Jha, Minister for Industry Asta Laxmi Shakya and Minister for Youth and Sports Gopal Shakya – all resigned from the cabinet after Prachanda’s announcement.
The CPN-UML party withdrew its support of the Maoist-led government.
Other cabinet members who boycotted the decision included the Madhesi People’s Rights’ Forum, Sadbhavana party and CPN-United. Said General Secretary of CPN-United, “Prachanda made the proposal despite opposition from other parties,” adding that the Maoist unilateral decision has thus isolated itself from the rest of the floundering government.
As for General Katawal, he has remained consistently defiant and refused to accept Prachanda’s letter that ousted him, pointing out that the only person who has the authority to fire him is the President of Nepal, Ram Baran Yadav.
Meanwhile, President Yadav rejected the ouster in a letter written to Katawal, calling the Prime Minister’s move unconstitutional. The letter was delivered to Katawal's office late Sunday night and copies were also sent to Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal's residence. Yadav was the first person elected as president in Nepal, where a centuries-old monarchy was so recently abolished. The army is officially under the president's command, not the prime minister. Yadav is a member of the Nepali Congress, the main opposition party, which has vowed to fight the decision.
Prachanda’s decision came despite domestic and international calls against such a move, including from India, which had repeatedly conveyed its concern over the planned sacking of Katawal. Indian ambassador Rakesh Sood met Prachanda on 26 April for a fourth meeting in ten days. Obviously, those meetings left Prachanda unmoved.
Some political analysts are now characterizing the teetering Maoist government as on the verge of implosion.
This, however, did not stop thousands of demonstrators filling the streets of Kathmandu. Maoist youths waved red flags and rejoiced, declaring a “victory for people’s views”. Other student unions affiliated with the main opposition Nepali Congress paralyzed traffic, (particularly around university campuses), in protest of Prachanda’s “non-constitutional ousting” of Katawal.
The plot thickens as the Maoists flourish their one-party decision-making policy in a country already peeling away from their heavy-handed agenda. Lt.Gen. Kul Bahadur Khadka, the number two in the army and -- according to the Wall Street Journal -- “a confidant of Prachanda”, was named as acting Army chief to replace General Katawal.
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May 1, 2009
During the decade-long insurgency, the fight was between the Nepal army and the Maoist combatants. And although a democratic process arose from the ashes of that conflict, three years down the line it would appear that not all that much has changed.
The foes remain the same: the Maoists vs. the Nepal Army (with a majority of the political parties currently weighing in favor of the army). The underlying issue is whether or not the Maoist rebels can be integrated into the professional army – an increasingly nebulous prospect. What’s at stake here is nothing less than the derailment of the peace process and, in the gloomiest scenario, a return to armed struggle.
For the last two months, the central players in this drama have been Prime Minister Prachanda and Chief of Army General Rookmangad Katawal. Prachanda has done everything in his power to undermine Katawal’s position and Katawal has refused to budge.
Prachanda’s sense of urgency to integrate his PLA with the state army is no doubt fueled by his fellow Maoist Central Committee leaders as well as 19,000 malcontent guerrilla combatants, who have been squirreled away and left moldering in distant cantonments for almost three years now. For the Maoist rank and file, the integration is more a matter of prestige. Grumblings abound that Prachanda is coming off as a weak leader, uncharacteristic of a leader of a revolutionary party.
Katawal’s resistance stems from what he regards as the sheer folly of a wholesale merger of irregular combatants with his highly professional, non-political military operation.
And in the meantime, the world takes notice with mounting misgiving: India, China, the US and numerous EU countries, and now the UN with a just-released report of the Secretary-General that cites the Maoist-Army standoff as a deepening rift played out in front of a Legislature-Parliament who bicker among themselves instead of tending to the far more crucial business of getting a constitution written:
“Notwithstanding the formation of coordination committees to strengthen relations and cooperation between UCPN-M and its major governing coalition partner, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (UML), and among the four political parties in the Maoist-led coalition Government, those relations remained fractious, marked by public acrimony and weak consultation over major decisions.”
MARCH-APRIL PLAYBACK
The Maoist-Army feud erupted last month when General Katawal recommended that eight brigadier-generals nearing retirement be given a three-year extension. Prachanda ignored the recommendation and, instead, attempted to force them to retire – a move that backfired when the Supreme Court failed to uphold Prachanda’s edict; that, in turn, prompted several Maoist leaders to issue diatribes against the Court’s (to put it mildly) sagacity. The outcome of that legal battle is still pending but has left many analysts wondering how sincere the Maoists really are when they claim that they seek democracy in Nepal. How does assailing the Supreme Court -- if the judges’ decisions don’t suit Maoist political priorities – jive with the democratic notion that the judicial branch must be held separate and sacrosanct?
Regardless, a bouquet of hostilities has befouled the halls of Parliament since then. Kid gloves, if there ever were any, have now been unceremoniously dropped and “to keep Katawal or to sack him” has become the central question that has eclipsed all else in the backrooms of Nepalese politics.
Katawal is a formidable opponent – both lighting rod and Achilles’ heel for Maoist resentment and self-esteem respectively. He’s either loved or despised by the general public and frequently portrayed as the villain of the 2006 19-Day Uprising. Moreover, there’s no dearth of rumors that he is capable, if not actually planning, a “soft coup” – but one wonders if there isn’t wishful thinking at play here.
Katawal is a graduate of India’s National Defense Academy, the Indian Military Academy and he trained with Special Forces in the United States. (Over the years, American taxpayers have spent a lot of money training Nepal’s military elite.) Interestingly, King Mahendra, (the father of the recently deposed King Gyanendra) adopted Katawal when he was a boy – a legacy that has dogged him with a “royalist” tag ever since.
But his monarchial upbringing hasn’t appeared to be an obstacle to his support of the democratic process as mandated by the people of Nepal. Throughout the controversy, he’s been assiduously adamant that his role is strictly non-political. [Soon after the 19-Day Uprising reached its culmination, a leading foreign diplomat at the time assured me that it was “Army top brass that told the king he must step down – that killing dozens of unarmed demonstrators was going to escalate into hundreds of killings and no one in security could stomach that eventuality.” In effect, it was Katawal who gave the king his walking papers by taking “his” army away from him.]
In any event, when it comes to defending Nepal – in spite of who runs the government -- Katawal seems to have the narrow-eyed focus of a bull terrier. Also like a bull terrier, he doesn’t back down from perceived infringement upon his appointed territory. I have never spoken to anyone who is more determined to (literally) stick to his guns. Put in another way: Katawal is a man one wants to have on one’s side.
Maoist Defense Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa does not have Katawal on his side. Katawal defied Thapa’s order to stop recruitment to NA and, during Thapa’s brief but stormy tenure, has repeatedly opposed Thapa’s plan to induct guerrillas of the PLA en masse. A fresh provocation occurred in April when the new government held the National Games after a hiatus of eight years. When Prachanda issued a last-minute order to allow a Maoist team to join in the games, the Nepal Army-affiliated team staged a boycott, leaving the event decidedly lackluster and Maoist leadership once again publicly foiled and with egg on its face.
Prachanda’s determination to remove Katawal is beginning to look like personal obsession. Katawal is due to retire in August, a mere four months away. Many onlookers are now murmuring, “Why not get back to Constituent Assembly business and let Katawal quietly exit at the end of summer?”
Regardless, Prachanda’s urgency became pronounced earlier in April when the Maoist government served Katawal with a notice that he was to submit a written explanation in 24 hours for his list of “misdeeds” – a move that made it clear that the Maoists intended to sack him forthwith. Katawal’s reply was prompt and to the point: He contended that the only man who could sack him was the president of the republic. Maoist leadership was furious. Finance Minister Dr. Bhattarai went to the media with the threat that the Maoists would quit the government if they were not allowed to fire the army chief – a renewal of an armed insurgency being the implication behind the threat.
An additional back-story, furnished by The Telegraph, says that in a meeting with Katawal, Prime Minister Prachanda assured him that, if he quietly resigned, “he could be appointed as an ambassador or appointed as a security advisor to the Prime Minister. …However, as Katawal rebuked both the lucrative propositions, PM Dahal told him that the Military Act could be amended to sack him.” [This story has not been verified by other sources.]
Whatever was or was not offered behind closed doors, in the third week of April Prachanda backed down.
According to Republica, “India and the United States…put intense pressure on the government not to sack the army chief. Indian Ambassador, Rakesh Sood, met Prime Minister Dahal for the second time in as many days and appraised [sic] him of the Indian government’s view. US Ambassador, Nancy J Powell, also called on Home Minister Bam Dev Gautam and informed her country’s reservation against the government action.”
In addition, the political parties lined up against Prachanda’s plan, both in the ruling and opposition camps. “Except the ruling Maoists, Madhesi People’s Rights Forum, Sadbhavana Party and opposition Dalit Janajati Party, Sanghiya Loktantrik Rastriya Manch and National People’s Front, all the parties have stood united against the government move. …Ruling party CPN-UML came up openly with protests against the decision in a meeting of 17 parties initiated by Nepali Congress. Party Vice-Chairperson Bidya Bhandari termed the Maoist move as “motivated by ill intention” and said her party was “against all the attempts aimed at inviting instability and imposing single party authoritarianism by demoralizing judiciary, press and national security agencies.”
WHERE IS INDIA AND CHINA IN ALL THIS?
India is obviously deeply concerned about the clash between Prachanda and Katawal. Delhi is keen to see the Constituent Assembly succeed in drafting a new constitution by next year’s deadline.
Prachanda is equally intent on not being perceived as being dependent on Indian support.
But the fact is that the Maoists have always, to some extent, been dependent on Indian protection. Prachanda himself spent eight of the ten years of insurgency in hideouts on Indian soil – mostly in the eastern states of West Bengal and Bihar. The acrimony between deposed king Gyanendra and Sonia Gandhi also helped to emasculate Nepal’s monarchy, thus playing into the hand of the Maoists. When Indian External Affairs Minster Pranab Mukherjee claimed earlier this year that the Maoists rose to power thanks to Delhi support, the Nepali Maoists were uncharacteristically mute in responding to the assertion.
Once the Maoists came into power, however, the emphasis, at least publicly, shifted from India to China. China, it will be remembered, supported the monarchy but did a flip-flop once Prachanda took the helm. China is now seen as the most significant international backer of the Prachanda’s sequestered PLA.
But the Katawal ruckus has thrown a monkey wrench into Prachanda’s Chinese agenda. Only a few days ago, the Prime Minister summoned Chinese ambassador Qui Guohang to his residence and postponed a much-anticipated trip to Beijing that was to commence on May 2. It was regarded as an important trip for the Maoists – an opportunity to dispel Beijing suspicions over the Maoists’ closeness to Delhi and, no doubt, to discuss the army integration process.
Still it would be foolish for the Maoists to ignore or downplay the extent to which Nepal is, indeed, dependent on India. If, as some surmise, the Maoists’ ultimate goal is to take over the Nepal Army, India would not look kindly on that unwanted shift in the balance of power – a northern neighbor with an army backed by China – particularly since China supports Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), India’s arch-enemy.
IS INTEGRATION REALISTIC OR EVEN WANTED BY THE EX-REBELS?
Lasting peace is impossible in a country where parallel armies exist, particularly if one or more armies have opposing political agendas.
The Nepal Army proved itself to be non-political by standing back while a centuries-old monarchy was transformed into a republic.
The Maoist rebel combatants, who did not win militarily and, as a result, have found themselves miserably sequestered in cantonments for several years, have failed to establish themselves as a non-political entity.
In other countries, it has been proven that integration cannot proceed successfully until the end of a political process has transpired. In other words, ex-rebels cannot be expected to conform to state armies unless their ideological ambitions have either been attained or dissolved. There is also the question of their emotional state: Have they adjusted psychologically to the point that they are now capable of joining hands with previous enemies? Forcing integration – on either army regulars or ex-rebels -- before psychological adjustment takes place is asking for failure.
According to the Seven-Point agreement: “The verified combatants of the Maoist Army will be offered a choice of various alternatives for rehabilitation including an economic package.” [Clause 2.2.2]
What alternatives has the Maoist leadership offered its languishing combatants? Apart from force-feeding them into the Nepal Army, what options have been offered them for reintegration into Nepali society? There are many options including financial support while pursuing further education, training in skilled occupations or placement in commercial, agricultural or foreign employment.
The entire peace process hangs in the balance because of 19,000 under-skilled, under-educated sidelined rebels.
Has anyone -- apart from Maoist leaders, who could easily employ coercion -- canvassed these poor guys to see if they actually want to join the Nepal Army? Has anyone asked if they might prefer to hang it all up, to go back to their villages, to find a wife, to secure a new trade, or get a better education?
Has anyone bothered to ascertain what these dysfunctional combatants really want – without their officers noting down what they say?
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April 23, 2009
At least on paper, the question of “the untouchables” has been eliminated from the hierarchal system of Nepalese society. “Untouchables” are now referred to as Dalit, a self-designation for a South Asian group of people traditionally regarded as “polluters of the upper classes.” While the caste system has been formally abolished under the Nepali constitution, there is still widespread discrimination and prejudice against them in the private sphere.
In the context of traditional Hindu society, Dalit status has often been historically associated with occupations regarded as ritually impure, such as any occupation involving butchering, removal of dead animals and removal of night soil (human feces). Dalits still work as manual scavengers, cleaning latrines and sewers by hand and clearing away dead animals. Engaging in these activities was (and is) considered to be polluting to the individual who performed them, and this pollution was considered to be “contagious”. But they were also consigned to certain trades: Kami (ironsmiths), Sarki (leather workers), Damai (tailors) and Badi (entertainers, musicians). Historically, Dalits were commonly banned and segregated from full participation in Hindu social life. They could not enter the premises of a temple or a school and stayed outside the village, while elaborate precautions were sometimes observed to prevent incidental contact between Dalits and other castes. Even today, many Dalits are doomed as bonded workers and many work in slave-like conditions to pay off debts that were incurred generations ago. The majority of Dalits still live in segregation and experience violence, murder, rape and other atrocities on a scale that dwarfs the victimization of other caste groups in Nepal.
As a result, inferiority, humiliation, resignation, lack of self-esteem and dependency on upper castes has developed because of geographical exclusion, social exclusion, capability deprivation and domination by external powers. All of this has contributed to underdevelopment with in the Dalit community.
In spite of the new Maoist regime, which relied heavily on Dalit participation during the decade-long “People’s War”, the Dalits’ lot in life has not improved significantly. It is perhaps pertinent to note that the Maoist leadership hails from upper caste lineage, including Prime Minister Prachanda, a Brahmin by birth.
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Last week I had the opportunity to sit down with Dinesh Kumar Pariyar, a Dalit who -- through intelligence, talent and a lot of hard work – has managed to extricate himself from the normal preordained Dalit occupations. He has gone on to make a place for himself in urban 21st century Nepal. Among other things, he has worked with the Dalit Welfare Organization, under the UK Government's Department For International Development (DFID, where he produced and directed the television program SAHAYATRA, (broadcast on Nepal Television). On KANTIPUR FM 96.1 Radio, he produced and presented “The Voice of Dignity”, an advocate program concerning Dalit rights, development, governance, human rights, poverty, gender and children. Currently, he is a producer, writer and news reporter for IMAGE CHANNEL PVT. LTD.
DUNHAM: Tell me a little about your early background.
DINESH: I was born in 1979, in a village not too far from Kathmandu called Dhaksi, in Matatirtha VDC-9. My ancestors came from Gorkha, along with King Prithivi Narayan Shah. We have been in the Kathmandu Valley for six or seven generations. I studied in a school near my home, called Nandi Ganesh, up to grade five. I took my SLC with excellent results in 1997. I’m the first Dalit in my community who passed the SLC.
DUNHAM: Did your family encourage you to get an education?
DINESH: My family came from the lower class and it was a real struggle to pay for my studies. But I received some help through scholarships -- that made it a little easier. My family was involved in traditional sewing and tailoring work – their income was not enough for food, let alone school costs. To augment our income, we also did some farm work and poultry work, and hard labor. Everyone in the family worked long hours each day.
So I went school in the morning, but in the afternoon, I joined the rest of my family, who were working somewhere.
DUNHAM: How many brothers and sister do you have?
DINESH: One sister and two brothers. All are married.
DUNHAM: When was the first time that you sensed that your caste, the Dalits, was discriminated against?
DINESH: When I was in grade five, the school organized a picnic program. All the school kids were there. There was a circular seating arrangement set up for the students. But when I arrived I realized that there was another place where three of us – all Dalits – had to sit – apart from the main group. Before that, the three of us Dalits had sensed that we were discriminated against, but at that picnic I saw very clearly, by the seating arrangement, how condemned we really were.
DUNHAM: Who were the adults who made you sit apart from the rest of your classmates? Brahmins? Chhetris?
DINESH: Well, they were definitely from castes above Dalits: Brahmins, Chhetris – yes – but it was a mixed community so there were various castes involved. Also, there were ethic groups that looked down at us.
DUNHAM: As a child, what did you want to be when you grew up? Did you have any hope that, one day, you could break away from upper caste discrimination? Or did you feel resigned to the old traditions and constraints?
DINESH: Before I answer that, I would like to tell you a story about one of my friends who was a Brahmin. The guy’s family had a store in the village; it was my friend’s chore to carry merchandise to the store. One time I helped him; we took turns carrying the packages. But as we approached the store, my friend told me to quickly give him the packages. I didn’t say anything at the time. But later, when we were alone, I asked him, “Why did you insist that I give you the packages before we got to the store?” And he said, “You are a Dalit. If someone saw you carrying the store merchandise, I would be in big trouble. Our customers wouldn’t buy our goods if they knew you had touched it.” That experience taught me a big lesson.
And there were other incidents that I saw as a child that informed me of the community’s prejudice against my low caste. My mother, for instance, was never allowed to draw water from the village well. When my father went to a teashop to buy a cup of tea, he had to wash his teacup after he was finished. None of the other castes in the village had to wash their own cups. It was everyday things like that.
These examples – and there were many – began to build upon one another and, as I grew older, I realized that I was feeling more and more rebellious. I didn’t just want to change the way my village was. I realized that the entire society of Nepal would have to change. I thought, “I have to be the change-maker of society.”
DUNHAM: Where did you go after you got your SLC? And what was the villager’s reaction, once you achieved that milestone within the Dalit community? Was there any sort of backlash, or did they accept your achievement of being the first Dalit to receive an SLC?
DINESH: Actually, the villagers accepted it. Even the upper caste students – who didn’t get first division marks – they didn’t have a problem with my success. They were just happy that someone in our region of Nepal had proven to be capable of achieving scholastic superiority. They also appreciated that I got these good marks even though I also has to work as a laborer when I wasn’t in school. No, the whole community was happy for me.
DUNHAM: What did you do after you got your SLC?
DINESH: Well, I wanted to continue my studies and become and a civil engineer. I applied to Pulchok College [in Patan]. As it turned out, I wasn’t selected for civil engineering but I got into auto-mechanical engineering, which had been my second choice. I studied auto-mechanical engineering for six months, but I didn’t have enough money to continue, so I dropped out.
Instead, I enrolled in RR [Ratna Rajya Laxmi] College in Kathmandu. I took a bus from home and commuted to college each day. But also each day, I spent some hours teaching in my home village. The income from teaching school provided me with enough money to pay for my daily expenses. RR College is a government college, so the fee is minimal. So at RR, I took a career turn and enrolled in journalism and mass communication, along with English and political science. I was very interested in the political situation and also the country was, at that time, in political upheaval. I graduated from RR and then enrolled in another college to get a Masters Degree in sociology. I still haven’t finished my Masters.
DUNHAM: You went from a quiet village to the urban environment of Kathmandu Valley. In terms of discrimination, was there a perceptible change from village to city?
Was one more biased than the other?
DINESH: In my village, there was always biasness, in one form or another. There still is. But the degree of rudeness has definitely been reduced. But during my college years, I really didn’t and haven’t felt discriminated against.
The village attitude towards me has changed because of my higher education. Now, I am welcomed into the villagers’ houses more often. There is another factor: I was the village schoolteacher; the children were learning and the parents were very happy that their kids were advancing in knowledge. On one level, you could even say that my status in the village is higher than members of the community who come from higher castes. But I’m something of an exception. I got this recognition because of what I had achieved through my studies. Even my immediate family members’ status has risen because of me. However, I’m rather unique. Other members of the Dalit community in my village are still rejected as social inferiors.
DUNHAM: OK, earlier you mentioned that there was political upheaval while you were in school. There was ten years of insurgency swirling all around you. In general, did the rising popularity of the Maoists have any impact on changing the attitude of the upper castes toward Dalits?
DINESH: Change is achieved through two means: one is through self-awareness and the other is through some sort of external pressure. To answer your question, though, the political movement had very little impact on the Dalit community in the Kathmandu Valley. Bias against Dalits might have been reduced a bit, but there has really been no significant change.
In other areas of Nepal, however, the change has been far more significant. In the far west, for example, there are areas in which discrimination against Dalits has been substantially reduced. In some cases, equality has been truly established. The way people look at Dalits has totally changed. In the far west, the picture is quite positive. And the Maoists can take credit for forcing the change in attitude.
But as I said, that change is not universal – certainly not in the Kathmandu Valley.
DUNHAM: Why?
DINESH: So many things have improved in Kathmandu: more people are educated, more people have more resource; but the humanistic attitude and conscience of Kathmandu’s citizens has not developed along with the other things. The fact is that the Dalits in Kathmandu have not experienced improvement – not in lifestyle and not in attitude from higher castes. DUNHAM: So how do the Dalits feel about this? And by the way, how many Dalits are there in Nepal?
DINESH: According to the government census, 13% of Nepal’s population is of the Dalit caste, but the Dalits themselves refuse to accept that number.
DUNHAM: Why?
DINESH: Because the surveyors didn’t bother to go to areas where high concentrations of Dalits lived. Dalits are not just one caste. Dalits are many castes, all of which are or were considered “untouchable”. But the government has overlooked many of the castes that fit into the “Dalit” category. And so many people have not been properly counted in the census.
Let me give you an example. There are many Newari castes, six of which are Dalit. But the government categorizes them as Newari, not Dalit.
What the Dalits are claiming is that 20% of Nepal’s population is Dalit.
DUNHAM: And do you thing that the 20% is more accurate?
DINESH: Yes.
DUNHAM: But isn’t it also true that a substantial number of Dalits have changed their surname to disguise the fact that they are Dalit?
DINESH: Yes, yes, yes. They have to survive in Kathmandu and other urban areas, so it’s easier on Dalits to simply disguise the fact that they are Dalit. They take the surnames of higher castes to avoid discrimination.
DUNHAM: Has the Dalit community become unified and politically organized? Is there any kind of Dalit movement?
DINESH: There is definitely some shift in that direction. But Dalit political movement is based on ad hoc incidents.
You can divide Dalit movement into two aspects: political and social. The political movement is not as effective as it could be. Every major political party has a Dalit sister organization. For example: the Maoists have the Nepal Dalit Mukti Morcha wing; the president of that wing is Tilak Pariyar. Nepali Congress has Nepal Dalit Sangh; the president of that wing is Man Bahadur Biswakarma. UML has Utpidit Jatiya Mukti Samaj; Lal Bahadur Biswakarma is the president of that party wing. The list goes on.
But these parties are simply using the Dalit wings as an easy voters’ bank. The Dalit political movement doesn’t have a voice of its own; it’s dependent on larger political parties for its voice.
Looking back at the brief history of the Nepal democratic movement, the Dalits have participated in and contributed to every step forward in that development. But instead of organizing themselves, they have always been organized by political parties. So what happens is that their agenda gets lost in the larger agenda of the powerful political parties.
The political party leaders have never prioritized the Dalit issue because the parties have always been lead by non-Dalits. Thus, we have a vacuum of Dalit leadership, which has prevented the movement from going forward.
The constitution of 1990 was a very good constitution, but it was biased against Dalits – biased because the Dalits were never mentioned in the constitution, completely overlooked. And the Dalits failed to rise up in meaningful protest against the oversight. As a result, this has contributed to the fact that we continue to be marginalized by the government and discriminated against by the general population.
It also led Dalits to be sympathetic to the Maoists during the “People’s War”. The Maoists roused them with their slogans of equality and brought them into their fold in the mid-1990s onward. A lot of Dalits joined the Maoist People’s Revolution. The percentage of Dalits in the People’s Revolution was very high. The Maoists gave the Dalits hope for a better life.
Another reason the Dalits joined the Maoists was that the Maoists promised them a better constitution – one in which Dalits would be guaranteed equality. So they fought for the Maoists and died for the Maoists. A lot of Dalits became martyrs during the ten-year insurgency.
DUNHAM: Now the Maoists are in power. They have transformed themselves from rebels to the central administration. The government is supposed to finish writing a new constitution by May 2010. At the present time, do you believe that the Dalits are a priority for the Maoist leaders?
DINESH: No. Not really. Understand that the Dalits fought in the insurgency, not only for themselves but for the general public as well. They believed that if the general condition of people in Nepal improved, their group would benefit as well. So they fought. Over 1500 Dalits died during the insurgency. In the April 2006 rebellion, 3 of the 25 people killed were Dalits. The Dalits have fought for freedom and more than paid the price in blood. Still, time after time, the system has failed the needs of the Dalits.
According to the current interim constitution, Dalits are no longer “untouchables” and they must be treated as equals to the rest of the population. But the reality is quite different. Dalits women are still being barred from drawing water from the wells. Very recently, a Dalit woman was treated atrociously because the village claimed she was a witch; she was brutally beaten and then forced to eat human excrement. But the government failed to take any action against her torturer, who happened to be a woman and the principle of the local school.
Have the Maoists come to the rescue for the Dalits? No. The Dalits are still knocking on the door of justice, now controlled by the Maoists, hoping to achieve equality. The new Maoist government shouts its new slogans but its attitude is in no way different from previous administrations when it comes to helping the Dalit community.
The irony is that, in the past, if we used some kind of force and raised our voices, some kind of justice could be achieved. But now, with the Maoists in power, even that has been taken away from us. Why? Because other castes now appose our demands. For example, when the cabinet was created under the Maoist leadership, for four or five months, not one Dalit was represented in the cabinet. Even during the king’s regime, there were two or three Dalit cabinet leaders. But the party that shouted the slogan of “proportional representation” -- the Maoists -- has failed to apply the slogan to their own cabinet. There was not 20% representation of Dalits in the Maoist cabinet. That has changed recently, but the Dalits who have been given posts are more aligned with the Madeshi issue than their own Dalit caste. So even now, Dalits don’t feel like they are being properly represented. The party that touted social inclusive and equal rights has now shown its true face. And the Dalit community is completely unsatisfied by what they see.
DUNHAM: Because people know that they can still mistreat Dalits with impunity? If someone wants to abuse a Dalit because they think that person is a witch, or if someone wants to single out a Dalit in the community because they don’t like them for some reason – is it fair to say that those people can proceed without fear of being brought to justice?
DINESH: Yes, and the reason is that higher caste people run the judicial system in Nepal. They are members of the very castes who chronically discriminate against Dalits. They even feel proud to be asserting their old caste privileges when dealing with us. Justice is achieved through an administrative process. Even if the judiciary would like to rule in favor of Dalits, the administrative process – the police, the government attorneys, etc. – all from higher castes, mind you – the administrative process works against the Dalits ever having their day in court.
For example, torturing someone in the name of “witch” is banned according to law. If the case goes to court, the victim will get justice, but the police won’t even accept the complaint against the torturers. So how can the victim get justice if they can’t jump the hurdle of police discrimination?
If an upper caste woman is tortured for being a witch, there are many cases in which the torturer has been brought to justice and punished. But if the victim is Dalit, the torturer escapes justice.
DUNHAM: Dalits are easy victims – sitting ducks.
DINESH: Yes, yes. For example, at the beginning of my career in journalism, I used to produce short documentaries, funded by DFID (Dept. for Foreign and International Development – a UK government organization); the documentaries were broadcast on Nepalese TV with the help of a local NGO. I was producer, director and resource director. I still remember an incident in Bungmati [in Lalitpur] where one Dalit woman was severely beaten by the local people for drawing water from the community well. She hadn’t had water in her house for three or four days. She was dying. She knew that she would be tortured if she went to the well but she went to the well anyway, so dire was her condition.
We heard about the incident and went there to film and interview her. She was bed-ridden. While we were filming location shots around the well, 1500 – 2000 locals surrounded us. They seized and smashed our camera. They accused us of being there just to defame their community. I was abused and beaten badly – and not only that—the Dalit woman was again beaten, accused of having inviting us, even though she had not invited us.
DUNHAM: When did this happen?
DINESH: In 2004, while the Maoist insurgency was at its height. The police had no intention of arresting the culprits. If we had run a story that accused the police, we, in turn, would have been accused of being Maoists. We were threatened that that would be what would happen. It’s not just my theory. So, in the end, we ended up dropping the story.
It was one of the saddest moments of my life. I was born in the Kathmandu Valley, I was raised here and I was discriminated against all my life, but I never realized the depth with which the people of Kathmandu despised us and the extent to which they could be so cruel.
That was the moment when I realized that little protests, here and there, are not going to have any impact on improving the status of the Dalit community. It’s going to require a huge, broad revolution.
And I promised myself that, from that time on, I would not compromise; I would devote my life to furthering the cause of Dalit equality. That incident is the overriding experience that continues to motivate me to fight Dalit discrimination.
DUNHAM: Are you personally politically involved in organizing the Dalit community?
DINESH: For a long time, I believed that society could be improved through political action. As a student I became alternative Central Committee member of ANNFSU – the student wing of UML. Our group led a lot of protests in Kathmandu. I led the movement to grant a 33% discount for student transportation and we prevailed. It was one of the most successful student protests to date. After that, some of the leaders of the protest, joined the Maoists, some drifted off into the private sector, and some of us, like me, shifted from political activism to social activism.
Being part of the media is one part of my social activism. My journalism is all about social justice and activism. Raising awareness through the media has proven to have more impact than if I had remained just a wingman for a political party.
I’ll give you an example: I produced a documentary about a group of upper castes that refused to buy milk from the local Dalits. There is an old tradition saying in Nepal: “If the Dalit touches the milk, the cow will climb the tree”. In other words, even the cows are afraid of Dalits touching them. They would rather fall out of tree than being contaminated by Dalits. Such a ridiculous belief.
But through my documentary -- when we showed the reality of how Dalit dairy farmers conducted their daily operations, things changed significantly in that community. The attitude of the upper castes changed. Today, they have no problem purchasing milk from the Dalit dairy farmers.
In another documentary, I covered the story of an oppressed Dalit woman from Kapilvastu [Terai town along the Indian border]. Even though she was educated, extremely intelligent, she was repressed by the local community. After my televised profile on her, however – and it was aired several times here in Nepal – she was allowed to participate in local politics. And she proved to be so active, so effective that the UML used her in several rallies. Her success continued and finally she was selected to be a UML sponsored member of the current Constitutional Assembly.
These are examples of what my efforts, through the media, have brought in terms of concrete change. Imagine what could be done if more Dalits had significant jobs in the media and were allowed to cover the subjects with which they have intimate knowledge.
DUNHAM: How will the proposed federal system affect the Dalit community?
DINESH: If it happens, if will be very bad for the Dalit community. We have accepted it because the government has really committed itself to Federalism. But we want a special clause included in the new constitution that guarantees equal opportunity for Dalits. Why? Under federalism, the Dalit community will be scattered among several states and the focus on them will be diluted.
Dalits don’t lack skill—they have already acquired these skills through the work-based caste system that has been forced on them for centuries. No, the main problem for Dalits is social discrimination. If discrimination were eliminated, the Dalits could profit from their skills -- go ahead and thrive on their own abilities.
But here’s the problem – the uneven percentage of Dalits who have odds stacked against them. 47% of all Nepalis are under the poverty line, out of which 90% are Dalit. In terms of education, 33% of all Nepalis continue past the SLC level but only .04% of Dalits continue past the SLC level. Every political party can boast of Dalit representation, but none of the Dalits in those parties have a powerful enough position to have an impact on party decision. Out of 601 members in the CA, only 51 are Dalit. And within the assembly itself, the Dalit members have not been given any important roles. There is no meaningful representation of Dalits in the judicial system.
My position is that, since the State has been responsible for keeping Dalits downtrodden in the past, it is now the responsibility of the State to rectify that system by including special clauses in the new constitution that will assure Dalits of special rights—not only based on proportional representation.
But it’s not just external powers that are keeping the Dalits down. The Dalit community itself needs to find a unified voice and rise up to insure that the State includes new provisions in the constitution.
In the last several years, many of the cultural and ethnic groups have unified and focused on insuring that their voices are heard. The Dalits need to follow suit.
The Nepali government owes us for past grievances. The Nepali rulers followed the Indian custom of using the caste system. Jayasthiti Malla divided Nepal into four groups and many sub-castes. The religious law he wrote presented prevented the Sudra group [the untouchables] from touching water used by upper castes. Different occupations were forced on the Dalits, which remains in place today. Then, when civil codes were introduced, the same religious laws were applied to the codes – thus extending Dalit servitude. So it’s the State who must rectify the injustice they put into law many years ago. The time has come for the Nepali government to make things right.
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