January 28, 2010
It’s not a question of whether or not India has treated Nepal unfairly. Historically, India has regarded Nepal as its poor relation to the north. Lopsided treaties between the two countries reflect that condescension. Illegal land encroachment continues to be a hotly debated issue. There are ample examples that can be cited in which India’s treatment of Nepal could and should be rectified.
However, when Nepali politicos exploit the long-standing resentments of their people, when they use India as their scapegoat for everything that needs fixing in Nepal, when anti-Indian rhetoric becomes the cynical tool for rallying blind nationalism (and easy votes), when they use India-bashing as a means for advancing their own political agendas -- then the people of Nepal should take a hard look at where that hate-mongering will inevitably lead.
Prachanda is a case in point. Nepal’s Maoist leader and
erstwhile Prime Minister, has been capturing the headlines recently by making
accusations against India that he cannot possibly prove. In a speech given on
Jan 9, he made the startling accusation that the Indian Government was behind
the tragic Palace Massacre of June 1, 2001 – the fateful event in which King
Birendra and his entire immediate royal family were wiped out. In the same
speech, Prachanda also asserted that the Indian government was behind the 1993
death of popular communist leader Madan Bhandari. Bhandari died in a road accident. Prachanda provided no evidence to substantiate his allegation that the
Indian government orchestrated the event.
As reported in Janadisha, (the daily Maoist newspaper), Prachanda claims that, “Madan Bhandari and King Birendra were killed because they did not surrender to India.” Why, specifically, did New Delhi have the royal family slaughtered? Prachanda provides us with two unverifiable reasons: King Birendra favored buying weapons for the Royal Army from China instead of India and 2) the Indians discovered that he, Prachanda, was planning to secretly meet the king within the month, presumably with negotiations in mind.
One would like to ask Prachanda what happened to his previous theory that it was King Gyanendra who had his own brother and family assassinated – also unsubstantiated but very popular among the people in 2001.
In 2010, neither credibility nor consistency seem to be high priorities for Prachanda. Depending on the group he is speaking to, he demonizes India or insists that he wants to have calm discussions with India. He contradicts himself so frequently that even his fellow Maoist leaders seemed to be at a loss as to where he is going.
In the second week of January, Prachanda turned on Maoist Second-in-Command Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. Prachanda complained that he was being slighted by New Delhi and that the GOI preferred to deal with Bhattarai instead – the implication being that Bhattarai was too pro-India.
Dr. Bhattarai fired back the next day in an interview with Outlook Magazine by characterizing Prachanda’s remark as “an attempt to assassinate my character.” Bhattarai also cautioned that, “Anti-Indian nationalism has always prevailed in Nepal. But blind nationalism does not work. I have always been in favor of a rational debate and consensus, but there are people in my party, as well as other parties, who are followers of blind nationalism. A leader should be diplomatic and political when he speaks. We shouldn’t be blaming India in a loose manner. We should be able to put across our differences in a polite but clear manner and seek its resolution to the best of our national interest.”
This is not the first time Prachanda and Bhattarai have crossed swords. It will be remembered that during the 10-year insurgency Bhattarai fell from grace, reportedly because Prachanda (and other central committee members) felt that Bhattarai was too cozy with Indian power brokers.
In any event, on January 16, India’s Foreign Minister S M
Krishna met with Prachanda. Krishna had come to Nepal to emphasize the
importance of rebuilding consensus among political parties to conclude the
peace process and to draft Nepal’s new constitution within the stipulated
timeframe. But Krishna used his meeting with Prachanda as an opportunity to let
him know that his ramped up India-bashing had crossed the diplomatic line.
According to an Indian spokesperson, Krishna conveyed “his deep disappointment
at the baseless attacks on India by the Maoist leadership, which vitiate the
age-old and time-tested friendly relations between India and Nepal and people
of the two countries. He emphasized that such baseless propaganda has negative
impact on Indian public opinion.”
The latter point may be the salient one: Prachanda behaves as if his remarks are spoken in a vacuum and that no repercussions need be feared. But the truth is that Nepal cannot behave as if it needn’t fuss with Indian opinion. There is practically no level on which Nepal, to some extent, is not reliant on its far more powerful neighbor to the south. Warmer relations with China may somewhat mitigate Nepal’s dependence on India, but it will never erase the fact that Nepal is geographically surrounded by India to the east, south and west. Nepal is landlocked. All the bravado in the world is not going to make that hard fact go away.
After his meeting with Krishna, Prachanda glossed things over by assuring reporters that his discussion with Krishna had been a positive one.
PRACHANDA AND THE INDIAN ARMY
In the meantime, on January 19, India’s Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor flew into Kathmandu on a four-day goodwill visit to Nepal. Historically, the bilateral relationship of the Indian and Nepali armies has provided a significant means of sustaining trust and mutual confidence between the neighboring nations. The traditional linkage of the two armies underlines Nepal and India’s social and cultural commonality. Beyond that, there is a unique military relationship between the two armies: Large numbers of Nepali Gorkha soldiers and officers have served in the Indian army. General Kapoor met with Nepal’s prime minister, defense minister and COAS. The visit culminated on January 21, when President Yadav conferred on General Kapoor the title of Honorary General of Nepal Army.
As if to sabotage the general’s visit, Prachanda gave a speech on January 20 in which he not only dismissed the longstanding relationship between the two armies, but strongly supported the unrealistic (if not bizarre) “Demand for Greater Nepal”, an ultra-nationalist movement to retrieve territories that were lost to India in 1816: The Sugauli Treaty.
Prachanda’s logic for demanding the return of land lost two centuries ago goes like this: “The Sugauli Treaty was signed with the British India Company, not with the rulers of present day India. …We have the right to reject the treaty that was signed with the now non-existent East-India Company that ruled India for centuries. The Treaty of 1950 made with India after liberation clearly annuls all those treaties signed with the British India Company. …It is our right to discuss that our territories that extended up to Tista in the east and Sutlej in the west, prior to the signing of the Sugauli Treaty.”
It may be Prachanda’s right to discuss such matters, but short of Nepal declaring war on India – a move that would be suicidal and patently absurd – who in Delhi is going to listen to Prachanda with a straight face?
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS THAT DEMAND INDO-NEPALI COOPERATION
One of the overriding concerns behind India’s desire to have a good working relationship with Nepal is an international security issue: The use of Nepali soil by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and international terrorist elements – particularly anti-Indian terrorist cells. New Delhi would very much like to see an extradition treaty in place with Nepal.
On January 12, for instance, Mizra Ali aka “Rasool”, a murder convict with links to the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, was arrested by India’s Special Task Force on a train headed for Bangladesh, where he had intended to fly on to Afghanistan. Rasool admitted that he worked as an operative of the Taliban and LeT between 2004 and 2008. He also confessed to his involvement in several terror strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan, after which he escaped to Nepal. Rasool explained to the Bihar police that he had selected the Katihar-Jogbani train because it “took advantage of the long and porous Bihar-Nepali border.”
In fact, since the beginning of the 2010, Indian intelligence wings and anti-terror squads have received numerous tips of increasing activity to and from Nepal. They have responded by stepping up security along the Nepali border, in concert with Nepali police.
On January 22, the Indian government issued a terror alert in its airports after gathering intel of a possible hijack attempt by al-Quada, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamat-ul-Dawa linked terrorists. Specifically, the groups planned to hijack an Air India plane operating in or from Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, in an effort to destabilize the region.
It will be remembered that, on Christmas Eve 1999, Islamic militants took over an Air India jet flying out of Kathmandu, bound for New Delhi but rerouted to Kandahar, Afghanistan. One passenger was stabbed to death during the hijack. 167 passengers and crewmembers were later released in exchange for New Delhi turning over four Islamic militants.
Following Delhi’s January 22 terror alert, Nepal put security at its international airport on high alert. According to Keshav Raj Khanal, Director General of the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal, “We will deploy more security forces and beef up our vigilance at the Tribhuvan Airport.”
On January 23, India revised its report on Indo-Nepali terrorist activity, stating that recently “not three but over 24 terrorists have intruded the territories of Bihar and UP through the Nepal border.” Director-General of Police of Uttar Pradesh Karmveer Singh suggested that increased activity might be concentrated on January 26, India’s upcoming Republic Day celebration.
India’s intensified focus on security
issues with Nepal (and other neighbors) can be seen – according to many analysts –
by the recent shift of former Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon to the
position of National Security Advisor.
According to the Times of India: “Given Menon’s facility with neighboring nations, his appointment as NSA is seen to indicate that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is keen on tacking some long-running sores. Stability in India’s ties with countries vital to its geo-political interest may well be top priority for the PM in his second term.”
This shift may also be reflected in the Indian Prime Minister's impending visit to Nepal. The last time an Indian PM visited Kathmandu was in 2002.
Nevertheless, Prachanda’s diatribe against India continues unabated.
January 23-24. Prachanda continued to try to have it both ways – practicing diplomacy when in front of Indians and blasting them when he thought they couldn’t hear.
Last Saturday, while speaking at the Indian border town of Rajbiraj, he avoided the topic of India's many wrong-doings.
The following day, however, 100 kilometers northwest of Rajbiraj in a provincial outpost, Prachanda gave yet another blistering speech damning India. He reiterated his earlier claim that “both King Birendra and communist leader Madan Bhandari were murdered as per India’s wish.” He went on to claim that “no force on earth” could stop the Maoists from waging another revolt if the peace process was derailed or the constitution drafting was disrupted – an odd thing to say since the Maoists have played the major role in disrupting the process for nearly a year.
But really, Prachanda: No power on earth can stop the Maoists?
Forget for the moment that India has the bomb. India has many ways of exerting pressure on the Nepali government. Take electricity, for instance.
On January 21, Nepal Electricity Authority and the Power Trading Corporation of India reached an agreement to import an additional 30 MW of electricity in Nepal. Nepal asked for 60MW in an effort to reduce Nepal’s chronic load-shedding to twelve hours daily. But after two months of pleading, they settled for half that amount for the simple reason that Nepal had nothing in its pocket to leverage a better deal.
If India can turn on Nepal’s light switch—and they do so
because they want to work with Nepal – they can just as easily turn it off. And
no amount of Maoist chest-thumping can change that unfortunate, but working
reality. To deny that reality is not only to be mindlessly provincial, but heedless of what is in the best interest for the people of Nepal. Nepal really has no choice but to keep an open dialogue with India and -- as Dr. Bhattarai suggested -- within civil perimeters. The alternative is dangerous and counterproductive.
